This is not at all a matter of the usual stupid refusal of the FBI and other security services to understand an early warning even when they have detected one. It is a direct challenge to the unity and integrity of the armed services, which have been one of our society’s principal organs and engines of ethnic and religious integration. A U.S. soldier who wonders about the reliability of his, let alone her, Muslim colleague is not being “Islamophobic.” (A phobia is an irrational or uncontrollable fear.) If Maj. Hasan has made this understandable worry in the ranks more widespread, he has done his fanatical preacher friend the greatest possible service. But that’s his fault for doing what he did, and his superiors’ fault for letting him openly rehearse it for so long, not mine for pointing it out.
I wrote some years ago that the three most salient characteristics of the Muslim death-squad type were self-righteousness, self-pity, and self-hatred. Surrounded as he was by fellow shrinks who were often very distressed by his menacing manner, Maj. Hasan managed to personify all three traits — with the theocratic rhetoric openly thrown in for good measure — and yet be treated even now as if the real word for him was troubled. Prepare to keep on meeting those three symptoms again, along with official attempts to oppose them only with therapy, if that. At least the holy warriors know they are committing suicide.
Christopher Hitchens, “Hard Evidence: Seven salient facts about Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan”, Slate, 2009-11-16
November 17, 2009
QotD: Characteristics of death-squads
November 14, 2009
November 11, 2009
Contrarian investment strategy: short Chinese stocks
I’ve been skeptical of the official Chinese government economic statistics for quite some time, so I find articles like this one to be quite believable:
Chanos and the other bears point to several key pieces of evidence that China is heading for a crash.
First, they point to the enormous Chinese economic stimulus effort — with the government spending $900 billion to prop up a $4.3 trillion economy. “Yet China’s economy, for all the stimulus it has received in 11 months, is underperforming,” Gordon Chang, author of “The Coming Collapse of China,” wrote in Forbes at the end of October. “More important, it is unlikely that [third-quarter] expansion was anywhere near the claimed 8.9 percent.”
Chang argues that inconsistencies in Chinese official statistics — like the surging numbers for car sales but flat statistics for gasoline consumption — indicate that the Chinese are simply cooking their books. He speculates that Chinese state-run companies are buying fleets of cars and simply storing them in giant parking lots in order to generate apparent growth.
Back in 2004, I wrote:
While there is no doubt that China is a fast-growing economy, the most common mistake among both investors and pundits is to assume that China is really just like South Carolina or Ireland . . . a formerly depressed area now achieving good results from modernization. The problem is that China is not just the next Atlanta, Georgia or Slovenia. China is still, more or less, a command economy with a capitalist face. One of the biggest players in the Chinese economy is the army, and not just in the sense of being a big purchaser of capital goods (like the United States Army, for example).
The Chinese army owns or controls huge sectors of the economy, and runs them in the same way it would run a division or an army corps. The very term “command economy” would seem to have been minted to describe this situation. The numbers reported by these “companies” bear about the same resemblance to reality as thos posted by Enron or Worldcom. With so much of their economy not subject to profit and loss, every figure from China must be viewed as nothing more than a guess (at best) or active disinformation.
Probably the only figures that can be depended upon for any remote accuracy would be the imports from other countries — as reported by the exporting firms, not by their importing counterparts — and the exports to other countries. All internal numbers are political, not economic. When a factory manager can be fired, he has his own financial future at stake. When he can be sentenced to 20 years of internal exile, he has his life at stake. There are few rewards for honesty in that sort of environment: and many inducements to go along with what you are told to do.
Under those circumstances, any growth figures are going to be aggregated from all sectors, most of which are under strong pressure to report the right numbers, not necessarily corresponding with any real measurement of economic activity. So, if the economic office wants to see a drop in the economy, that’s what they’ll get.
Basing your own personal financial plans on numbers like this would quickly have you living in a cardboard box under a highway overpass. Companies in the soi-disant free world have shareholders or owners to answer to. Companies in China exist in a totally different environment.
Five years on, there’s not much (except a few outdated details) that I’d bother changing.
H/T to Ghost of a Flea for the link.
In memorium
A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:
The Great War
- Private William Penman, Scots Guards, died 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
(Elizabeth’s great uncle) - Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 1915 at Loos, age 35
(Elizabeth’s great grandfather) - Private Walter Porteous, Northumberland Fusiliers, died 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
(my great uncle) - Corporal John Mulholland, Royal Tank Corps, died 1918 at Harbonnieres, age 24
(Elizabeth’s great uncle)
The Second World War
- Flying Officer Richard Porteous, RAF, survived the defeat in Malaya and lived through the war
(my uncle) - Able Seaman John Penman, RN, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Murmansk Run (and other convoy routes), lived through the war
(Elizabeth’s father) - Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured at Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp
(Elizabeth’s uncle)
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD (1872-1918)
November 10, 2009
Military ATV usage
I can understand the attraction of riding an ATV, as carrying a full pack and combat gear is exhausting, but I would have thought the noise of the vehicle would make them tactically useless:
ATVs (all terrain vehicles) have proved particularly useful, and popular in Afghanistan. There are many models in use, all of them militarized civilian vehicles. The British use a militarized versions of the Yamaha Grizzly 450. Basically, the Grizzly is a four wheel, 628 pound, cross country motorcycle. This ATV is six feet long and 3.5 feet wide. In addition to the driver, there are racks on the bike that can carry another 175 pounds. In addition, the vehicle can tow a trailer carrying another 350 pounds of cargo. Top speed, on a flat surface, without a trailer, is about 75 kilometers an hour. Cross country, it’s usually about half that, and a bit less if a trailer is being hauled.
Four years ago, the British Army bought 250 of the Grizzly 450s, and these were very popular with the troops in Afghanistan. There they are used for patrolling, and hauling supplies to troops in isolated positions. The army is paying $41,000 for each bike, although that includes a trailer, spare parts and technical services. The civilian version goes for about $8,000 each.
November 3, 2009
Desperately seeking . . . combat?
Strategy Page reports on a morale issue that will seem to come from another planet to many civilians — troops looking forward to combat:
Many young American infantry soldiers stationed in Iraq are disappointed at the lack of combat. These guys are in for four years, and they hoped to get a little action, as in some once-in-a-lifetime combat. The troops know the odds of getting killed or mutilated are low (at least compared to previous wars, the casualty rate in Iraq is about a third of what it was in Vietnam), so there’s not a great deal of fear about “not coming back.” The upside is appealing, with the prospect of exciting stories to last a lifetime, and maybe a few decorations to confirm it all.
Most eagerly sought is the CIB (Combat Infantry Badge), a large device worn above the ribbons on your uniform jacket, and a sign to everyone else that you’ve seen the elephant (been in combat with the infantry). But in another typical reaction, the NCOs who have been in combat, are not eager to get back. The risks are real, and all that violence is hard on the nerves.
That report will stick in the craw of peace campaigners who often try to portray soldiers as little better than armed boy scouts or economic victims of desperate upbringing with no real desire to fight.
October 30, 2009
“Then we seize Canadian power plants near Niagara Falls, so they freeze in the dark”
OMG! US invasion plans target Halifax, Montreal, Winnipeg . . . and Sudbury?
The United States government does have a plan to invade Canada. It’s a 94-page document called “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Red,” with the word SECRET stamped on the cover. It’s a bold plan, a bodacious plan, a step-by-step plan to invade, seize and annex our neighbor to the north. It goes like this:
First, we send a joint Army-Navy overseas force to capture the port city of Halifax, cutting the Canadians off from their British allies.
Then we seize Canadian power plants near Niagara Falls, so they freeze in the dark.
Then the U.S. Army invades on three fronts — marching from Vermont to take Montreal and Quebec, charging out of North Dakota to grab the railroad center at Winnipeg, and storming out of the Midwest to capture the strategic nickel mines of Ontario.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy seizes the Great Lakes and blockades Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific ports.
At that point, it’s only a matter of time before we bring these Molson-swigging, maple-mongering Zamboni drivers to their knees! Or, as the official planners wrote, stating their objective in bold capital letters: “ULTIMATELY TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL.”
Old news indeed, but still of historical interest. The plans in the other direction were held in Defence Scheme No. 1:
Lt. Colonel Brown himself did reconnaissance for the plan, along with other lieutenant-colonels, all in plainclothes. These missions took place from 1921 and 1926. As historian Pierre Berton noted in his book Marching as to War, these investigations had “a zany flavour about it, reminiscent of the silent comedies of the day.” To illustrate this, Berton quoted from Brown’s reports, in which Brown recorded, among other things, that in Burlington, Vermont the people were “affable” and thus unusual for Americans; that Americans drink significantly less alcohol than Canadians (this was during Prohibition), and that upon pointing out that to Americans, one responded “My God! I’d go for a glass of beer. I’m going to ‘Canady’ to get some more”; that the people of Vermont would only be serious soldiers “if aroused”; and that many Americans might be sympathetic with the British cause.
Green Berets to combat-test latest wearable military computer gear
Although the Land Warrior program was officially cancelled in 2007, the US Army is still actively working on making better technology available to troops in the field. The next phase will be equipping a Special Forces unit:
In the US military, the term “Special Forces” isn’t generic as it is in the UK — it refers specifically to US Army Special Forces, aka the Green Berets (as distinct from Navy SEALs, Delta Force, Rangers, Marine Force Recon etc etc, all generically grouped as “special operations forces”). If the report is accurate, then, it’s Army Special Forces who will get the new Land Warrior.
The Green Berets, while undeniably frightfully elite, are “Tier Two” specwar people, not “Tier One” like Delta Force, the best of the best. The Berets are the rest of the best, as it were.
For supertrooper use, the Land Warrior’s ordinary radio networking will apparently be upgraded to include satellite comms. Every operator will carry it, rather than just team leaders as in line units, and reportedly there will be a new and improved GUI as well. The kit is expected to weigh about the same as the 7lb sets now in use by the 5th SBCT.
October 26, 2009
Must be “British military” week – MoD backs down on Territorial Army cutbacks
Sometimes, calling attention to a stupid move can cause the government to reconsider. As I mentioned several days back, the British Ministry of Defence was considering huge training cutbacks for the army’s reserve formation, the Territorial Army. The opposition in Parliament appear to have forced the government to at least a partial backdown:
Ministers have scaled back planned cuts to the Territorial Army and made concessions over their training after fierce criticism from the opposition.
The Ministry of Defence wanted to cut £20m from the TA budget and halt all training for six months except for those due to be sent to Afghanistan.
But it now says every unit will get one night’s training a month while the TA budget will not be cut by as much.
The Conservatives said the plans were a “shambles” and should be dropped.
The Lib Dems said the government had shown poor judgement and that the move could do long-term damage to the TA.
One night per month is still less than what is necessary, but at least it provides some continuity. Back in the mid-1970s, the Canadian government tried something similar with their reservists. Our officers and senior NCOs paraded without pay for months to ensure that the junior ranks were paid for training. It was a sacrifice on their part that shouldn’t have been necessary, but it did eventually force the government to re-instate something more like normal training activity.
October 20, 2009
The infantryman’s dilemma: trading carry weight for capability
The US army belatedly listens to the complaints from the field about the excess weight infantry troops have to carry when dismounted from their vehicles:
In an effort to lessen the weight infantry have to carry in Afghanistan, several hundred commando style Mk 48 7.62mm machine-guns are being sent. These are nine pounds lighter that then standard, 27.6 pound, M240 machine-guns they will replace. SOCOM (Special Operations Command) has been using the Mk 48 for eight years now. SOCOM troops need the light weight for commando operations. But that light weight comes at the expense of durability. The lighter components don’t last as long. For example, the M240 bolt and receiver are both good for 100,000 rounds fired. But on the Mk 48, the bolt has to be replaced after 15,000 rounds and the receiver after 50,000. This was not a problem with the commandos, who made sure they had plenty of spares available, and kept track of the (approximate) number of rounds fired. Not so hard to do, you just have to pay attention.
The nine pound savings with the Mk 48 makes all the difference when it comes to carrying a 7.62mm machine-gun with you. The M240 is so heavy, that troops rarely take them away from the vehicles they are usually mounted on. But the Mk 48 is less heavy enough to justify hauling with you up those Afghan hills.
October 14, 2009
Military false economies
Strategy Page reports on the British Territorial Army:
Recently, Britain decided to suspend training for its Territorial Army, for six months, as a way to save money so that more resources could be devoted to the effort in Afghanistan. This has caused an uproar in Britain, where there is much popular support for the Territorial Army, even though it is a relatively small force, with only 34,000 troops.
Cutting training was widely seen as false economy, since the average Territorial only gets 4-5 weeks of training a year. The government saw it differently, noting that many non-combat jobs in the Territorial Army are held by people who do the same kind of work in their civilian job. This is particularly true of people with communications, maintenance or medical jobs in the Territorial Army. But Territorials only get two weeks of additional training before being sent off to a combat zone, and the feeling is that they need all the training they can get if they want to survive overseas.
I’m astonished not only at the bone-headed decision to suspend training, but the relatively tiny size of the current Territorial forces . . . bureaucratic war results, I suspect, as the part-timers don’t have a strong voice in either the military or civilian hierarchy to defend their interests.
October 9, 2009
Army beats Navy and Airforce
Following up on yesterday’s post about the British Ministry of Defence directive to find savings to support the ongoing (primarily army) efforts in Afghanistan, Strategy Page calls the winner:
British Army Sinks The Navy And Grounds The Air Force
After several months of debate, the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been ordered to cut back on spending, so that money and resources may be used to support army operations in Afghanistan. Among other things, the army has been pointing out that only ten percent of spending on new equipment goes to the army (based on actual and planned spending between 2003-18). This, despite the fact that it’s the army that is doing most of the fighting during this period. Although the army recently pulled out of Iraq (where it had been since 2003), it is still in Afghanistan, and more troops are headed there. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have not been fully involved in a major operation since the Falklands in 1982, although they have been involved in several more limited efforts. The point is that they face nothing like what the army is dealing with in Afghanistan.
The British armed forces have 191,000 troops on active service. Of those, 38,000 are in the Royal Navy, 109,000 in the Army, 41,000 in the Royal Air Force, and the rest in joint staffs and operations. The annual defense budget is about $58 billion.
Those aircraft carriers are looking less and less likely to be ever in service . . .
October 2, 2009
Draft dodgers, yes. Deserters, no.
There’s an article at the National Post which argues against a proposed amendment to Canadian law which would automatically grant asylum to military deserters:
Gerard Kennedy is a man of good intentions but a new law he has proposed should be judged on its potential for unintended consequences, rather than its intent.
The former Liberal leadership candidate has introduced a private members’ bill that seeks to amend the Immigration and Refugee Act, in order that people who want to avoid compulsory military service can stay in Canada on humanitarian grounds.
I’m adamantly opposed to conscription in any form (military or “civilian”), and I’m quite willing to see Canada offer a refuge for those who choose not to serve (the “draft dodgers”, for instance). I’m equally opposed to allowing military deserters to use Canada as a safe haven once they change their minds about volunteering for military service.
September 25, 2009
Operation Nanook
You wouldn’t say they go out of their way to glorify the military in this video . . .
Every army has their fair share of REMFs
Over at Castle Argghhh!, Bill remembers the distasteful creatures known as REMFs:
In my war, we coined a term to describe the guy who lived in Saigon in an air-conditioned trailer with access to clean water that didn’t smell or taste like bleach, who worked in an area where the greatest danger was spilling a drink at Happy Hour, who took PX breaks four times a day to see if his new TEAC stereo system had arrived, who exchanged his boots for new ones whenever his spitshine was scuffed, who spent his days tweaking his Efficiency Reports to achieve maximum promotability, who had starch lines *sewn* into his jungle fatigues to nullify the effects of the humidity, who may have once heard a mortar explode a couple of miles away — and bitched about how tough it was being in Vietnam.
The term was REMF. Rear Echelon Mother-F*cker.
REMFs are present in all branches of all militaries — they aren’t common, but they make themselves obnoxious in ways that are impossible to ignore.
This kind of creature exist in every army, including (as Michael Yon can confirm) the British army.
