Quotulatiousness

April 2, 2011

The high cost of modern combat aircraft

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Technology — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 11:35

Many claims have been made about the actual cost to Canada for the small tranche of F-35 aircraft the Conservative government has agreed to buy. The opposition claimed that there were potentially huge savings from having a competition instead of ordering F-35’s. This may or may not be true, especially as the Department of National Defence still hasn’t made a clear statement about what role the new aircraft will be expected to fill (that is, we’re told the F-35 is the answer, but the question still hasn’t been specified).

Back when we bought the F-18, for example, one of the stated criteria was that the plane we bought had to have two engines, due to the potential risk of engine failure in the far north (where airfields are very few and very far apart). This ruled out the F-16, a single-engine plane. This time around, we’re buying a single-engine plane, but the reasons have not been spelled out. It may well be that the F-35 really is everything we need, but it does feel like we’re buying it because we were part of the original “team” during the early design phases.

Combat aircraft are not cheap, and the currently available crop show that well:

Despite the high expense all the electronic gear, the F-18G is not the most expensive combat aircraft out there. The F-22 costs $355 million each. The low budget F-18E costs $94 million each, while the F-18G goes for $105 million. The F-35 costs over $130 million (and growing). Even unmanned aircraft are pricy, with the Global Hawk costing $182 million each (with high end sensors). Older fighters, like the F-16, cost $60 million, and an F-15E goes for about $100 million. The price of the export EA-18G hasn’t been set yet, but it will probably be under $100 million.

These prices constantly fluctuate because of the need to incorporate a share of the development cost for each aircraft built. While most development expense occurs before mass production begins, there is sometimes considerable additional development expense, or major refurbishment, later in the lifetime of an aircraft. Many modern warplanes cost more than most warships, and have the same high maintenance (periodic refurbishment and development of new components) expenses.

Update: There’s another Strategy Page article of interest, this one talking about the decline of Canadian air power:

When the Canadian government decided to send some warplanes to assist in establishing the no-fly zone over Libya, they found out that sending six of their CF-18 fighters would amount to 20 percent of flyable Canadian fighters. That was a bit shocking to most Canadians. But not to those who run the Canadian Air Force, as they know quite well that the CF-18 is on the way out. For example, late last year, Canada awarded $700 million in contracts to two commercial firms (Harris and L3) to provide maintenance for its F-18 fleet of jet fighters over the next nine years. This type of contract is increasingly popular, as they provide a cheaper way to provide all the more complex maintenance, other than what the ground crews do on a daily basis. This involves major overhauls, management of spare parts and upgrades of equipment. This includes the airframe, engines and electronics. Canada expects to retire its remaining 79 CF-18s by 2020, and replace them with 65 F-35s. Meanwhile, only about 30 CF-18s are flyable, because so many aircraft are undergoing upgrades and extended maintenance.

[. . .] Canada plans to replace its CF-18s with the new 65 F-35s. The trend towards fewer, but more capable and expensive aircraft is a common one. Half a century ago, Canada had a fleet of nearly 600 fighters, including license built U.S. F-86s, and what would eventually amount to over 600 CF-100 fighters, the only Canadian designed fighter to enter mass production. The CF-100s were gradually retired over the next three decades. The last ones left service as the CF-18 entered service. But in between, Canada built, under license, several other U.S. fighter designs. Canada had become a major aircraft manufacturer during World War II (over 16,000 aircraft produced), and that provided the foundation for an aircraft industry that remains a major supplier of commercial aircraft to this day.

Why the F-22 was not deployed to Libya

Filed under: Africa, Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 11:12

I thought the answer to that question was simple: the F-22 is a pure fighter, and there’s no crying need for pure fighters to enforce the no-fly zone that can’t be met with older aircraft. Apparently, it’s a bit more complicated:

Conspicuously absent in the skies over Libya is the new American F-22. Despite modifying the F-22 to operate as a fighter-bomber, the F-22 was uniquely unsuited to operate as part of the international force assigned to stop Libya from attacking its own people. That job requires aircraft that can carry lots of smart bombs. Defeating the Libyan Air Force was not a major chore, and was easily handled by less capable (and cheaper to operate) air superiority fighters. Another problem was communications. The F-22 is not equipped to operate as part of an international aerial armada. The F-22 is a stealthy lone-wolf. Most of the time, the F-22 does not use its radio. To communicate with other F-22s, a special, short-range system is used. The F-22 does not have the full suite of communications equipment most NATO warplanes carry.

[. . .]

The 36 ton F-22 has internal bomb bays, like the F-117, to enhance stealthiness. Thus it can carry two half ton smart bombs, or eight 250 pound SDBs (ground penetrating Small Diameter Bombs) internally, in addition to a pair of air-to-air missiles. However, the F-22 is not yet modified to carry the SDB. The internal bays were originally designed to carry six air-to-air missiles, not bombs. Using the external hard points, which makes the aircraft more visible on radar, an F-22 can carry about four tons of bombs and missiles.

The F-22 has the most advanced radar and electronic warfare gear of any jet fighter. When you include the cost of research and development, each F-22 ends up costing nearly $400 million. But for pilots in certain types of combat, it’s money well spent. But not for what was needed over Libya, where most non-stealthy fighters can carry four or more tons of bombs and missiles.

March 26, 2011

Cheap flights (with subtitles)

Filed under: Britain, Humour — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 12:00

H/T to Roger Henry for the link.

March 17, 2011

AWACS in Libyan airspace

Filed under: Africa, France, Military, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:21

Strategy Page reports on the use of AWACS resources over the north African country:

A week after NATO began sending its AWACS aircraft to monitor aircraft activity over northern Libya, it’s been decided to have these radar aircraft monitor that airspace 24/7. The AWACS can fly over international waters and still monitor air activity several hundred kilometers into Libya. This may become crucial if a no-fly zone is established over the Libyan coastal area (where most of the population lives). AWACS can spot Libyan aircraft taking off, and call in fighters to deal with that problem before the Libyan warplanes can get very far.

The Libyan rebels resisted calling for a no-fly zone, but recent defeats have changed their minds. The Arab League has also called on the UN to authorize a no-fly zone, and the U.S. has agreed to participate. American and French carriers, plus, possibly, Egyptian fighters, would provide the combat aircraft needed for enforcement. While Libya doesn’t have many flyable warplanes, the few they do get into the air have proved to be powerful weapons against the rebels. In at least three cases, Libyan pilots refused to bomb the rebels. The pilots of two aircraft defected and flew to Malta. The two crew in another fighter-bomber ejected and let their aircraft crash. It’s believed that Libyan dictator is now using mercenary pilots (perhaps from Syria).

March 4, 2011

Israel’s largest defence company moving toward privatization

Filed under: Economics, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 07:43

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is a state-owned company with a great reputation for quality and innovation. The Economist looks at their moves toward going into private control:

When Mr Shamir, an important figure in Israel’s booming high-technology business, took on the job of sorting out his country’s biggest industrial company in 2005, state-owned IAI was in a wretched condition.

For one thing, it had never quite got over the blow to its self-confidence when the Lavi, an advanced dual-role combat aircraft, was cancelled by the government headed by Mr Shamir senior in 1987. Although the Lavi was on course to meet all its performance targets, the cost of the project and American concern that it was helping to finance a rival to its F-16 and F-18 fighters killed it. For IAI, it meant that it would never again try to make a fast jet on its own.

For another, despite recovering much of its technological élan, IAI was an organisational and financial mess. Executives say it had gone three years without a formal chairman and two years without a signed financial statement. Banks had seized some of its financial assets and its chief executive of 20 years, Moshe Keret, was facing bribery allegations (he denied these and the case was dropped for lack of evidence). The firm was also in the grip of the Histadrut union federation, which fought all attempts to slim a bloated workforce and introduce merit-based remuneration.

March 3, 2011

Eurofighter Typhoon sets new standard for “bloated expense” and “limited usefulness”

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Military, Technology — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 12:41

Lewis Page is on record as thinking the Eurofighter Typhoon was a bad bargain, but even he is shocked at just how bad a bargain the plane is:

Probably the most dismal figure we are given is that the RAF will actually put into service just 107 Typhoons. At the moment it has received 70: the last of the 160 planes ordered by the UK will be delivered in 2015. But, we are told, “by 2019” all the Tranche 1 jets (which were still being delivered to the RAF at the start of 2008) will be “retired” — that is, thrown away. We’ll pay for 160 jets (actually we’ll pay for 232), but we’ll only ever get a fleet of 107.

This shows the acquisition cost of the Eurofighter/Typhoon in an even worse light than it had previously appeared, when an RAF fleet of 160 had been expected. It is now acknowledged that the development and production cost to the UK of Eurofighter will be £23bn with planned upgrades.

This means that we UK taxpayers will have shelled out no less than £215m for each of our 107 jets — that’s $350m at today’s rates, rather more than the US taxpayers have been made to pay for each of their 185 Raptor superfighters, almost all of which will be used operationally. And the Raptor has third-generation Stealth: the Eurofighter has no stealth features at all. The Raptor has thrust vectoring for unbeatable manoeuvrability in a dogfight: the Eurofighter doesn’t.

But, for all the expense, at least the RAF has a fine, modern, fully in-service fleet? Well, almost:

The lack of planes actually fit to fly is serious — the NAO reports that of the 70 Eurofighters the RAF currently possesses, just 42 are actually available to flying squadrons. And the lack of flight hours has meant that some flyboys haven’t been able to get into the cockpit at all [. . .]

The RAF currently has eight pilots who are capable of undertaking ground attack missions on Typhoon … The Department plans to have sufficient numbers of trained pilots to conduct a small scale ground attack mission by 2014 and aims to deliver sufficient flying hours to train enough pilots to undertake the full range of planned tasks by 2016.

What a joy it is to think that we paid £119m to upgrade the Tranche 1 planes back in 2008 so that they could do ground attack. In 2016 the RAF will finally have the pilots it needs to use this capability: but by then the Tranche 1s will already be being thrown away – all of them will be gone by 2019, remember.

We paid all that money upgrading the Tranche 1s and now we’ll dispose of them without ever having pilots trained to use the upgrade! The Eurofighter story really just gets better and better.

February 21, 2011

RAF cuts pilot training numbers

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Education, Military — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 10:57

I’ve mentioned this before . . . when a big bureaucracy is forced to cut back, the instinct of most bureaucrats is to cut the “frontline”: if they have extensive public contact, cutting back there to cause the greatest disruption to the public is a common (and often effective) way to protest. The public react to the cuts in service and complain to the politicians, and (too often) the politicians soften or even rescind the cutbacks.

Britain’s Royal Air Force is having to cut back from their current numbers, and have chosen a way that will (they hope) cause some public outcry:

Britain is planning massive cuts in its armed forces, and while exact numbers are still being debated, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has gone ahead and dismissed 25 percent of 400 pilot officers currently in training. This means 20 fighter, 30 helicopters and 50 transport student pilots halt their training and become civilians again. Some of the pilot trainees are only weeks away from completing their training. Over a hundred million dollars has already been spent on the training of those dismissed, and the former officers can probably use that training to quickly complete a civilian flying course, so they can get jobs as civilian pilots.

It will also mean that the almost fully trained pilots will displace an equal number of civilian pilot trainees, and the civil aviation scene in Britain is already over-supplied with willing pilots.

February 10, 2011

No more manned fighters?

Filed under: Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:24

As I said the last time this topic came up, “This is not a repost from 1957”. We may actually be looking at the last generation of manned fighters, if this update from Strategy Page is true:

On February 4th, the U.S. Navy X-47B UCAV (unmanned combat air vehicle) made its first flight. It was three years ago that the navy rolled out its first combat UAV; the 15 ton X-47B. This pilotless aircraft has a wingspan of 20 meters/62 feet (whose outer 5 meter/15 foot portions fold up to save space on the carrier). It carries a two ton payload and will be able to stay in the air for twelve hours. The U.S. is far ahead of other nations in UCAV development, and this is energizing activity in Russia, Europe and China to develop similar aircraft.

[. . .]

All of these aircraft are stealthy and can operate completely on their own (including landing and takeoff, under software control). The UCAVs would be used for dangerous missions, like destroying enemy air defenses, and reconnaissance. Even air force commanders are eager to turn over SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) missions to UAVs. SEAD is the most dangerous mission for combat pilots. But until quite recently, all these projects had either been cancelled, or were headed in that direction.

Now, the U.S. Department of Defense wants the new UAV combat aircraft in service by the end of the decade, some twenty years ahead of a schedule that was planned in the 1990s. The F-35 is expected to cease production in 2034, more than a decade after the first combat UAVs, that can match F-35 performance, enters service.

Unable to buy new aircraft designs (because they are too expensive, or simply take too long to get into service), and facing the prospect of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) displacing more and more manned ones, the American military is spending a growing chunk of its budgets on upgrading and refurbishing the combat aircraft they already have. This was not a deliberate, long term plan, but simply a reaction to shortages of new aircraft. A lot of the new electronics and weapons involved in these upgrades can also equip UAV designs still in development, so such efforts are a double win.

More and more, it looks like the new 36 ton F-22 and 27 ton F-35 are the end of the road for manned fighter-bombers. Not just because the F-22 and F-35 cost so much to develop, but because so much new tech has arrived on the scene that it simply makes more military, and economic, sense to go with unmanned aircraft. Meanwhile, the existing F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, A-10s and all American heavy bombers are being equipped with new targeting pods and combat Internet connections, along with new radars and all sorts of electronics. Older aircraft are having worn out structural components rebuilt or replaced. This buys time until the unmanned aircraft are ready. F-35s will also fill the gap, which may be a very small one.

Usual caveats apply of course, and you could do worse than reading the comment thread on that original post for some of the caveats spelled out.

February 7, 2011

James May’s U-2 ride

Filed under: Media, Space — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 12:38

Not at all Top Gear-ish.

H/T to Jon for the link.

January 27, 2011

New entrant into the “Security Theatre Kabuki Hall of Fame”

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 12:54

Step forward, our first inductee for 2011, Gatwick Airport security staff:

Airport officials ordered a holidaymaker carrying a toy soldier onto a plane to remove its three-inch gun — because it was a safety threat.

Ken Lloyd was stunned when he was told he could not go on the plane with the nine-inch model soldier because it was carrying a ‘firearm’.

The Canadian tourist and his wife had bought the toy, which holds a replica SA80 rifle, during a visit to the Royal Signals Museum at Blandford Camp in Dorset.

Well caught, security super-heroes! Here’s the vicious piece of deadly weaponry they bravely prevented from being smuggled aboard the plane:

Grounding the Nimrod

Filed under: Britain, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:22

It’s as predictable as night following day: for every defence cut, you can find retired senior officers getting up on their hind legs and protesting:

Scrapping the RAF’s Nimrod surveillance aircraft will leave a “massive gap” in British security, former defence chiefs warned today.

The controversial decision to get rid of the £4bn fleet was taken on cost grounds as part of the government’s strategic defence and security review last year.

With the process of breaking up the equipment set to begin, a number of service chiefs signed an open letter to the Daily Telegraph warning of the dangers of the move.

“Machine tools have been destroyed; several millions of pounds have been saved but a massive gap in British security has opened,” the letter said.

“Vulnerability of sea lanes, unpredictable overseas crises and traditional surface and submarine opposition will continue to demand versatile responsive aircraft.

There was a number in there that helps to explain the cuts: £4bn. That’s a lot of money. What did the RAF get for their money? In a column from 2009, here’s Lewis Page on the manifold wonders of the Nimrod:

Quite apart from all that, the Nimrod MR2 — being a flying antique — is horribly expensive to run, both in money and in lives. The MR2’s extensive use above Afghanistan in recent times as a flying spyeye and to relay radio messages between ground units in no way justified its continued, very expensive existence; far less could such unimportant work possibly have justified the known risks of refuelling these aged birds in mid-air.

So getting rid of the MR2s loses us nothing important, and will make our service people noticeably safer — the Nimrod has actually killed one of our people for every 15 killed by the Taliban. Better still, this will permit another pricey airbase here in the UK to largely close, saving money to be spent at the front line. As a fringe benefit, the base in question — RAF Kinloss — is in a Scottish National Party constituency, giving people there a taste of the independence from the UK that they have voted for. (Strangely the local SNP member of parliament still isn’t happy.)

So the Nimrod was expensive to buy, eye-wateringly expensive to upgrade, but it must be cheap to operate, right? No:

[. . .] our new fleet of refurbished De Havilland Comet subhunters (sorry, “Nimrod MRA4s”) will cost at least £700m a year to operate. If we put the whole Nimrod force on the scrapheap for which they are so long overdue right now, by the year 2019 we will have saved [. . .] £7bn

That’s from an earlier column in 2009.

Update: Lewis Page says that scrapping the four Nimrods is great news:

The UK press is bursting with indignation today as the process of scrapping the Nimrod MRA4 submarine-hunting aircraft begins. But in fact the four planes now being broken up were a financial and engineering disaster. Had they gone into service they would have become a terrible, cripplingly expensive millstone around the neck of the Ministry of Defence. We are much, much better off without them.

[. . .]

What the ex-brasshats are bemoaning is the UK’s loss of long-range maritime patrol aircraft in general, not the Nimrod MRA4 in particular. They’re wise to draw this distinction, as the MRA4 project has now achieved the unwelcome distinction of producing the most expensive aircraft ever made: with a reported £4.1bn spent, just one is airworthy.

By comparison, a new Space Shuttle would cost about £1.75bn at current rates if it were built today. Even the staggeringly expensive B-2 nuclear Stealth bombers only cost £1.3bn apiece.

Our sole flying Nimrod MRA4 (pictured above) has wound up costing us no less than £4.1bn — and it is not even a new aircraft. All the MRA4s are refurbished and re-equipped Nimrod MR2s, which had already been purchased by the RAF long ago at inflated prices.

But wait . . . it gets even worse:

And make no mistake, scrapping the Nimrods will save money — a lot of money. Support and maintenance of a normal military aircraft can be expected to cost two to three times the acquisition price over its service life — and the Nimrod was far from normal.

In fact, the MRA4s would have been the last nine De Havilland Comet airliner airframes left flying in the world. The Comet, designed in the 1940s, failed commercially and went out of airline service many decades ago — and since then large aircraft have no longer been made in the UK.

The Nimrod/Comet is so old that it belongs to a lost era of manufacturing: this is the main reason why the MRA4 project was so horrifically late and over budget. The planes supplied for upgrading by the RAF had significant differences in size and shape — they had been essentially coach-built, bodged together with the blueprints used more as a guide than followed with any accuracy in the modern sense. Trying to rebuild, re-equip and re-engine them, with no real idea what the physical dimensions and internal layout of any given plane actually were, was a technical nightmare.

December 21, 2010

EMALs successfully launches aircraft

Filed under: Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 09:37

In what must be welcome news for naval aviators, the next-generation catapult for launching aircraft from carriers was successful in a land-based test:

The US Navy says it has successfully launched a jet fighter into flight using a radical new electromagnetically powered catapult. The feat is important for the Americans, whose next supercarrier will be a disastrous botch without the new tech: it is even more critical for the future of the Royal Navy.

The US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) announced the test success of its Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) last night, saying that the shore-based trials catapult at Lakehurst, New Jersey, successfully launched a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet on Saturday.

“I thought the launch went great,” said Lieutenant Daniel Radocaj, the test pilot who flew the Hornet off the electric mass-driver. “I got excited once I was on the catapult but I went through the same procedures as on a steam catapult. The catapult stroke felt similar to a steam catapult and EMALS met all of the expectations I had.”

The timing of the test is crucial for the US Navy’s next big warship:

The next US fleet carrier — CVN 78, aka USS Gerald R Ford — is now at an advanced stage of build, and was designed around the EMALS. If EMALS couldn’t be made to work, the US Navy would have found itself in possession of the world’s biggest helicopter carrier. There will be much celebration at NAVAIR following Saturday’s success.

December 18, 2010

Man bites dog story, military style

Filed under: Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 11:42

In Afghanistan and Iraq, they are finding uses for manned aircraft to supplement Predator UAV patrols:

The U.S. Air Force MC-12 “manned UAV replacement” has been in Afghanistan for a year, and has proved successful. This despite the fact that it can only stay in action for seven hours per sortie, versus more than twice the hours for a UAV. But the military needs more UAV capabilities (vidcams overhead for hours at a time), and doesn’t care if the pilots are in the air or on the ground.

[. . .]

The MC-12 is basically a militarized version of the Beech King Air. The army began using the Beech aircraft as the RC-12 in the 1970s, and has been seeking a replacement for the last few years. But then it was realized that the RC-12 was suitable for use as a Predator substitute.

The King Air 350 is a 5.6 ton, twin engine aircraft. The MC-12 can stay in the air for up to eight hours per sortie. Not quite what the Predator can do (over 20 hours per sortie), but good enough to help meet the demand. The MC-12 has advantages over UAVs. It can carry over a ton of sensors, several times what a Predator can haul. The MC-12 can fly higher (11 kilometers/35,000 feet) and is faster (over 500 kilometers an hour, versus 215 for the Predator.) The MC-12s cost about $20 million each, more than twice what a Predator goes for. The MC-12’s crew consists of two pilots and two equipment operators. Some of the sensors are operated from the ground.

December 14, 2010

Conservatives now still pushing corporate welfare

Filed under: Cancon, Economics, Politics, Technology — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 07:35

Okay, they’re not even pretending to be fiscally conservative any more:

The Conservative government has announced it is loaning aerospace giant Pratt & Whitney Canada $300 million for a $1 billion research project to develop the next generation of aircraft engines.

Industry Minister Tony Clement made the announcement on Monday saying it will create 700 high-skilled jobs in the GTA and more than 2,000 over the 15-year lifespan of the project. He also claimed the firm is in the process of hiring 200 engineers.

[. . .]

‘Create and maintain Canadian jobs’ has been the Conservative mantra during their recent shift to Keynesian economics and massive long-term deficits for the next half decade. The same political party that once decried government largesse and inexplicable corporate subsidies (also known affectionately as corporate welfare) is now a major player in the ‘too big to fail’ macroeconomics game.

This is nothing new: under former minister Maxime Bernier, the current darling of the small-government wing of the Conservative party, Pratt & Whitney got $350 million in corporate welfare just four years ago. That debt hasn’t been repaid.

November 30, 2010

The big hole in the TSA security screen

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 07:28

Even if the TSA is backing down on requiring pilots to go through the full pornoray scanner or humiliating pat-down, they’ve continued to leave a huge security hole open — apron workers and contract ground support staff:

Although the X-ray and metal detector rigmarole is mandatory for pilots and flight attendants, many other airport workers, including those with regular access to aircraft — to cabins, cockpits, galleys and freight compartments — are exempt. That’s correct. Uniformed pilots cannot carry butter knives onto an airplane, yet apron workers and contract ground support staff — cargo loaders, baggage handlers, fuelers, cabin cleaners, caterers — can, as a matter of routine, bypass TSA inspection entirely.

All workers with airside privileges are subject to fingerprinting, a 10-year criminal background investigation and crosschecking against terror watch lists. Additionally they are subject to random physical checks by TSA. But here’s what one apron worker at New York’s Kennedy airport recently told me:

“All I need is my Port Authority ID, which I swipe through a turnstile. The ‘sterile area’ door is not watched over by any hired security or by TSA. I have worked at JFK for more than three years now and I have yet to be randomly searched. Really the only TSA presence we notice is when the blue-shirts come down to the cafeteria to get food.”

H/T to Cory Doctorow for the link.

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