Quotulatiousness

February 20, 2026

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project

Filed under: Asia, Cancon, Germany, Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Royal Canadian Navy is planning to replace its four current conventional submarines, the British-built Victoria class with a dozen new conventional submarines from either South Korea or Germany (a joint German-Norwegian design). Michael J. Lalonde, a former Canadian intelligence officer, goes through the requirements for the new submarines, the two contending designs’ strengths and weaknesses, and makes his own recommendation for the RCN’s next submarine class:

Rough transit routes to Canada’s Arctic from Esquimalt BC and Halifax NS

The first step is to assess what the Government of Canada wants out of its new submarine fleet and what capabilities it will need to achieve its objectives. I’m starting here because there is a common misconception that Canada needs submarines exclusively for Arctic patrol and surveillance, which is false. While it’s true that Arctic sovereignty and security are quite rightfully a preoccupation for the government, patrolling Canada’s Arctic is not the only capability Canada needs out of its new fleet. However, it is the most common argument in favour of a submarine fleet since Arctic sovereignty remains popular within Liberal and Conservative circles alike, along with mainstream media.

Unfortunately, this narrative forces a lopsided conversation about the role these new boats will be expected to play over the coming decades. In addition to Arctic operations, these subs will be expected to deploy far into the North Atlantic with NATO and push across the Pacific to support the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Ottawa’s own defence policy update ties submarine recapitalization to contributions with allies in both theatres.

This implies a blue-water capability, which means these conventionally powered submarines must be able to deploy and fight in the open ocean, far from home ports and daily logistics, for extended periods. This requires long range and endurance for transoceanic transits, sustained submerged persistence through air independent propulsion (AIP) and high-capacity batteries to minimize snorkelling, and habitability and maintenance margins that keep the crew and systems effective past the 30- to 60-day mark. Simply put, the new boats must be able to cross an ocean, remain covert and lethal on station, and deliver effects.

The government further stipulated specific capabilities that the new submarines must have in one of its press releases stating “Through the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), Canada will acquire a larger, modernized submarine fleet to enable the Royal Canadian Navy to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, control our maritime approaches, project power and striking capability further from our shores, and project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts.”

What caught my attention here is the ability to project power and striking capability further from our shores. Power projection is synonymous with a blue-water capability; however, a striking capability, which I take to mean a land strike capability, is not typical for a conventionally powered SSK, which are typically armed only with torpedoes to take out other submarines or surface vessels.

To sum up, Canada’s new subs must be able to:

  • Patrol the Arctic with under-ice capability year-round
  • Deploy with NATO in the North Atlantic and support Canada’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy – A blue-water capability
  • Remain submerged for three weeks or more at a time
  • Covertly detect and deter maritime threats
  • Control Canada’s maritime approaches
  • A range of 7000 + nautical miles
  • Project power far from home ports
  • Anti-surface and subsurface warfare
  • Land-attack capability via cruise and/or non-nuclear ballistic missiles
  • Insert Tier-1 special operators on coastal infiltration missions
  • Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Canadian maritime approaches and abroad.

With that out of the way, let’s look at what each submarine can do.

He outlines the two competing designs and how they could meet the RCN’s needs and then plumps for the South Korean KSS-III for its stronger case for meeting those needs in the wider ocean environments than the German/Norwegian Type 212CD:

ROKS Shin Chae-ho, a KSS-III submarine at sea on 4 April, 2024.
Photo from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) via Wikimedia Commons.

The KSS-III is the only conventional submarine that can meet all of Canada’s requirements. It combines the blue-water reach and endurance demanded by transoceanic tasking with a vertical launch system that enables credible land-attack and complex anti-surface strike options, supported by lithium-ion batteries that lengthen quiet submerged persistence and improve sortie tempo on distant stations. Its larger hull and higher automation provide the habitability and crew margin needed for 30 to 60 day deployments from Halifax and Esquimalt to the North Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific, and the Arctic ice edge, while remaining within the conventional, non-nuclear profile Canada has set. The design’s modern combat system and sensor suite can be integrated with Canadian and allied command, control, and targeting architectures, and the bilateral sustainment framework required with South Korea can be structured by contract to include full technical data access, in-country training pipelines, and an industrial workshare that anchors through-life support domestically. The delivery cadence proposed for a 2026 award would shorten Canada’s reliance on the Victoria class and reduce associated sustainment exposure during transition, while an initial Canadian order of up to twelve boats would give Ottawa a controlling voice over configuration management, growth paths, and export-variant standards for the life of the class.

February 5, 2026

On The Line with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Pacific, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Line
Published 3 February, 2025

Today on On The Line, Matt Gurney is joined by Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, for an extended, wide-ranging conversation recorded in the library of the Royal Canadian Military Institute in downtown Toronto. The discussion ranges across geopolitics, the state of the world, the state of Canada’s navy, what’s going right for the fleet, and what still needs to improve.

First, a correction from your host. During the conversation, Matt incorrectly stated at several points that Canada intends to procure 15 new submarines. Admiral Topshee was too kind to interrupt him during the recording, but the correct number is 12. That mistake was entirely Matt’s, and he regrets the error.

With that out of the way, the conversation spans the globe. Admiral Topshee discusses what’s happening in Europe with Russia and Ukraine, and in the Pacific, where growing Chinese power and influence is challenging long-held assumptions about global security. There’s also extensive discussion of the Arctic, why it matters, and what is changing there. Procurement comes up as well — shipyards, new ships for the fleet, and what it will actually cost to deliver on plans that now enjoy broad political support.

They also spend time on what Canada itself needs to sustain a much larger navy and armed forces. Do we have enough bases? Enough reservists? Are people being enrolled into the navy quickly enough? And how, realistically, could Canada expand its forces rapidly in a time of war?

It’s a long, free-ranging conversation about geopolitics, the evolution of warfare, and the future of the Royal Canadian Navy. Check it out today on On The Line. And special thanks to the Royal Canadian Military Institute for hosting this recording of the podcast. For more like this, visit ReadTheLine.ca, and as always, like and subscribe.

0:00 Intro
0:26 Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee
54:16 Outro

#OnTheLine #RoyalCanadianNavy #AngusTopshee #CanadianForces #Geopolitics #ArcticSecurity #NavalPower #CanadaDefence #MattGurney

January 26, 2026

The 2026 US National Defence Strategy

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Noah looks at the recently released American National Defence Strategy and identifies areas of interest (or concern) for Canada (edited for typos):

The 2026 National Defense Strategy is out, and with it we get a few references to Canada. While our mention is little, and when there is it is fairly mundane, there is a message. You either step up or get stepped over. [NR: This has always been true, but administrations in the past have been more coy about it than President Trump … who is the opposite of coy. On the other hand, the Canadian government has been quite blatant about giving mere lip service to shared US-Canadian defence interests and slacking off completely on any serious work to keep the Canadian Armed Forces in a state to be able to do what the government pretends to want.]

This policy was shadowdropped in the middle of the night, so I decided to quickly rush to get just about anything out about it. This isn’t a full analysis, but more a quick rundown with some personal thoughts for those who want the quick go of whats happening.

To start, here are the direct mentions of Canada:

    We will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests.

The policy continues:

    Canada also has a vital role to play in helping defend North America against other threats, including by strengthening defenses against a missile, and undersea threats. In addition, U.S. partners throughout the Western Hemisphere can do far more to help combat illegal migration as well as to degrade narco-terrorists and prevent U.S. adversaries from controlling or otherwise exercising undue influence over key terrain, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.

The strategy itself is fairly domestic in focus, with repeated mention of the Western Hemisphere and borders as the key areas for which the United States should focus. It takes a backseat approach to the Indo-Pacific, favoring a collaborative approach to Chinese containment that focuses on “peace through strength”, instead of what the NDS refers to as “confrontation”.

In this regard, it is funny that despite criticisms today from President Trump regarding Canada’s trade deal with China, as well as criticism over an apparent lack of Canadian support for Golden Dome, the NDS further states that “President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China.” [NR: I think Noah is being a bit naive here … Trump wants to deal with China as a normal trading partner, but China’s actions in so many ways show that China doesn’t want to reciprocate.]

The strategy further states that “Our goal in doing so is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple: To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies.”

On today’s Golden Dome comments, I wanna take note that Canada has been discussing participation fairly openly and trying to figure out in what ways we can align even without full participation. There is no indication the current government is against Golden Dome.

The RCAF has its own IAMD study underway in Canadian Shield. It is already fairly well aligned to what the Americans are doing. People will focus on space-based interceptors and such, but Golden Dome is far more extensive than that. There’s much we align on without joining.

Canada is also undertaking its own extensive modernization of both NORAD and space-related assets, both of which will significantly contribute to Continental Defence in a variety of different ways. That includes OTHR and F-35, yes, but is so much more extensive.

From autonomous vehicles in the Arctic to ground- and space-based optical capabilities, AEW&C aircraft, new satellite constellations for both communication and surveillance, domestic launch investments, and even establishing a VLF communication capability.

There is so much going on that can and will contribute to collective Continental Defence. Much more than I believe anyone truly knows about, even myself. We need to highlight and promote these investments if we want mentalities to change and people to recognize the effort.

January 15, 2026

“The logic employed to support an invasion of Greenland is purely onanistic”

Filed under: Europe, Media, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Last week, I reposted part of CDR Salamander’s view of President Trump’s desire to take Greenland from Danish control. I still don’t really understand his motivation, so Kiran Pfitzner‘s take that Trump’s “perverse interest in Greenland” can only be explained as rising from a belief “that conquest, that being a conqueror, is a pleasant fantasy to indulge in”:

“InfantryDort” is not worth responding to, but the tweet is a useful frame for our discussion.

Aside from morality and legality, invading Greenland is, strategically speaking, utterly pointless. Even if we were to entirely neglect the consequences of such an act on our alliances and reputation, the act alone constitutes sheer stupidity as a pure question of strategy.

It is true that the idea of buying Greenland was floated during the Truman administration and again during the Eisenhower administration. However, a number of factors differentiate that endeavor:

  1. The offer was made secretly, so as to prevent any political or diplomatic complications over the question.
  2. The significance of Greenland was peculiar to the time — a nuclear attack on the US would have had to have come over the Arctic by Soviet bombers — technology has since starkly reduced its importance.
  3. Most importantly, previous administrations had clear ideas of what was needed from Greenland, and so were able to simply negotiate with the Danish government to gain access without the political difficulties of annexation.

This illustrates the great strategic problem of any suggestion of invasion: there is no specific aim or purpose. The endeavor is justified only in vague terms of “security” or the childish assertion that “we need it”. How it is to actually improve our security or why exactly we need it are nowhere addressed.

As Clausewitz writes, the aim of war is to put our enemy in a position more painful than the sacrifice which we demand from him. What exactly is it we want from Greenland? What have they denied us that we should seek to gain by force?

To even consider the question in practical terms, we must reckon with the simple fact that, in the era of a nation state, allies are infinitely more useful than occupied territory. Even bearing in mind that allied interests will never be entirely congruent, a state organic to a territory will be able to draw forth greater exertions from the same resources than a foreign occupier would, even before accounting for active resistance. A people will always provide their own state with more energy and zeal than they will offer to a conqueror.1 There is less “friction”.

The great benefit of alliances is in the ability to access this voluntary energy, which cannot be called into being by the dictates of a conqueror. Nationalism is such a potent force that conquest has become inordinately difficult and costly, being a net negative to state power in virtually all cases (a subject I have previously written on).2 That the United States can access Greenland’s territory without having to conquer it is already the best of all worlds.

  1. For more on the organic energy of the People, see Carl von Clausewitz “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of the Prussian Landwehr” (1819) in Historical and Political Writings.
  2. See also: Posen, Barry R. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”. International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 80–124.

September 17, 2025

“It would be a grave error to scrap NORAD”

Filed under: Cancon, Media, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

J.L. Granatstein makes the case that abandoning NORAD in a fit of pique over the antics of the Bad Orange Man would be worse for Canadian national defence interests and might not even be noticed in Washington DC:

There are beginning murmurings that Canada should get out of the North American Aerospace Defence agreement (NORAD). Given the Trump administration’s hostile tone — its 51st state suggestions, its tariffs, and its growing concerns with Arctic defence — the United States has become a difficult partner and a threat to Canadian sovereignty. But would this be a sensible decision for Ottawa to make?

Not at all. In the first place, NORAD is a joint alliance to defend North America against Russian, Chinese, or other potential attackers. Canada provides aircraft, radars, personnel, and expertise to this role that serves our national interests. It would be a grave error to scrap NORAD and to take on the role of defending our part of North America on our own. It would also be hugely expensive.

The problem, however, is that the Trump administration is right: Canada is, in fact, not doing enough today to defend our portion of North America and protect our sovereignty in the region.

The Royal Canadian Air Force has 1980s vintage CF-18s flying patrols and occasional larger surveillance aircraft monitoring traffic in Arctic waters; there are snowmobile and ATV patrols of Canadian Rangers armed with rifles; and a few army exercises in the north each year. The Royal Canadian Navy has a half dozen new Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels that have limited utility in Arctic waters and are very lightly armed, and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has only one 66-year-old icebreaker capable of clearing thick ice. The CCG is now under the authority of the Department of National Defence, but its members, unlike those in the Canadian Armed Forces, are unionized, and its vessels are unarmed. This could be a problem in a conflict.

Yes, Ottawa has promised to do more. The Trudeau government agreed to the $38.6 billion NORAD Modernization Plan, which includes the new Northern Approaches Surveillance System featuring the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar and a Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar, enhancing early warning and threat tracking from the North for air and maritime threats. These systems will not be fully operational until the 2040s.

There’s more, but it’s behind the paywall.

August 7, 2025

The Arctic, strategically speaking

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Russia, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

CDR Salamander suggests we tilt our globes (you have a globe on your desk, don’t you?) 90 degrees and consider the Arctic Ocean:

First things first, as it is the focus of the report, let’s go to the chart room and properly define the, “Central Arctic Ocean”.

There it is, the horizontally shaded bit outside everyone’s EEZ.

The chart comes from the report in question by RAND: The Future of Maritime Presence in the Central Arctic Ocean.

Before we dive in — and the Front Porch knows exactly where I am going here — I need to point out again what we see at the very top where all the red, green, and blue lines intersect. You can’t miss it, and it should have you screaming to whatever direction The Pentagon is from where you sit.

Yes kiddies, that is the Bering Strait, half of which is ours, and the other side is Russia. As you move from the Arctic into the greater Pacific or from the Pacific to the Arctic, you have to pass through that strait, and before it the American Aleutian Islands.

As we’ve covered here before, we have criminally avoided leveraging the blessings of the geography bequeathed to our nation, that of controlling both the inner and outer gates to the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific.

I should not have to explain to you the importance of the Arctic shores of Alaska to anyone. Challengers to the security of our resources in the north, both old and new, are back on the scene. We are a decade late in building a base at Nome and reactivating Adak. I covered that in a previous Substack linked in the prior sentence. Read it and come back if you need to catch up.

A weakness of much of the RAND report is, it is mostly based on stale talking points about immediate climate change in the Arctic, and questionably alarmist assumptions about the Arctic climate for the rest of the century, which seem more suited to the first Obama Administration, but put this to the side.

Should the climate in the Arctic mid-century trend towards the more ice or less, the simple facts remain — the competition in the Arctic is only increasing and the time to act on this new reality is now.

July 4, 2025

Another military procurement cock-up … this time it’s the C-19 rifles of the Canadian Rangers

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Cancon, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Canadian Rangers, one of the least-known parts of the Canadian Armed Forces, are a mainly Inuit reserve force operating in the Canadian north. They’d been equipped with WW2-era Lee Enfield rifles since the 1940s and the weapons were getting too old to perform the task so the CAF’s procurement folks settled on a Finnish rifle manufactured under license by Colt Canada. The Rangers, operating primarily as small patrols or as individuals, didn’t need the high firepower of a modern infantry rifle and the harsh climate they work in meant that a bolt-action rifle was desired. Bolt-action rifles are not new technology, so you’d think the CAF procurement would have been pretty straightforward, but no, they managed to miss something critical in the specifications they issued for the contract. And because the rifles met the published specifications, it’s on the CAF rather than the manufacturer to make sure that the weapons are safe to operate by the Canadian Rangers:

A Canadian Ranger handles the military’s new C-19 rifle. Shortly after the rifles were sent to Ranger units, red dye from the stocks started appearing on the hands of the soldiers when the weapons were exposed to wet conditions. (Credit: Canadian Armed Forces)

Canadian Rangers who use their new rifles in the rain are finding their hands covered in red dye because the stocks on the weapons can’t handle moisture, according to newly released military records.

The problem was discovered in May 2018 as the new C-19 rifles were initially being distributed to Canadian Ranger units as part of a $32.8-million contract with Colt Canada. The .308 C-19, which is equipped with a red stock, replaced the Lee Enfield .303 rifle that had been used by Canadian Rangers since 1947.

Under the contract, the new rifles were required to withstand extremely cold temperatures in the Arctic as well as moderate-to-high humidity in the coastal and forested regions of the country.

“Obviously from a health and safety perspective having dye released onto the skin is not a good situation,” Arthur Hall, who is with the Department of National Defence’s small arms program, noted in a May 9, 2018 email regarding the C-19.

Further complaints continued to come in from Ranger units who also found the stocks were cracking.

“The issue is that when exposed to moisture the red dye in the stock will run, and will discolour the hands of the user,” Luke Foster of the Directorate of Soldier Systems Program Management, pointed out in a July 3, 2018 email. “This is also an indication that the stocks are not properly protected from the elements.”

One report from an officer assigned to the Rangers noted he took his new rifle outside in the rain for only five minutes before returning indoors. Once back inside he noticed the weapon was dripping red dye. “I held the weapon for approximately 5-10 mins and it stated to stain my hand,” Captain T.M. Collier wrote in a May 9, 2018 email.

The documents, acquired by the Ottawa Citizen, were released under the Access to Information Act.

Department of National Defence officials, however, say it will be up to taxpayers to cover the costs of replacing the stocks on the 6,800 new rifles. That cost is estimated to be up to $10 million.

April 9, 2025

Stretching the RCN’s limited number of AOPS too thin?

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I admit that I doubted the overall utility of the Harry DeWolf-class of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships when they were announced, but aside from the typical teething troubles of new ship designs they seem to be doing a good job at their initial taskings. Noah, on the other hand, proudly describes himself as “perhaps their [the AOPS] biggest online defender“, but he’s raising concerns that the Harry DeWolf class will soon be expected to pick up the slack as the Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels come to the end of their working lives with no obvious replacements under construction:

Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship HMCS Harry DeWolf shortly after launch in 2018. The ship was commissioned into the Royal Canadian Navy in June, 2021.

It’s a common fact that I love the AOPS.

I am perhaps their biggest online defender, despite the hate, the early issues, and the slander. They, to me, are the perfect vessel for what we require up North, modular, flexible, with a whole world’s of potential.

The six vessels that make up the DeWolfe-class have kept themselves busy, so busy that you often forget that they are, primarily, Arctic vessels. Now that isn’t to say they can’t take other tasks, nor should they be limited.

OP CARRIBE, a trip to Antarctica, hosts of exercises. The AOPS manage to be kept busy, while still finding time for trips up North, although not nearly as much as many would seem to like.

Their ability to hold containerized payloads has also seen them used as testbeds for various capabilities, including towed arrays for ASW, submarine rescue equipment, and in the future, RMDS and unmanned systems like Cellula Robotics’ Guardian AUV.

Indeed, the AOPS are slowly, though surely coming into their own. Yet it is those things it does well, that potential, that puts them in the spotlight among a fleet that is aging and soon set to dwindle in numbers over the next decade.

The looming writing off of the Kingston-class is coming faster and faster everyday, and soon, they will be gone. The little workhorses, whom performed far more than anyone could have asked of them.

The Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) HMCS Moncton in Baltimore harbour for Sailabration 2012.
Photo by Acroterion via Wikimedia Commons.

The Kingstons have been a backbone, beyond the littoral-patrolling minesweeper they were envisioned as when the MCDV project was first stood up.

Yet the Kingstons as we know them are to be retired with no true replacement, their original tasks overtaken by other systems and automation.

Their original replacement, as part of the OPV project has evolved into the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette, a vessel envisioned to one day be a true second-line combatant to complement the River-class destroyers.

Instead the tasks of the Kingstons shall fall onto the small number of AOPS in service. They will be tasked, not only to fulfill their role as Arctic Patrol ships, but now take the mantle of fulfilling a host of growing secondary tasks that has been filled by these cheaper, smaller vessels.

Add on a Halifax-class that is struggling to stay afloat, bouncing around various states of condition and expected to keep sailing for another decade. Even as the River enter service, the tasks of the Kingstons will not be filled by them.

It’s a lot of strain and demand to put on vessels that are not only significantly larger than the Kingstons, but also significantly more expensive to operate on fulfilling tasks like OP CARRIBE, where while they may be very valuable assets, might not be optimal in lieu of smaller vessels that can easily fill the same role just as efficiently.

On that note it also can’t be understated that the more we put on the AOPS, the more we take it away from its Arctic taskings, and the more we expect of these six vessels to do almost every secondary task, the more we create gaps in our continental defence.

Six AOPS not only for Arctic Patrol, but MCM, Submarine Support, Seabed Warfare, things like OP CARRIBE … How can we expect these vessels to remain in service for the next quarter-century with all this strain?

We don’t talk about these vulnerabilities a lot, but as it stands Canada is severely vulnerable to adversaries and foreign actors ability to leverage asymmetric methods to limit our ability to respond abroad and severely harm Canada’s strategic infrastructure.

February 12, 2025

Poilievre’s outlined plan for the Canadian Arctic gets the CDR Salamander seal of approval

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Although most of the attention is on the still ongoing Trump tariff tantrum, there is still the required battle-space preparations going on for the next federal election. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre discussed his proposals for improving national security in the Arctic, and CDR Salamander is enthusiastic:

Pierre and Ana Poilievre at a Conservative leadership rally, 21 April, 2022.
Photo by Wikipageedittor099 via Wikimedia Commons.

… here are the highlights as I see them.

  • Canada’s Arctic is under threat. 75% of Canada’s coastline is in the far north, and 40% of her landmass. Canada needs to become self-sufficient.
  • In the fall of 2022, the Canadian military found Chinese monitoring buoys in the Arctic.
  • A Royal Canadian Navy frigate shadowed a Chinese research vessel in the Bering Strait off Alaska last year (thank you RCN friends, we don’t have any frigates nor naval bases in Alaska because … our leaders don’t understand much outside Norfolk, San Diego, or the Potomac).
  • Russia is building new bases and infrastructure in the Arctic.
  • Canada will take back control of Canadian waters, sky, and land.
  • The Canadian military today is weakened and her allies no longer respects her.
  • Canada does not have a permanent military presence in the Arctic.
  • When Prime Minister, he will increase Canadian forces by:

    • – Doubling the size of the Canadian Rangers from 2,000 to 4,000 Rangers.

    – Acquire two additional polar heavy icebreakers for the Royal Canadian Navy by 2029 on top of the two current icebreakers being built for the Canadian Coast Guard.

    – Will build Canada’s first permanent Arctic military base since the Cold War. It will be CFB Iqaluit. 100% of the cost of the base will come out of the Canadian foreign aid budget and will be up and running within two years of Poilievre becoming Prime Minister.

    – New submarines.

  • Bringing wasted foreign aid back to Canada.
  • If Canada wants to be a sovereign, self-reliant nation, it must take control of their north, secure its borders, and stand on its own two feet.
  • Canada cannot count on the Americans to do it for them.

Further on in this speech, Poilievre speaks out strongly against some of the statements of President Trump and his administration, and that is fine for me. Were I Canadian, I would say very similar things. This is OK. Friends can have disagreements now and then, but for every one item that causes friction, we will always have nine items that bring us together.

It’s all good.

December 3, 2024

Canadian Armed Forces: Can the RCN Really Stop Russia and China in the Arctic?

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Esprit de Corps Canadian Military Magazine
Published 2 Dec 2024

Vice Admiral Angus Topshee recently told the National Post that the Canadian Navy is able to defend our Arctic waterways against China or Russia … without help from our allies (aka the US Navy). It is time to target just what the heck the Admiral is talking about!

November 21, 2024

Canadian defence priorities – don’t listen to what they say, watch what they spend the money on

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Hub provides an edited transcript of what retired Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie (and former Liberal whip in the Commons) said to the Standing Committee on National Defence earlier this month, which shows very clearly where national defence ranks in Justin Trudeau’s world:

My intent is to offer some criticism of the status quo so that we can learn and then perhaps some sort of question period to get into some solutions. Essentially, in my opinion, “Strong, Secure, Engaged“, the precursor to the current defence policy, delivered nothing substantive in terms of modern military equipment, which saw Canada, in fact, become weaker, more insecure, and essentially absent from the deployable stables of troops required for either United Nation missions, or, of course, NATO.

The 2024 defence policy update of “Our North, Strong and Free” is no better, unfortunately, in that it promises some urgently needed equipment years from now, but nothing today. Indeed, the 2024 defence spend will be less than that of 2023. Of course, we’re well aware of what just happened down [in the] United States. Both Republicans and Democrats are united and increasingly vocal about telling Canada how disappointed, frustrated and fed up they are with Canada’s failure to defend itself and their allies, with a special mention on the Arctic.

Meanwhile, as we know, and I was involved in the last NAFTA renegotiations, that’s coming due at a time when a variety of key players down south have articulated clearly the base of 3 percent [of GDP spending on defence] looms on the horizon, and how defence, security, trade, and border security are all intertwined. At this time of crisis internationally, with what’s happening in the Middle East, in Ukraine, Canada’s military readiness is at its lowest level in 50 years. Canada spent last year, in 2023, more money on consultants and professional services than it did on the Army, Navy, and Air Force combined — which quite frankly, is madness.

The Army has over 50 percent of its vehicle fleets, which are awaiting spare parts and technicians. The Navy is struggling mightily — bless them — to keep elderly warships, a handful of them at sea, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, and they’re desperately short of trained sailors. The Air Force has been unable to participate in significant NATO deterrent exercises, either up north or over the oceans, in conjunction with our friends and allies, because they don’t have the pilots, the spare parts, or the money to fly the aircraft.

In the Arctic, which is many times larger than Europe, Canada has fewer than 300 military support staff who are not a deterrent — they’re essentially unarmed. Some of them are part-time, bless them, and about 1,600 Ski-Doos equipped with rifles, and Canadian Rangers who are not combatants. Their role is to observe and report.

The bottom line is that Canada has no permanently assigned combat elements to deter potential presence by the Russians or the Chinese, who are showing up in our waters with increasing frequency. But other people do. Russia specifically has between 25,000 to 35,000 combat troops deployed in their Arctic with huge amounts of operational equipment — air, land and sea. The United States, bless them, has 22,000 full-time military and part-time military professionals with more equipment than the entirety of the Canadian Forces in terms of combat delivery. So really, thank you America for defending our Arctic.

We are facing unprecedented dangers and challenges, and quite frankly, I see no sense of urgency to change, to modify, to re-guide the efforts of the government towards supporting and assisting in the Canadian Forces.

Some facts. We have less than 35 military personnel deployed on UN missions; in 2003, we had close to 2,500. We are the only NATO nation whose level of military operational readiness is going down when everyone else is skyrocketing up. We have the longest and least efficient procurement system in NATO; indeed, in any nation that I can find. We are the only nation in NATO that does not have a costed plan to get to 2 percent of GDP, which was first agreed to by the minister of defence in 2008 and reiterated in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and I could go on. We are the only NATO nation whose defence minister has publicly admitted that he could not convince his fellow cabinet members of the importance of NATO defence spending, and the 2 percent GDP. And, as mentioned already, we’re the only NATO nation whose defence budget decreased this year.

Emphasis mine.

July 23, 2024

Trudeau announced new submarines for the RCN … don’t assume he’s really serious

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

At The Hub, J.L. Grantastein explains why Trudeau’s hasty commitment under pressure from our exasperated NATO allies is not likely to be met, and almost certainly not to be met fully:

HMCS Chicoutimi escorts Peoples Liberation Army (Navy) ships visiting Victoria on behalf of the Chinese military, 13 December 2016.
Photo: Cpl Carbe Orellana, MARPAC Imaging Services, ET2016-0468-03 ©2016 DND-MDN CANADA

Canada has no capacity to construct submarines, and the country’s shipyards are struggling to build destroyers, icebreakers, and supply ships. This means that submarines will need to be purchased from European or Asian shipyards with experience in building them. (There will be a certain irony if the RCN, having fought against U-boats in two world wars, ends up with German submarines.)

As of Trudeau’s announcement, let us be clear, no submarine design has been selected, and naval officers are said only to have been engaged in seeking the best models for the RCN. Given Canada’s broken defence procurement system, this is unlikely to be a quick process. The RCN may soon know what it wants but the bean counters will rule as they always do, and orders most likely will not be placed for at least three to five years.

Few expect that the Liberals will be in power in 2027, and if the Conservatives do form the government, it is worth noting that Pierre Poilievre has refused to commit to a date for Canada to meet its 2 percent pledge. New subs may not be an idea the Tories will accept.

If an old or new government does decide to continue with a submarine program, it is certain that a new conventional sub will cost at least $1 billion, many millions more to make it strong enough to operate for long periods in the Arctic, and millions more for its torpedoes, missiles, other weapons, radars, and electronic systems. The costs involved all but guarantee that 12 submarines are a pipedream — the RCN will be lucky to get four to six. Trudeau did not offer a timetable in his remarks, but it is highly unlikely that even a single submarine would be ready to go to sea before the early 2030s and the last by the 2040s.

Then there is the problem of manning a fleet of underwater vessels. The RCN has four Victoria-class boats now. These subs, purchased used from the Royal Navy, have not worked well, are constantly undergoing expensive repairs, and scarcely leave the dock. In other words, the crews have relatively little sea-going experience, the RCN is short of sailors already, and experienced mechanics and skilled technicians are in even shorter supply. Each sub will need more than sixty officers and sailors, and there must be at least three times that number on leave, on courses, or in training to support each crew.

There is little point in acquiring new submarines if there are no crews to sail in them, and with the fifteen new destroyers planned and just beginning construction, the senior service’s personnel needs must be a top priority. That need will not be met until the Canadian Armed Forces’ problems with recruitment are fixed, and that problem has bedevilled the military for decades. (I served on a Department of National Defence Special Committee in 1995 that advanced recommendations to improve recruiting, but nothing changed. Nothing has improved in the three decades since.)

Note that referring to the navy as “the senior service” is only appropriate when talking about Britain’s Royal Navy. The Royal Canadian Navy was established in 1910, long after the Canadian Army came into existence. I’m sure members of the RCN won’t mind if you make that mistake, however.

July 12, 2024

New Canadian submarines and icebreakers promised at NATO Summit

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Under reportedly intense pressure from NATO allies, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau grudgingly promises to begin the (usually decades-long) process of purchasing new submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy:

HMCS Victoria
Image via Wikimedia Commons.

The Canadian government announced today it is “taking the first steps” towards buying 12 conventionally-powered, under-ice capable submarines — a massive acquisition with numerous shipbuilders from the around world already eyeing the program reported to be worth at least $60 billion Canadian dollars.

“As the country with the longest coastline in the world, Canada needs a new fleet of submarines — and today, we’ve announced that we will move forward with this acquisition,” Bill Blair, minister of national defence, said in a statement published during the NATO Summit being held this week in Washington, DC. “This new fleet will enable Canada to protect its sovereignty in a changing world, and make valuable, high-end contributions to the security of our partners and NATO allies.”

Canada has been eyeing the acquisition of a new class of submarines to replace its four aging Victoria-class boats since at least April 2023, and Blair himself was the target of criticism earlier this year after he included language about the acquisition in a major defense policy document that critics labeled as “wishy washy”.

In an op-ed for Breaking Defense published ahead of the NATO summit, Blair said that Canada was still pursing the submarine plan, and emphasized that the investment would help his nation cross the 2 percent GDP target.

The government’s press release does not include a price estimate for the program, but the Ottawa Citizen has previously reported that the Royal Canadian Navy tagged the acquisition at $60 billion Canadian dollars ($44 billion USD).

Another item from Breaking Defence details a new trilateral agreement with Finland and the United States to develop a joint design for a “fleet” of icebreakers:

Originally ordered in 2008 for delivery in 2017, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker is now expected to enter service in 2030.
Canadian Coast Guard conceptual rendering, 2012.

The US, Canada and Finland announced today a new trilateral effort, dubbed the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort or “ICE Pact”, to work together on the production of a “fleet” of new polar icebreakers, in what a US official said was a “strategic imperative” in the race of dominance of the high north.

The initiative, to be formalized in a memorandum of understanding by the end of the year, calls for better information sharing on ship production, collaboration on work force development — including better allowing workers and experts to train at each other’s yards — and an “invitation” to other allies and partners to buy icebreakers from ICE Pact members.

“Due to the capital intensity of shipbuilding, long-term, multi-ship orderbooks are essential to the success of a shipyard,” the White House said in its announcement. “The governments of the United States, Canada, and Finland intend to leverage shipyards in the United States, Canada, and Finland to build polar icebreakers for their own use, as well as to work closely with likeminded allies and partners to build and export polar icebreakers for their needs at speed and affordable cost.”

Ahead of the announcement, White House Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh framed the partnership as a commercial and industrial boon, but also one with national security implications: It is, in part, a message to Russia and China that the US and its partners “intend … to project power into the polar regions to enforce international norms and treaties that promote peace and prosperity in the arctic and Antarctic.”

June 20, 2024

Canadian Armed Forces – Snow Machines

Filed under: Cancon, History, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Ontario Regiment Museum
Published Mar 7, 2024

During the TANK SATURDAY — Winter Warfare event in 2024, we had special guests from the Hussars Military Vehicle Club. They brought their fully restored CAF Arctic equipment to the museum and spoke to our visitors about the history and use of these unique vehicles.
(more…)

May 13, 2024

“Our NATO allies are despairing. Our American friends are frustrated … all the officers are extraordinarily polite in public. But in private, the conversations are quite brutal.”

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Former Liberal MP and retired Lt.-General Andrew Leslie has few illusions about the current Liberal government’s approach to military issues:

Lt.-Gen. (ret’d) Andrew Leslie is keen to talk about the embarrassing state of Canadian military preparedness.

“The current prime minister of Canada is not serious about defence. Full stop. A large number of his cabinet members are not serious about defence. Full stop,” the former Liberal MP tells me.

“Our NATO allies are despairing. Our American friends are frustrated. But because NATO and Norad (North American Aerospace Defense Command) are both essentially voluntary organizations, in which other people cannot give Canada orders,” the retired general explains, “all the officers are extraordinarily polite in public. But in private, the conversations are quite brutal.”

I have asked Andrew to explain our federal government’s foot-dragging on military spending — despite significant changes in risk — and what we should expect from our allies. This 35-year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), former chief of staff of the Canadian Army and one-time MP for Orleans is well-placed to decipher what’s really going on and in our frank conversation, he doesn’t pull any punches. I connect with Andrew at his home in Ottawa; behind him, the walls of his spacious office are sheathed in medals and awards, testimony to decades of decorated service in places like Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.

We get to the heart of the matter. Canada’s allies are pressuring Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to get serious about military spending. And with a relentless war in Ukraine, a thawing and more vulnerable Arctic, unrest in the Middle East, and a general shakeup of the world order, Canadians are waking up to the risks of not being ready to defend ourselves.

Recently, U.S. Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot (who took over leadership of Norad in February) has put his Canadian counterparts on notice that he aims to have U.S. troops training, not just in Alaska, but in the Canadian Arctic. A good idea, or the thin edge of a wedge?

It’s totally sensible, Andrew replies, because Canada has “no permanently stationed combat capability in the Arctic.” After a pause to let that sink in, he repeats that fact and elaborates. “Just in terms of numbers, there’s about 22,000 professional men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces based in the Arctic, mainly in Alaska. There’s about 30,000 to 35,000 Russian armed forces based in the Arctic. Canada has about 300 people.”

Older Posts »

Powered by WordPress