Quotulatiousness

March 16, 2010

News from a parallel universe

Filed under: Middle East, Military, Technology — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:29

The US Air Force is doing something to reverse the tide of mechanization and automation: they’ve introduced a “manned UAV”:

The MC-12 will provide the same service as a UAV (full motion video) in addition to electronic monitoring (radio, cell phone, etc.). The air force is converting some existing King Air 350s, as well as buying new ones, to obtain up to fifty MC-12s for duty as, in effect, a Predator UAV replacement. About three dozen will be in service by the end of the year. This will be a big help, because UAVs cannot be manufactured fast enough to supply battlefield needs, so the manned MC-12s helps fill the gap. The MC-12 is a militarized version of the Beech King Air. The army began using the Beech aircraft as the RC-12 in the 1970s, and has been seeking a replacement for the last few years. But it was realized that the RC-12 was suitable for use as a Predator substitute.

The King Air 350 is a 5.6 ton, twin engine aircraft that, as a UAV replacement, carries a crew of four.

A cynic might point out that it now takes four humans to replace one robot . . .

March 12, 2010

Striking at the enemy’s head

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 08:44

Strategy Page looks at the relative success of both intelligence and implementation in attacks directed at Taliban leaders:

The American campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan continues, mainly because it works. Since this “decapitation” (of key terrorists) program began in 2008, about 120 attacks have been made, killing about a thousand people. Some 30 percent of the dead were civilians, as the terrorists try to surround themselves with women and children. They believe that the American ROE (Rules of Engagement) will not permit missiles to be fired at them when there are obviously civilians nearby. But most of the missiles hit buildings at night. The Taliban and al Qaeda don’t like to discuss these attacks, even to score some media points by complaining of civilian casualties. But the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services do monitor radio and email in the area, and believe that about 700 terrorists, including two dozen senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and nearly a hundred mid-level ones, have died from the UAV missile attacks. Civilian deaths are minimized by trying to catch the terrorists while travelling, or otherwise away from civilians.

[. . .]

While the terrorist groups are concerned about the losses, especially among the leadership, what alarms them the most is how frequently the American UAVs are finding their key people. The real problem the terrorists have is that someone is ratting them out. Someone, or something, is helping the Americans find the terrorist leaders. That would be Pakistani intelligence (ISI), which promptly began feeling some heat when the civilians were back in power in 2008. After the purge of many Islamic radical (or pro-radical) officers, the information from the Pakistani informant network began to reach the Americans.

This Hellfire campaign is hitting al Qaeda at the very top, although only a quarter of the attacks so far have taken out any of the most senior leaders. But that means over half the senior leadership have been killed or badly wounded in the last two years. Perhaps even greater damage has been done to the terrorist middle management. These are old and experienced lieutenants, as well as young up-and-comers. They are the glue that holds al Qaeda and the Taliban together. Their loss is one reason why it’s easier to get more information on where leaders are, and why rank-and-file al Qaeda and Taliban are less effective of late.

March 2, 2010

Military neglect: “it’s how we’ve always done it”

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Politics, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:23

Matt Gurney discusses the military share of the federal budget, in light of proposed spending restrictions in the upcoming throne speech:

It can’t be denied that the Harper government has delivered what the troops needed. German-made tanks, American transport helicopters and British artillery cannons have made our troops more effective and harder to kill. But it has also revealed an enduring flaw in Canadian military procurement policy: In peacetime, we convince ourselves we’ll never need a military, and in wartime, we pay through the nose to buy one off the shelf. From building virtually a whole new navy and air force to battle the Nazis, to the recent race to get drones and helicopters into Kandahar in time to make a difference, it’s how we’ve always done it. This must change.

Neglecting our Forces in peacetime and then racing to properly equip them once they’re already committed to battle not only puts our men and women in danger, it’s fiscally inefficient. It would be better, both for our military and our treasury, to commit ourselves to maintaining a large, robust military in peacetime that is capable of going to war on short notice, with all it needs already on hand. That means maintaining a high tempo of training, recruiting enough manpower to fill the ranks, and replacing obsolete or worn out equipment promptly.

[. . .] arguably, each branch of the Canadian Forces, most particularly the army but certainly the navy as well, ought to be considerably larger than it is. Even if Canadians are willing to settle for the status quo — a small military that uses technology and guts to punch above its weight — we’re going to need to spend to keep us there.

Many will no doubt argue that Canada doesn’t need a powerful military. But to their credit, the Conservatives, who’ve spent the last several years positioning themselves as the party that gave the military its pride back, aren’t taking that line. Thursday’s budget — and those that follow it — must put the money where their mouths have been.

Historically, Canadians have not supported military spending outside wartime. The necessity of paying for salaries, training, and equipment when they’re not actively being employed seems to most Canadians to be wasted spending. Even when the government manages to overcome its hesitation to spend money on new kit, it is viewed primarily as a source of regional development assistance, political patronage, or industrial policy, rather than providing the troops with the tools they need to do their jobs.

It’s (barely) possible that the goalposts have shifted over the last several years: Canada’s military has a higher profile in public eyes than at any time since 1945. Canadians are far more individually supportive of soldiers, sailors, and airmen than ever before. Perhaps there won’t be the political cost to the government for paying the extra financial costs to keep our military kit up to current standards.

But the smart money isn’t betting on that as the most likely outcome.

February 12, 2010

Careful wording of poll questions significantly influences responses

Filed under: Media, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 09:09

I know, “duh!”

But most people don’t know how much the choice of questions does influence the outcome of polling. This is a perfect example:

As the Obama administration proposes repealing the policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” a new New York Times/CBS News poll finds that a majority of the public support allowing openly gay men and women to serve in the military.

There’s less support, however, for allowing homosexuals to serve openly.

Confused?

The results highlight the importance of wording on the issue. In a test, half of the poll’s respondents were asked their opinion on permitting “gay men and lesbians” to serve, and the other half were asked about permitting “homosexuals” to serve.

The wording of the question proved to make a difference. Seven in 10 respondents said they favor allowing “gay men and lesbians” to serve in the military, including nearly 6 in 10 who said they should be allowed to serve openly. But support was somewhat lower among those who were asked about allowing “homosexuals” to serve, with 59 percent in favor, including 44 percent who support allowing them to serve openly.

This is a very simple example. It can get a lot more sneaky:

February 11, 2010

Britain to try new method of trimming defence budget: locking the generals out

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:40

It’s an unusual way of “[fixing] the counter-productive incentives within the system”:

Lord Drayson, the British arms industry’s man inside the Ministry of Defence, has moved to lock the heads of the armed services out of the room in which the Forces’ future is to be settled. This is being billed as an attempt to prevent interservice bickering, but it will leave the rapacious UK arms business facing almost no uniformed opposition in its bid to pocket more government cash.

The Financial Times, having seen a copy of a speech to be delivered by Drayson, reports that a new MoD committee set up to “review direction and affordability” will not include the heads of the army, navy and air force “because we need to fix the counter-productive incentives within the system”, according to Drayson.

“We need to make sure that the decisions made about capability are rigorously examined… from the perspective of Defence overall and not a single viewpoint within Defence,” the noble lord is expected to add.

A skeptic might assume that there’s no good reason for this, but there is a plausible explanation:

The RAF, left to itself, would squander fortunes on buying more Eurofighters and then turning them into a deep-strike force capable of penetrating strong enemy air defences — a thing that it is vanishingly unlikely the UK will need to do. The Army is currently planning to spend no less than £14bn recreating its heavy tank force, despite the fact that it is 20 years since that force went to war — and the general who commanded it then has since said that in fact the last real tank battles ever seen took place 20 years before that.

The Navy is also wasting money foolishly at the moment, not on aircraft carriers as everyone thinks — those are a good idea and a joint-service one to boot, and cheap in this context at £4-5bn — but on billion-pound unarmed missile destroyers.

January 22, 2010

On the fight card today, RAF versus RN

Filed under: Britain, Military, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:54

No matter what the outcome of the next British general election, the military situation is going to be near the top of the agenda for the incoming government. Britain’s army is stretched very thin with overseas obligations, while the RN and the RAF are at daggers drawn over the future of British carrier aircraft. The RAF would love to sink the navy’s carrier plans, as it would free up huge amounts of budget room for them to buy new toys for themselves (if there are no carriers, there’s no need to buy carrier aircraft, which are much more expensive than similar non-maritime planes). If the RAF succeeds, the army would prefer more money for troops on the ground, helicopters, and unmanned drones. The Economist provides a state-of-play summary:

Even in a great seafaring nation, the remorseless logic of austerity forces admirals to plead for their budgets. It has long been clear that fixing the fiscal crisis would mean taking money from the already cash-strapped Ministry of Defence. Where to make the cuts is something military chiefs have started to argue about in public.

On January 19th Sir Mark Stanhope, Britain’s top admiral, defended long-standing plans to build two expensive new aircraft carriers. The country is bogged down now in an Afghan ground war, he said, but future conflicts may require projecting power by sea. Britain has flirted with phasing out its carriers before, only for the Falklands war to prove their indispensability.

The day before, Sir Mark’s opposite number in the army, Sir David Richards, said that Britain’s agonies in Afghanistan showed the need for more helicopters and unmanned drones, and for better-equipped troops. An “impressive” amount of this gear could be bought if money were redirected from expensive equipment intended for big state-on-state wars; the risk of such conflicts was small enough to be dealt with through NATO (ie, America). Though Sir Richard did not say carriers should be cut (he offered to get rid of some army tanks), they are an obvious target.

It has been an aspect of all British governments since 1945 to take on additional responsibilities while constantly looking for economies in the military budget. Neither the Conservative opposition nor the current Labour government wants to take the political heat for increased military spending (that’s not even in consideration: the debate is over how deep the cuts must be). During a recession, it’s understandable that the politicians would take this kind of stance, but this is true regardless of the state of the economy.

December 16, 2009

More info on the RAF cuts

Filed under: Britain, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 12:50

Lewis Page finds the MoD’s recently announced cuts to — shock, horror — make good military and economic sense:

It doesn’t happen often, but just for once there’s good news out of the Ministry of Defence — good news for British troops in combat overseas, and good news for British taxpayers too. But it’s bad news for the UK arms biz, and bad news for certain regional communities who rely on the MoD to bring them government money they wouldn’t otherwise receive — and don’t particularly deserve.

So what’s the government done?

In essence, they have cut down massively on military things which we don’t — and almost certainly won’t — need, and ordered a lot of things which we are desperately short of.

Other than the reduction of the RAF’s Harrier force by one squadron, the government also indicated they may cut the Tornado force by one or two squadrons. This is sensible because the Tornado was designed to do a job that no longer needs to be done — or, rather, no longer needs to be done by manned bombers. Another big change is that the RAF will be losing their Nimrod aircraft, which has both military and political aspects:

Quite apart from all that, the Nimrod MR2 — being a flying antique — is horribly expensive to run, both in money and in lives. The MR2’s extensive use above Afghanistan in recent times as a flying spyeye and to relay radio messages between ground units in no way justified its continued, very expensive existence; far less could such unimportant work possibly have justified the known risks of refuelling these aged birds in mid-air.

So getting rid of the MR2s loses us nothing important, and will make our service people noticeably safer — the Nimrod has actually killed one of our people for every 15 killed by the Taliban. Better still, this will permit another pricey airbase here in the UK to largely close, saving money to be spent at the front line. As a fringe benefit, the base in question — RAF Kinloss — is in a Scottish National Party constituency, giving people there a taste of the independence from the UK that they have voted for. (Strangely the local SNP member of parliament still isn’t happy**.)

December 15, 2009

RAF and Royal Navy facing further cuts

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 07:40

With the costs of maintaining British troops in Afghanistan still rising, the government is expected to announce further cuts to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy today:

Some RAF bases face closure to pay for extra equipment for British forces in Afghanistan, a defence minister indicated this morning.

Quentin Davies said that it would be a “very good thing” to get by with fewer RAF bases if that was possible and that the Ministry of Defence wanted to spend its money with “maximum effect”.

[. . .]

Some Tornado and Harrier aircraft and small navy surface vessels are likely to face cuts. A number of RAF bases will be closed — including reportedly RAF Kinloss in Moray — and part of the sovereign base areas in Cyprus will be sold.

The two large aircraft carriers are expected to survive this particular cut, although it wouldn’t be surprising to see further delay introduced into their construction . . . even though stretching out delivery dates is an expensive way to increase short-term savings:

The announcement follows the publication of a report from the National Audit Office saying the gap between the cost of planned weapons projects and what the MoD can actually afford could be as much as £36bn.

The gap would have been larger had the ministry not delayed a number of projects, such as the construction of two large aircraft carriers, the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales, the NAO reports.

However, the decision to delay the carrier project to save £450m over the next four years will increase costs by £1.12bn over later years — a net increase of £674m, the NAO says.

The MoD has also decided to reduce an order of Lynx Wildcats from 80 to 62 helicopters, saving £194m but reducing planned flying hours by a third. The report says that last year the price for the 15 biggest military schemes rose by £1.2bn, £733m of which was the result of delays designed to save money in the short term.

Update: Believe it or not, there’s actually some sense to the government’s announced changes:

The headlining move comes with the announcement, widely anticipated, that the British fleet of US-made Chinook heavy-lift helicopters is to increase from 48 to 70 aircraft, with initial deliveries of ten new choppers arriving by 2013. The Chinook is the only helicopter in widespread Western service with enough spare lift to operate with any freedom in Afghanistan’s heat and high altitudes, and the new copters will be extremely welcome among British forces there.

It is also expected that another Boeing C-17 heavy transport plane will be ordered to join the existing UK fleet of 5, which are regarded as crucial to sustaining the “air bridge” logistic link between Blighty and its troops in Afghanistan.

These short-term improvements will be paid for not by any budget increase, but by reducing the active forces of Tornado bombers and Harrier close-support jets, and early retirement for much of the existing fleet of antique Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft. These moves will allow closure or mothballing of some of the RAF’s 45+ UK stations, with associated further job losses and savings.

They’ve also announced the retirement of the Sea King helicopter from active service, with the existing inventory of Merlin HC3 moving from the RAF to RN service (including whatever refitting will be necessary to “maricise” them for full-time service with the fleet).

Overall, the changes make a good deal of sense . . . what a surprise.

December 8, 2009

India grounds their SU-30 fighters (again)

Filed under: India, Military, Russia — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 08:26

The Indian military has grounded their fleet of Russian SU-30 fighters after a crash involving a more advanced version:

For the second time this year, India has grounded its Su-30 fighters because one of the aircraft crashed. This time, the grounding of the 98 Su-30s in service is expected to last only a few days. Earlier this year, in May, its Su-30 fighters were grounded for a month after one of them appeared to develop engine problems and crashed. One of the pilots survived, but the parachute of the other failed to open. Four days before the Indian Su-30 went down, a Russian Su-35 also crashed because of engine problems. The Su-35 is an advanced version of the Su-30, and uses a similar engine. Earlier this year, Russia grounded all its MiG-29 fighters to check for structural problems, after one of them came apart in flight. All this is particularly upsetting to Indians, who had been assured by the Russians that the Su-30 was a modern (built to Western standards of reliability) aircraft. Such assurances were necessary because of earlier Indian experience with the MiG-21, and Russian aircraft in general. So far this year, India has lost twelve military aircraft, most of them of Russian design.

November 19, 2009

Female fighter pilots in Pakistan, but not in India

Filed under: China, India, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 08:30

Strategy Page looks at the differing outlooks for female pilots in Indian and Pakistani service:

The Indian Air Force does not plan to train women to be fighter pilots. Neighboring Pakistan is not much better, even though it has seven female fighter pilots. They fly F-7s, a Chinese version of the Russian MiG-21. None have been in combat yet, despite the heavy use of jet fighter-bombers in nearly a year of fighting in the tribal territories. There, the more modern F-16s are doing most of the bombing of Taliban targets. The Indian air force leaders believe that it costs so much (over $2 million) to train a fighter pilot, that they air force needs 10-15 years of active service to get that investment back. But women tend to leave the air force to have children, thus making them much more expensive fighter pilots than their male counterparts. So the Indian leadership is holding off on female fighter pilots.

Women flying Pakistani F-7s are a very recent development, part of a program that only began six years ago. Pakistan is not alone using women as fighter pilots, with China graduating its first 16 female fighter pilots this year. There are already 52 women flying non-combat aircraft, and another 545 in training. India has female military pilots, who only operate helicopters and transports.

[. . .]

All the nations considering female fighter pilots, are having a hard time keeping male pilots in uniform. Too many of the men depart for more lucrative, and less stressful, careers as commercial pilots. Women may not be the solution. Currently, only about half of Indian female officers stay in past their initial five year contract. Indian women, even military pilots, are under tremendous social and family pressure to marry. Those that do may still be pilots, but married women expected to have children. The Indian Air Force provides its female officers with ten months leave for this, six months during pregnancy, and four months after delivery. The air force does all this because pilots are very expensive to train. Fuel costs the same everywhere, as are spare parts. So what India may save in lower salaries, is not enough. A good pilot costs over half a million dollars for training expenses, and requires over five years flying experience to become effective in a first line fighter (the Su-30 for India). It’s all that expensive aviation fuel that pushes the final “cost of a fighter pilot” to over $2 million. Many women are willing to take up the challenge. But they have already heard from their peers in Western air force, that motherhood and piloting can be a very exhausting combination.

November 16, 2009

Harrier replacement moves to next stage

Filed under: Britain, Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 13:28

The F-35B has been delivered to an American base for testing of its vertical take-off and hover capabilities:

The F-35 “Lightning II” B model will, like other versions of the same aircraft, offer supersonic performance and stealth technology – a combo so far offered in only one aircraft in the world, the famous F-22 Raptor ultrasuperfighter. But the F-35B, unlike its tailhook and normal-runway counterparts, is also equipped with a central lift fan mounted in a shaft through the fuselage and can swivel its jet exhaust downwards too.

This means that an armed and fuelled F-35B should be able to make a very short takeoff run to get airborne and then, having burned fuel and perhaps released weapons, make a vertical landing supported entrirely by engine thrust. This Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capability has so far been offered in the Western-aligned world only by the famous Harrier, originally developed in Britain and now in service with the RAF, the Royal Navy and the US Marines.

Of course, Britain’s interest is moving toward being purely intellectual . . . the bookies are offering long odds on Britain ever commissioning even one of those two new aircraft carriers, never mind both of them. Back story here, here, and here.

November 13, 2009

Follow-up on Northwest’s overflight situation

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Military, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 19:41

The New York Times reports on the FAA’s investigation into the October 21st incident (see blog post here, including commmentary from one of the spokesmen involved):

Air traffic control supervisors delayed nearly an hour in notifying Norad, the military air defense command, that a Northwest Airlines jetliner was not responding to radio calls, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration said on Friday. The delay was a violation of detailed procedures put in place after the quadruple hijackings of Sept. 11, 2001.

The lapse probably made no difference to Norad, said the administrator, J. Randolph Babbitt, because while the Air Force did ready fighter jets in the incident, it never decided to order them into the air.

Decisions on how to handle planes that do not respond to air traffic control instructions are based on a variety of factors, Mr. Babbitt said. Among them are whether the plane is in a metropolitan area, whether it is flying erratically and whether it is sending signals that it has been hijacked. None of those was the case on Oct. 21, when Northwest Flight 188, from San Diego to Minneapolis, flew about 150 miles past the airport.

November 11, 2009

In memorium

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 11:00

A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:

The Great War

  • Private William Penman, Scots Guards, died 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 1915 at Loos, age 35
    (Elizabeth’s great grandfather)
  • Private Walter Porteous, Northumberland Fusiliers, died 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
    (my great uncle)
  • Corporal John Mulholland, Royal Tank Corps, died 1918 at Harbonnieres, age 24
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)

The Second World War

  • Flying Officer Richard Porteous, RAF, survived the defeat in Malaya and lived through the war
    (my uncle)
  • Able Seaman John Penman, RN, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Murmansk Run (and other convoy routes), lived through the war
    (Elizabeth’s father)
  • Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured at Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp
    (Elizabeth’s uncle)

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.

Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD (1872-1918)

October 26, 2009

An alternative spending plan for Britain’s MoD

Filed under: Britain, Economics, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:16

Lewis Page looks at the Ministry of Defence and comes up with innovative ways to both save money and increase military capabilities:

Under the plan as laid out in the Times, the Ministry of Defence would still buy the two planned new carriers, to be dubbed HMS Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales. However the Prince of Wales would not be operated as a strike carrier with a force of jets; instead she would be a “commando carrier”, a floating forward-mounting airbase full of marines, helicopters and drones. This would mean no need to replace HMS Ocean, the navy’s current helicopters’n’marines ship — which would, according to the Thunderer, cost £600m in the 20-teens. (That seems pretty steep as Ocean herself only cost £150m in the mid ’90s).

This is the same story I linked to yesterday, although I said I suspected that the MoD had probably decided that their best plan was to scrap the carriers altogether. Part of the problem is that the Royal Navy can’t depend on the Royal Air Force to join with them in the larger purchase of aircraft:

It has long been known that the RAF doesn’t want to replace its own Harrier force — it would rather spend that money upgrading as many of its Eurofighter Typhoons as it can. The horrifyingly expensive Typhoon was designed as a pure air-to-air fighter, and at the moment it mostly still is — though a few RAF ones have been given an “austere” bombing capability.

The RAF would like to rebuild and re-equip as many of its largely irrelevant Typhoons as possible, giving them such things as trendy electronically-scanned radars and air-launched cruise missiles of various sorts. This would, perhaps, enable the Typhoon force to tackle tough enemy air-defence networks of the sort possessed by nations such as Iran and Russia.

There’s another over-priced item on the MoD budget that could be cut without seriously impacting military capabilities:

But there are many better ways to cut money from the MoD than crippling our new carrier force. To give just one example, our new fleet of refurbished De Havilland Comet subhunters (sorry, “Nimrod MRA4s”) will cost at least £700m a year to operate. If we put the whole Nimrod force on the scrapheap for which they are so long overdue right now, by the year 2019 we will have saved the £7bn needed to buy the missing eighty-odd JSFs for our second carrier — and the Prince of Wales isn’t actually going to be afloat much before then, so that’s not a problem.

[. . .]

There are many, many other such stories. We could buy cheap Sky Warrior auto-drones off the shelf rather than expensive Watchkeepers. We could equip the carriers properly and so buy cheaper F-35 C tailhook planes rather than pricey B-model jumpjets — this would save money straight off, and save a fortune on the vital carrier radar planes. Indeed, we could buy much cheaper Super Hornets to begin with, if we wanted to save a lot of cash. We could bin the expensive, feeble A400M transport and buy nice cheap C-17s instead. Rather than upgrading squadrons of Eurofighters into superbombers at a cost of billions we could buy a force of vastly more cost-effective turboprop strike planes to back our troops in Afghanistan. The list goes on.

I rather agree about the A400M . . . although Britain isn’t paying as much as South Africa for their planes.

Related: Strategy Page looks at the costs involved in refitting current USN aircraft carriers, and in designing and building the next generation of CVNs.

October 24, 2009

“Controllers have a heightened sense of vigilance . . . post-9/11”

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Military, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 00:04

Maybe I’m just being hyper-critical here, but an aircraft being out of communication with air traffic control “over two states” does not equate with the claimed “heightened sense of vigilance”. Especially as “worried officials alerted National Guard jets to go after the airliner from two locations, although none of the military planes got off the runway”:

A report released by airport police Friday identified the pilot as Timothy B. Cheney and the first officer as Richard I. Cole. The report said the men were “co-operative, apologetic and appreciative” and volunteered to take preliminary breath tests that were zero for alcohol use. The report also said the lead flight attendant told police she was unaware of any incident during the flight.

The pilots, both temporarily suspended, are to be interviewed next week by investigators of the National Transportation Safety Board. The airline, acquired last year by Delta Air Lines, also is investigating. Messages left at both men’s homes were not immediately returned.

Investigators do not know whether the pilots may have fallen asleep, but NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway said Friday that fatigue and cockpit distraction will be looked into. The plane’s flight recorders were brought to the board’s Washington headquarters.

Voss, the Flight Safety Foundation president, said a special consideration was that the many safety checks built into the aviation system to prevent incidents like this one, or to correct them quickly, apparently were ineffective until the very end. Not only were air traffic controllers and other pilots unable raise the Northwest pilots for an hour, but the airline’s dispatcher should have been trying to reach them as well. The three flight attendants onboard should have questioned why no preparations for landing were ordered. Brightly lit cockpit displays should have warned the pilots it was time to land. Despite cloudy weather, the city lights of Minneapolis should have clued them in that they had reached their destination.

NWA188_flight_path

I don’t know how involved a discussion has to be to get you to ignore your duties for that long, but if I were in charge of either air traffic control (ATC) or inteceptor aircraft for central North America, I’d be asking very pointed questions of my subordinates. A large commercial passenger aircraft should not be out of contact with sequential ATC points without some alarms being raised . . . yes, it could be communication equipment failure, but after 9/11, any unexpected communications failure with commercial aircraft should have raised red flags. The reported lack of scrambled interceptor aircraft implies either bureaucratic incompetence or criminal negligence.

As one or two people have pointed out, the flight was headed into non-critical airspace (Wisconsin, then Ontario), so perhaps the perceived need to scramble fighters was lower than if the flight profile had deviated toward Chicago or somewhere “important”.

Update: Doug Church of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association provides a clarification in the comments.

Update, 13 November: FAA indicates that air traffic controllers should have alerted NORAD much earlier than they did.

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