World War Two
Published 16 Jul 2022The Allies have begun their fight to take back Western Europe with Operation Husky. That’s not the only news though. They are also trying to extend their foothold in the Solomons, and Germany and the USSR continue smashing into one another at Kursk.
(more…)
July 17, 2022
Who Let the Dogs Out?! – The Invasion of Sicily – WW2 – 203 – July 16, 1943
Comments Off on Who Let the Dogs Out?! – The Invasion of Sicily – WW2 – 203 – July 16, 1943
July 12, 2022
Kursk, When Titans Clash – 202 – July 9, 1943
World War Two
Published 10 Jul 2022Adolf Hitler launches his huge summer offensive in the USSR, Operation Citadel, known as the Battle of Kursk. Men in the millions clash. The Allies’ New Georgia campaign continues in the Solomons, both on land and with fighting at sea this week, and the preliminary actions begin for the Allied invasion of Sicily, scheduled to go off tomorrow.
(more…)
Comments Off on Kursk, When Titans Clash – 202 – July 9, 1943
July 5, 2022
The Republic of China’s “Porcupine strategy”
Originally published in the New York Sun and reposted by the New English Review, Conrad Black believes any attempted amphibious invasion of Taiwan will become the worst invasion outcome since the Athenians assaulted Syracuse in 414-413 BC:
Taiwan relief map.
Library of Congress Geography & Map Division via Wikimedia Commons.
There has for some time been a good deal of flippant talk about a Communist Chinese invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan, as if that would be a simple military undertaking. It seems to be inadequately appreciated that Taiwan has thought of little else for many years, and is, unlike Ukraine, a very prosperous and technologically sophisticated country that is armed to the teeth with the most advanced American weaponry, and has plotted out a defense in depth that is called its “porcupine strategy”.
Though it is probably accidental, “porcupine” is the word applied to Switzerland by Adolf Hitler in 1941, when, after careful analysis by the German General Staff, he concluded Swiss defenders would inflict a much larger number of casualties on a German invasion force than could possibly be justified by the occupation of the country. (It can be lamented that more recent Western strategists did not apply the same test to Afghanistan.)
Comparisons with Ukraine are inapplicable, other than the fanatical determination of the defenders. Most obviously, Taiwan is not only an island but the Formosa Straits are three to four times as wide as the English Channel from the southern British ports to the beaches of Normandy. The People’s Republic of China would have no choice but to attack amphibiously as they could not possibly imagine success with fewer than 500,000 combat soldiers and no force remotely as large could be parachuted onto Taiwan.
A strike force of 500,000 would probably have to be supplemented by a follow-up force at least as large, all conveyed in a huge armada of slow and vulnerable craft. Taiwan has been supplied with the precise ground and air-launched missiles that the Ukrainians have used to such deadly effect in the Black Sea, including the sinking of the Russian flagship, the heavy missile cruiser Moskva.
Taiwan has a front-line Air Force of about 300 of the latest fully equipped fighter and interceptor aircraft that along with shore batteries could rain a dense and prolonged fire of missiles upon any invasion fleet. Such a fleet, even in the best of weather, would plod through open water for at least ten hours. They would be sitting, or at least slowly moving, ducks throughout that journey. It brings to mind the conclusion of one of Churchill’s Demosthenean addresses in the autumn of 1940: “We are still awaiting the long-promised invasion; so are the fishes.”
Comments Off on The Republic of China’s “Porcupine strategy”
June 29, 2022
A very charitable view of Canada’s Indo-Pacific naval involvement
In a post on the IISS Military Balance Blog, James Hackett extends far more charity toward the Canadian government’s “incremental growth” of naval activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans than it may deserve. Given the already stretched nature of the Royal Canadian Navy under ordinary conditions, a cynic might be tempted to speculate what other activities and training will have to be foregone to allow the noted two-ship deployment for several months overseas:
A Chilean navy boarding team fast-ropes onto the flight deck of RCN Halifax-class frigate HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) during multinational training exercise Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2009.
US Navy photo via Wikimedia.
On 14 June, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) frigates HMCS Winnipeg and HMCS Vancouver left their berths at Esquimalt naval base in British Columbia, bound for the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022 exercise, due to take place from 29 June to 4 August. The ships will then set a westerly course for a five-month deployment in the Indo-Pacific, principally to support Canada’s Operation Projection. This is the first twin deployment of its kind since 2017 and heralds a bolstering of Canada’s defence contribution in the region, with new naval investments on the way to help sustain it, but will they be enough?
[…]
However, a number of the building blocks to help sustain Canada’s regional defence ambitions are still being put in place. In 2016 the RCN retired the last of its Protecteur-class oiler and replenishment vessels and, for a time, resorted to hiring Chilean and Spanish ships to maintain replenishment capability amid delays in the project to replace the class. In 2018, as an interim measure it introduced the converted German container vessel MV Asterix into the role of an at-sea replenishment vessel and oiler.
The first of two new Joint Support Ships (JSSs) will be delivered in 2023. Also called the Protecteur-class, these ships are being built in Vancouver. They form a key part of Canada’s ambitious National Shipbuilding Strategy, alongside new class of surface combatants and Arctic patrol vessels. Based on the German Brandenburg-class design, the JSSs are intended to be compatible with Canada’s afloat combat platforms, boasting combat systems, tactical data links and defensive weapons systems. What role Canada’s submarine flotilla might play in an enhanced Indo-Pacific posture is uncertain, although one submarine, HMCS Chicoutimi, undertook an unusual deployment into the region in 2017/18.
Whether two JSSs will be enough in terms of naval logistic support at sea also remains an open question and there has even been talk of extending the lease on MV Asterix. The RCN will, nonetheless, have regenerated its sovereign at-sea replenishment capability once the new ships are in service. Alongside the other planned capability enhancements, the future RCN should be a more capable force than it is today. With the two new Protecteur-class vessels in service, the RCN should be more operationally sustainable and also better able to offer some of the broader non-combat defence assistance that may be required on the engagement and training tasks seen in missions like Operation Projection.
It’s always a foolish bet that any major equipment for the Canadian military will be delivered on time or under budget, and the Joint Support Ship project is unlikely to change that. The ships were originally announced in 2004, but between changes of government and re-imagining the entire RCN shipbuilding program, the contracts were not signed until 2020. Initially, $2.6 billion was allocated to purchase two vessels with an option for a third. It didn’t take long for budget realities to cancel the optional ship, and by 2020, it was reported that the anticipated final cost will be $4.1 billion. Unlike pretty much every other shipbuilding project, the Project Resolve ship MV Asterix was accepted into service in 2018, both on time and within budget … perhaps because this was a conversion of an existing hull rather than an all-new build.
The next major step after the JSS project is completed is to roll out the replacements for the Halifax-class frigates and the already-retired Iroquois-class destroyers. It will theoretically consist of 15 hulls, but as we usually see in naval expenditure, if the RCN ends up getting a dozen they may consider themselves lucky. The ships will be based on the British Type 26 frigate design.
An artist’s rendition of BAE’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship, which was selected as the Canadian Surface Combatant design in 2019, the most recent “largest single expenditure in Canadian government history” (as all major weapon systems purchases tend to be).
(BAE Systems, via Flickr)
Construction of the Canadian Type 26 ships is “expected” to begin in 2024. Gamblers may want to place their bets on how close to that date actual fabrication begins and by just how much the budget will be overshot by the time a few of the ships enter service in the “early 2030s”.
June 26, 2022
HMCS Ontario – Guide 148
Drachinifel
Published 12 Oct 2019HMCS Ontario, last of Canada’s cruisers and a Minotaur class vessel, is the second subject of the day.
Want to support the channel? – https://www.patreon.com/Drachinifel
Want a shirt/mug/hoodie – https://shop.spreadshirt.com/drachini…
Want a medal? – https://www.etsy.com/uk/shop/Drachinifel
Want to talk about ships? https://discord.gg/TYu88mt
Want to get some books? www.amazon.co.uk/shop/drachinifel
Drydock Episodes in podcast format – https://soundcloud.com/user-21912004
Comments Off on HMCS Ontario – Guide 148
June 4, 2022
Falklands Conflict Aftermath | The global impact of a 74-day conflict
Imperial War Museums
Published 1 Jun 2022The Falklands Conflict of 1982 only lasted for 74 days, but it had lasting consequences which continue to be felt today. Prior to 1982, Margaret Thatcher’s government was planning major defence cuts including withdrawing the military from the South Atlantic. Instead, they spent nearly £3 billion defending British sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, and to this day maintain a garrison there. What was the effect of this short conflict for Argentina, Britain and the Falkland Islands, and what impact did it have around the world?
Correction: The video states that Port Stanley was granted city status in 2002, this should be 2022.
Thanks for watching IWM’s 5 part series on the Falklands Conflict. Please like and subscribe for more, and let us know in the comments below what you’d like to see next.
Explore and licence the archive films in this video: https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/c/…
CREDITS
Mount Pleasant images, Crown copyright, April 2022
Margaret Thatcher images © University of Salford Press Office
Landmine clearance photos via Safe Lane Global
Sound effects via ZapSplat
June 1, 2022
How To Kill A U-Boat – WW2 Special
World War Two
Published 31 May 2022How to kill a U-Boat? The threat of the illusive and nearly undetectable submarines had been on the mind of every Allied naval planner since the Great War. As the Kriegsmarine once more unleashed its wolfpacks to the high seas, it became a race against time to find a way to stop the deadly stalkers from beneath the surface.
(more…)
Comments Off on How To Kill A U-Boat – WW2 Special
The Battle of The Glorious First of June 1794
MaritimeGB
Published 17 Feb 20131794 — After the failed harvest, France organises for a desperately needed grain convoy to cross the Atlantic. British Admiral Lord Howe is sent to intercept the French and although the British win the fight, the tactical victory goes to France.
Comments Off on The Battle of The Glorious First of June 1794
May 14, 2022
Operation Chariot, the “Greatest Raid of All”
The raid on the French port of St. Nazaire in March 1942, codenamed “Operation Chariot” by the British, was one of the most daring and successful special forces operation of the Second World War. In The Critic, Richard Hopton reviews a new history of this operation by Giles Whittell:
Operation Chariot, the Raid on St Nazaire, has long been known as “The Greatest Raid of All”. The audacity of the plan, the lethal danger of the operation, the inadequacy of the equipment provided, the astonishing courage of the participants and the spectacular success of its primary object have ensured its place in the annals of British martial heroism.
In the early hours of 28 March 1942, a force of 623 commandos and naval personnel stole up the Loire estuary to attack the port of St Nazaire. Leading the force was HMS Campbeltown, a superannuated destroyer acquired from the Americans, which had been converted into a floating bomb by the addition of four tons of high explosive secreted in her bows.
The plan was that she would ram the steel gate of the port’s immense dry dock where the charge would explode, demolishing the dock gate. The commandos would then swarm ashore to attack the dockyard installations, particularly the pumps and winding mechanisms which operated the dry dock. With the dock out of action, Hitler would not risk his battleship Tirpitz in the Atlantic where she could wreak havoc among the convoys supporting the war effort in Britain. This was the immediate, supposed object of the raid.
Giles Whittell’s new book is not the first full-length history of the event. C.E. Lucas-Phillips’s account, The Greatest Raid of All, was published in 1958 followed 40 years later by James Dorrian’s Storming St Nazaire, which remains the most detailed, authoritative account of the operation. In 2013 Robert Lyman published Into The Jaws of Death which told the story of the raid anew, with a greater concentration on the genesis and planning of the operation.
In 2007 Jeremy Clarkson took time away from messing around with cars to make a documentary for the BBC about the raid. The result was an “affectionate and enthralling” piece of television which brought the exploits of the Charioteers — as the men who took part in the raid have always been known — to a wider audience.
Although the ostensible object of the raid was to discourage the Germans from risking the Tirpitz in the Atlantic, it is now known that, by the spring of 1942, the German high command had already decided to keep the battleship moored safely in a distant Norwegian fjord. Accordingly, destroying the dry dock at St Nazaire was, strategically, a futile gesture.
Comments Off on Operation Chariot, the “Greatest Raid of All”
May 13, 2022
Battle of Tsushima – When the 2nd Pacific Squadron thought it couldn’t get any worse…
Drachinifel
Published 18 Sep 2019At long last the 2nd Pacific Squadron’s voyage comes to an end …
Want to support the channel? – https://www.patreon.com/Drachinifel
Want a shirt/mug/hoodie – https://shop.spreadshirt.com/drachini…
Want a medal? – https://www.etsy.com/uk/shop/Drachinifel
Want to talk about ships? https://discord.gg/TYu88mt
Want to get some books? www.amazon.co.uk/shop/drachinifel
Drydock Episodes in podcast format – https://soundcloud.com/user-21912004
Comments Off on Battle of Tsushima – When the 2nd Pacific Squadron thought it couldn’t get any worse…
May 9, 2022
Military Civics: The Many Armies of the United States
The Chieftain
Published 19 Dec 2020There are just shy of a hundred official land component military organizations in the United States of America, each with their own unique legal structure and chain of command. In this video, I try to break down the details for you. It also seems to have taken several days for someone to observe I have the branches in the wrong sequence, Marines go before Navy.
Improved-Computer-And-Scout Car Fund:
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/The_Chieftain
Direct Paypal https://paypal.me/thechieftainshat
Subscribestar: https://www.subscribestar.com/the_chi…
Comments Off on Military Civics: The Many Armies of the United States
May 1, 2022
Sinking of the General Belgrano – Falklands War Documentary
Historigraph
Published 30 Apr 2022Go to https://squarespace.com/historigraph to get a free trial and 10% off your first purchase of a website or domain.
Falklands War series:
[1] Invasion of the Falklands https://youtu.be/BUYp3Wqz00A
[2] Recapture of South Georgia https://youtu.be/4mCZBpX4pxsTo help support the creation of more videos, consider supporting on Patreon:
https://www.patreon.com/historigraph#FalklandsWar #Historigraph #Belgrano
Come join the historigraph discord: https://discord.gg/ygypfs3BEB
Buy Historigraph Posters here! historigraph.creator-spring.com
This video was sponsored by Squarespace.
► Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/historigraph
► Second Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCpIj…
► Twitter: https://twitter.com/historigraph
► Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/historigraphSources for the Falklands War Series (so far):
Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands
https://archive.org/details/battlefor…
Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate
Martin Middlebrook, Battle for the Malvinas
Mike Norman, The Falklands War There and Back Again: The Story of Naval Party 8901
Kenneth Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War
Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days
Paul Brown, Abandon Ship
Julian Thompson, No Picnic
John Shields, Air Power in the Falklands Conflict
Edward Hampshire, The Falklands Naval Campaign 1982
Hugh McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands
Cedric Delves, Across an Angry Sea: The SAS in the Falklands War
Rowland White, Vulcan 607
Vernon Bogdanor, “The Falklands War 1982” lecture https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9bWw…
Arthur Gavshon, The sinking of the Belgrano https://archive.org/details/sinkingof…
Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea and Air
http://www.naval-history.net/NAVAL198…
Hansard- https://api.parliament.uk/historic-ha…
Recording of Thatcher’s statement to the Commons is from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvbhV…Music Credits:
“Rynos Theme” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…“Crypto” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…“Stay the Course” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…Other music and SFX from Epidemic Sound
Comments Off on Sinking of the General Belgrano – Falklands War Documentary
April 28, 2022
Britain’s Incredible Recapture of South Georgia – Falklands War Documentary
Historigraph
Published 27 Apr 2022Go to https://squarespace.com/historigraph to get a free trial and 10% off your first purchase of
a website or domain.In just three weeks after the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland islands, Britain threw together a task force out of thin air, sailed it 8000 miles around the world and started taking its territory back. This is how it happened.
Made with thanks to the Fleet Air Arm Musuem in Yeovilton, Somerset. https://www.fleetairarm.com/
To help support the creation of the rest of the Falklands series, consider supporting on Patreon:
https://www.patreon.com/historigraph#Falklands40 #Historigraph
Come join the historigraph discord: https://discord.gg/ygypfs3BEB
Buy Historigraph Posters here! historigraph.creator-spring.com
► Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/historigraph
► Second Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCpIj…
► Twitter: https://twitter.com/historigraph
► Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/historigraph
Thumbnail credit Daniel Behennec: https://www.naval-history.net/FxDBMis…Sources for the Falklands War Series (so far):
Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands
https://archive.org/details/battlefor…
Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate
Martin Middlebrook, Battle for the Malvinas
Mike Norman, The Falklands War There and Back Again: The Story of Naval Party 8901
Kenneth Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War
Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days
Paul Brown, Abandon Ship
Julian Thompson, No Picnic
John Shields, Air Power in the Falklands Conflict
Edward Hampshire, The Falklands Naval Campaign 1982
Hugh McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands
Cedric Delves, Across an Angry Sea: The SAS in the Falklands War
Rowland White, Vulcan 607
Vernon Bogdanor, “The Falklands War, 1982” lecture https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9bWw…
Arthur Gavshon, “The sinking of the Belgrano” https://archive.org/details/sinkingof…
Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea and Air
http://www.naval-history.net/NAVAL198…
Hansard- https://api.parliament.uk/historic-ha…
Recording of Thatcher’s statement to the Commons is from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvbhV…Music Credits:
“Rynos Theme” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…“Crypto” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…“Stay the Course” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b…Other music and SFX from Epidemic Sound
Comments Off on Britain’s Incredible Recapture of South Georgia – Falklands War Documentary
April 23, 2022
Historic “innovation prizes” (somewhat) debunked
In the most recent Age of Invention newsletter, Anton Howes does a bit of heavy lifting to debunk some accreted nonsense about the origins and success of early innovation prizes:
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Cloudsley Shovell (1650-1707).
Portrait by unknown artist from the National Maritime Museum collection via Wikimedia Commons.
Yesterday I had a piece in Works in Progress magazine, on the best ways to design modern innovation prizes — and why many of them fail.
I examined the famous “Longitude Prize” of 1714, and in the process busted some major myths about it. Almost every element of the popular story is wrong — something that experts on the topic like Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt have been going on about for years. The popular story’s hero, John Harrison, often portrayed as an inventor shunned by a haughty scientific establishment, actually received massive amounts of funding from the committee for awarding the prize. The story’s villain, the Astronomer Royal Neville Maskelyne, was no villain at all. And there’s very little evidence that the prize actually incentivised people to innovate. The Board of Longitude, for that matter, ended up more like a grant-giving agency — a kind of navigation-themed DARPA — than just a committee of prize judges.
You can read the full piece here.
So what is the rest of this week’s newsletter about? Well, I’d like to take the chance to bust even more myths about innovation prizes!
Let’s start with a fairly small one, to do with longitude, that I’d missed. Take the narrative about the 1707 naval disaster off the Isles of Scilly, which led to the demise of the wonderfully-named admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell. The disaster is usually cited as having been the direct cause of the institution of the 1714 reward, and, of course, gives most Youtubers, bloggers, and TV presenters discussing longitude the opportunity to say the name “Sir Cloudesley Shovell”. Who wouldn’t?
I had already been sceptical of the disaster’s relevance to Parliament’s creation of the longitude reward, because of the seven-year delay. I had then noticed, when researching for the piece, that the disaster was hardly mentioned at all by those lobbying for the reward, by those consulted on it, or by the MPs who voted on it. It seemed to be irrelevant as a cause, so I repurposed that part of the popular story to simply use as a general example of a naval disaster caused by not knowing one’s position at sea.
But even my downgrading of its relevance, it turns out, may have been over-generous. Yesterday, after I published my piece, Richard Dunn pointed out to me that not only was the 1707 disaster irrelevant as a cause of the 1714 reward, but that the disaster itself may not have had very much to do with a specific failure to find longitude. It certainly wasn’t singled out as a cause at the time.
As for the actual causes, they were probably compass error, inconsistent charts, and even uncertainty over the fleet’s latitude, not just its longitude. And to the extent that not knowing the fleet’s longitude appears to have been a major part of the problem, it was also related to failures to accurately calculate longitude on land — something that could already be done using existing techniques. The navigational text-books, for example, disagreed on the position of Cape Spartel, in Morocco, from which the fleet departed and took its bearings. As the maritime historian William E. May put it, when he looked into the detail of the fleet’s route and navigational measurements, “the errors in longitudes in the accepted text-books must have introduced a danger just as great as any errors in reckoning the longitude.”
Comments Off on Historic “innovation prizes” (somewhat) debunked
April 18, 2022
Once upon a time, the American military wanted to know precisely nothing about the sex lives of servicemen
Yet another trip into a far distant past, this time in the US armed forces, long before the Current Year:
General Edward Ord (1818-1883), the designer of Fort Sam Houston, saw action in the Seminole War, the Indian Wars, and the American Civil War.
Undated photo from before 1883 via Wikimedia Commons.
For much of its history, the American military has had an aversion to hearing in any official way about the sexual conduct of servicemembers. In one of the US Army’s most notorious 19th-century legal conflicts, Captain Andrew Geddes reported from a remote post in Texas that Lieutenant Louis Orleman had been forcing his teenaged daughter to have sex; in a written statement to his commanding officer, Geddes wrote that Orleman “had been having sexual intercourse with her for the past five years, or since she was thirteen years of age, and that he had placed a loaded revolver to her head, threatening that he would blow out her brains if she did not consent to his horrible desires.” Thus informed, then-Brigadier General Edward Ord convened a court-martial — to conduct a trial of Captain Geddes, for putting such an appalling thing in writing.
As Louise Barnett concludes in her book about the trial, “acknowledging the possibility of incest by bringing charges against Orleman would have officially validated and magnified a scandal that would have haunted the Army, and the Department of Texas, for years to come. Fortunately for Orleman, this course of action was unthinkable because incest itself was unthinkable in America in 1879.”
Similarly, a rich and colorful history of the early American navy attempts to count recorded acts of sodomy at sea, and finds them buried in euphemism within official reports of sailor misconduct: “improper conduct too base to mention”, or “filthy conduct”, or “improper conduct on the berth deck”. As the historian James Valle has written, naval courts-martial finding themselves hearing testimony about shipboard sodomy tended to adjourn quickly, or to end testimony and immediately vote to acquit — after which the accused tended to vanish from a ship’s rolls, without explanation, the very next time the ship made port. “Consequently,” Valle concludes, in the early republic “not one navy man was ever convicted of homosexuality by a formal court-martial.” Herman Melville mentioned the unmentionable by writing, in White Jacket, of complaints regarding shipboard acts “from which the deck officer would turn away with loathing.” They didn’t want it to happen, but if it happened, they didn’t want to know about it.
The exceptions are, you know, interesting. In the early years of the Cold War, the sudden arrival of the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the emerging political power of the Eastern Bloc produced a moral panic in which security officials in the federal government hunted communists by looking for homosexuality; the “lavender scare” ran alongside the red scare. And so, as Elizabeth Lutes-Hillman has written, the Cold War military justice system became endlessly obsessed with sexual difference, throwing aside the usual disinclination to take notice of sexual behavior in the ranks: “Courts-martial instead became a performance of military values for the culture at large, setting the boundaries of deviant behavior for the armed forces, and so, to a certain extent, for the American body politic.” To drag that language about the performance of values down to the plane of action, Lutes-Hillman reports the example of the shore patrol in Norfolk, Virginia, which proudly reported in the late-1950s that it had caught 231 sailors in acts of sodomy by drilling holes in the wall of the local YMCA.
Putting all of that together, the American military has mostly preferred to avert its eyes from the sexual behavior of servicemembers, except in moments of transition and political crisis. If the armed forces are really interested in the question of which bed you spent the weekend in, Private Snuffy, something different is happening. For something more than 200 years, the default message from a company commander on Friday afternoon has generally been, “Handle your business, don’t interrupt my weekend with a phone call from a police department, and you’d best be in formation when the flag goes up on Monday morning.” Normal is the view that servicemembers are grown-ups whose intimate matters aren’t military business. Historically, if the armed forces officially have sex on the brain, something has been disrupted; anxiety and disorder outside the military have seeped into the ranks.
Now. To go back to an example from last year, this:
… suggests a number of obvious questions, starting with how did the United States Navy know this? Is this liberation, or is it intrusion? (BREAKING: The Department of the Navy proudly announces which helicopter pilots are into dudes, and stand by for detailed information on which surface warfare officers are bi-curious. We’re still asking around on that one, so.) It’s like the shore patrol is drilling holes in the wall at the YMCA again, but this time it’s so they can bus in a cheering section. The chain of command is right outside your door, you guys, and we hear what you’re doing in there, and OH MY GOD WE’RE SO PROUD OF YOU DO YOU NEED SOME CONDOMS? The Department of Defense isn’t a regular mom, it’s a cool mom.
Comments Off on Once upon a time, the American military wanted to know precisely nothing about the sex lives of servicemen
