Quotulatiousness

June 1, 2010

Media emphasis distorts extent of conflicts

Filed under: Media, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 07:53

Strategy Page points out one of the baleful aspects of modern media coverage of wars and other conflicts:

Worldwide violence continues to decline, but most people are unaware of this because the mass media will feature whatever wars and disorder they can find. This is an old journalistic technique, and it’s good for business. But not so helpful if you are trying to keep track of what’s really happening out there. Oddly enough, the most bloody conflicts (like Congo) get the least media coverage. Reporting tends to be distorted by how accessible wars are, as well as how easily your viewers could identify with the combatants. The media also has a hard time keeping score. For years, Iraq was portrayed as a disaster until, suddenly, the enemy was crushed. Even that was not considered exciting enough to warrant much attention, and that story is still poorly covered by the mass media. Same pattern is playing out in Afghanistan, where the defeats of the Taliban, and triumph of the drug gangs, go unreported or distorted. If you step back and take a look at all the wars going on, a more accurate picture emerges.

Worldwide, violence continues the decline is has exhibited for most of the decade. For example, violence has greatly diminished, or disappeared completely, in places like Iraq, Nepal, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Chechnya, Congo, Indonesia and Burundi. Even Afghanistan, touted as the new war zone, was not nearly as violent this past six months as the headlines would deceive you into believing.

All this continues a trend that began when the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union no longer subsidized terrorist and rebel groups everywhere. The current wars are basically uprisings against police states or feudal societies, which are seen as out-of-step with the modern world. Many are led by radicals preaching failed dogmas (Islamic conservatism, Maoism), that still resonate among people who don’t know about the dismal track records of these creeds. Iran has picked up some of the lost Soviet terrorist support effort. That keeps Hezbollah, Hamas, and a few smaller groups going, and that’s it. Terrorists in general miss the Soviets, who really knew how to treat bad boys right.

May 26, 2010

French and German troops play catch-up

Filed under: Europe, France, Germany, Military — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 07:47

Strategy Page looks at recent changes in the role of French and German troops in Afghanistan:

Since France and Germany loosened up their ROE (Rules of Engagement) in the last year, and allowed their troops to more readily engage Taliban gunmen, there has been a lot more combat for them. Before the ROE change, the Taliban generally ignored the German and French troops, knowing that these foreigners would not interfere with Taliban terrorism operations, and would not even fire unless the Taliban fired on the foreign troops first. But now that the French and Germans can go after any Taliban they spot (or suspect they’ve spotted), the Taliban have become much more aggressive against the French and Germans.

This led to the Germans and French discovering that they were not really equipped or trained to deal with the Taliban. The Americans, British, Canadians, Dutch and Australians made it all look so easy. But it isn’t, so now the French and Germans are hustling new equipment (especially armored vehicles, UAVs and sensors like night sights and thermals) to their troops in Afghanistan. But another shortcoming was training, and that was solved by borrowing training manuals (and some trainers) from their combat experienced allies, and starting to train troops back home, before sending them to Afghanistan. This meant having MRAPs back home, as well as realistic training exercises to get the troops ready.

May 17, 2010

“Of course . . . we care about winning the hearts and minds of people in Afghanistan . . .”

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 18:00

Radley Balko contrasts the ease with which Police SWAT teams can operate compared to the rather more restrictive terms under which army units in Afghanistan have to operate:

A reader who asks his name not be used writes about the drug raid video from Columbia, Missouri:

I am a US Army officer, currently serving in Afghanistan. My first thought on reading this story is this: Most American police SWAT teams probably have fewer restrictions on conducting forced entry raids than do US forces in Afghanistan.

For our troops over here to conduct any kind of forced entry, day or night, they have to meet one of two conditions: have a bad guy (or guys) inside actively shooting at them; or obtain permission from a 2-star general, who must be convinced by available intelligence (evidence) that the person or persons they’re after is present at the location, and that it’s too dangerous to try less coercive methods. The general can be pretty tough to convince, too. (I’m a staff liason, and one of my jobs is to present these briefings to obtain the required permission.)

[. . .]

I’ve heard similar accounts from other members of the military. A couple of years ago after I’d given a speech on this issue, a retired military officer and former instructor at West Point specifically asked me to stop using the term “militarization,” because he thought comparing SWAT teams to the military reflected poorly on the military.

H/T to Tom Kelly, who sent the Instapundit link from which I got the title for this post.

April 19, 2010

Sometimes simple ideas are best

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:02

A case where super-sizing is a good thing:

The product was inspired by a marine who, while serving in Somalia in 1993, thought it an obvious thing to have large size wipes. But there was no such product on the market. So the ex-marine took the idea to a friend who ran a gym, who then developed the product and found someone to manufacture it. All that took fifteen years, from the time the sweaty marine in Somalia got the idea.

Klenz Showers is a towel sized (2×4 feet/61x122cm) baby wipe. It was designed so that the package containing it fit into the pockets of field uniforms. The Klenz Showers wipe was large enough to clean yourself up, and feel refreshed. There was no scent, but there was aloe, so that the wipe helped heal the usual scrapes troops accumulated out in the bush. To keep the Klenz Showers light, you have to add four ounces (120ml) of water before using.

In the last two years, the Klenz Showers have become a major boost to morale, and cleanliness, for troops in Afghanistan, where many of them are out in the hills for weeks at a time. After ammo, water, batteries and food, the troops want their Klenz Showers packets.

Once you get past the initial “Dude, it’s a baby wipe” reaction, this is actually a really good idea.

April 14, 2010

Unexpected findings on delaying or avoiding PTSD

Filed under: Health, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:58

With American troops being deployed so frequently to combat missions over the last few years, efforts to diagnose and treat Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have become far more urgent. The risk of troops suffering from PTSD goes up the longer they are in combat or combat-like situations. The repeat deployments can’t be avoided, but other things can be done to reduce the risks:

The U.S. Army has found that PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) often does not appear immediately after combat, but gradually, over a longer (5-10 year) period. Short term, the army has found that 14 percent of troops on their first combat tour have stress problems. That goes to 18 percent for those on their second tour, and 31 percent for those on their third. But in the longer term (after five years of being in combat), 24 percent of troops who have served 12 months (one tour) in a combat zone will develop some PTSD. That goes to 39 percent for those who serve two tours and 64 percent for those who do three. The army wants to limit the number of troops suffering from PTSD. This is essential if the army is to maintain an experienced combat force.

[. . .]

Once a soldier has PTSD, they are usually no longer fit for combat, and many troops headed for Afghanistan are falling into this category. PTSD makes it difficult for people to function, or get along with others. With treatment (medication, and therapy), you can recover from PTSD. But this can take months or years. In extreme cases, there is no recovery. And while being treated, you stay away from the combat zone.

The army has found that PTSD can be delayed, or even avoided, by providing the troops with what previous generations of soldiers would have considered luxuries. For example, when possible, combat troops sleep in air conditioned rooms, and have access to the Internet and video games, as well as good food and other amenities. The video games and Internet resulted in an unexpected positive effect. The surveys found that troops that spent 2-4 hours a day on the Internet or playing video games (even violent ones) had far fewer stress problems. Having exercise facilities available also helped, despite the physically strenuous nature of combat in Afghanistan. While the combat troops spend most of their time out in the countryside, living rough, their commanders know what even a few days back at a larger base, with all the goodies, makes a big difference in attitudes, morale and combat effectiveness.

March 23, 2010

Post-traumatic stress in soldiers

Filed under: Health, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 07:35

Strategy Page looks at the rising rate of reported Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the forces engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq:

As expected the U.S. Army is beginning to see more widespread effects from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). There are two main indicators. The suicide rate, which has gone from 9 per 100,000 troops in 2001, to 23 last year, gets most of the media attention. The less noticed indicator, which impacts a lot more people, is the use of anti-stress medications. These have gone up 76 percent since 2001. About 17 percent of all troops now take these drugs, including six percent of those in combat zones. In 2001, the troops used these drugs to about the same degree as the civilian population (ten percent.) The impact of these drugs, especially in combination, can be unpredictable. The army is still waiting to see how this increased use of anti-stress medications will play out. This is all unknown territory.

[. . .]

Nearly a century of energetic effort to diagnose and treat PTSD (including much recent attention to civilian victims, via accidents or criminal assault), had made it clear that most troops eventually got PTSD if they were in combat long enough. During World War II, it was found that, on average, 200 days of combat would bring on a case of PTSD for American troops. After World War II, methods were found to delay the onset of PTSD (more breaks from combat, better living conditions in the combat zone, prompt treatment when PTSD was detected). That’s why combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan often sleep in air conditioned quarters, have Internet access, lots of amenities, and a two week vacation (anywhere) in the middle of their combat tour. This has extended their useful time in combat, before PTSD sets in. No one is yet sure what the new combat days average is, and new screening methods are an attempt to find out. But more troops appear to be hitting, or approaching, the limits.

March 12, 2010

Striking at the enemy’s head

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 08:44

Strategy Page looks at the relative success of both intelligence and implementation in attacks directed at Taliban leaders:

The American campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan continues, mainly because it works. Since this “decapitation” (of key terrorists) program began in 2008, about 120 attacks have been made, killing about a thousand people. Some 30 percent of the dead were civilians, as the terrorists try to surround themselves with women and children. They believe that the American ROE (Rules of Engagement) will not permit missiles to be fired at them when there are obviously civilians nearby. But most of the missiles hit buildings at night. The Taliban and al Qaeda don’t like to discuss these attacks, even to score some media points by complaining of civilian casualties. But the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services do monitor radio and email in the area, and believe that about 700 terrorists, including two dozen senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and nearly a hundred mid-level ones, have died from the UAV missile attacks. Civilian deaths are minimized by trying to catch the terrorists while travelling, or otherwise away from civilians.

[. . .]

While the terrorist groups are concerned about the losses, especially among the leadership, what alarms them the most is how frequently the American UAVs are finding their key people. The real problem the terrorists have is that someone is ratting them out. Someone, or something, is helping the Americans find the terrorist leaders. That would be Pakistani intelligence (ISI), which promptly began feeling some heat when the civilians were back in power in 2008. After the purge of many Islamic radical (or pro-radical) officers, the information from the Pakistani informant network began to reach the Americans.

This Hellfire campaign is hitting al Qaeda at the very top, although only a quarter of the attacks so far have taken out any of the most senior leaders. But that means over half the senior leadership have been killed or badly wounded in the last two years. Perhaps even greater damage has been done to the terrorist middle management. These are old and experienced lieutenants, as well as young up-and-comers. They are the glue that holds al Qaeda and the Taliban together. Their loss is one reason why it’s easier to get more information on where leaders are, and why rank-and-file al Qaeda and Taliban are less effective of late.

March 3, 2010

Horses for courses: weapons and targets

Filed under: Middle East, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 09:00

Strategy Page reports on changing conditions in Afghanistan forcing troops to adapt, especially in the personal weapons category:

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has learned that the safest way to attack foreign troops, is at long distance (at least 300 meters away). That’s because most foreign troops are armed with 5.56mm assault rifles. These are very accurate, and deadly, at under 200 meters. But beyond that, the 5.56mm bullet rapidly loses accuracy and hitting power. So the Taliban will set up a long range ambush using one or more 7.62mm machine-guns, 7.62mm rifles (preferred by snipers and sharpshooters everywhere, but in Afghanistan this often means a decades old bolt action weapon) and RPGs(rocket propelled grenades.)

[. . .]

The foreign troops have learned to adapt. For example, British infantry squads in Afghanistan have learned to adjust their armament to the mission. For example, when the troops will not be travelling long distances, over rough terrain, and expect to encounter armed resistance, they will carry more firepower, including more long range weapons. Thus an eight man squad will go out with two men armed with L85 5.56mm assault rifles (one equipped with a 40mm grenade launcher), two with 5.56mm LSW automatic rifles (an L85 with a longer and heavier barrel), two with 5.56mm FN Minimi machine-guns and two with FN-MAG 7.62mm machine-guns. The latter are particularly useful if the squad is fired on by an enemy several hundred meters away. These “heavy” squads are also receiving the new 7.62mm L129A1 semi-automatic sharpshooter rifles, and one of those will often be carried along as well. Most squads already have one man armed with the existing FN-FAL 7.62mm sharpshooter rifle. Thus the heavy squad would go out with only one standard L85 assault rifle, and that one carrying a 40mm grenade launcher attachment under the barrel. The 40mm grenades are officially accurate out to 400 meters. But an experienced grenadier can put rounds on targets at twice that range.

Under normal conditions, the squad is armed with four L85s, two LSWs and two FN Minimis. One L85 has the 40mm grenade launcher and, especially in Afghanistan (where longer shots are more common), one L85 is often replaced with a 7.62mm sharpshooter rifle. In some cases, one or both of the LSWs are replaced by a 7.62mm or .338 sniper rifle.

This informal upgrading of squad firepower is nothing new, and was quite common during World War II, where even captured enemy weapons (particularly automatics) were carried instead of the standard infantry rifle.

During peacetime, there’s the official, standard TO&E. When the shooting starts, the troops on the ground quickly adapt. That’s SOP.

February 24, 2010

Sex and the single warlord

Filed under: Media, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:50

Strategy Page discusses one of the less-well-publicized aspects of life in Afghanistan:

[. . .] in the Islamic world, sex is, well classified. Especially illicit sex. Thus some enterprising reporters have latched onto the ancient practice (in the entire region, from North Africa to India) of using young (well, teenage down to about ten) boys for sex and other entertainments (dancing, cross dressing, camel jockeys). This has been a thing with the rich and powerful in the area, for thousands of years. In some places it is sort of legal, but generally it is tolerated, even if officially forbidden. That’s because this sort of thing is most popular among the wealthy and powerful. Getting this story for Western audiences is dangerous, as those who indulge would rather make Western reporters disappear, than stop. These guys don’t consider themselves pederasts, just the custodians of ancient cultural traditions. Or something like that.

When the Taliban came to power in the mid 1990s, they outlawed the practice, but it continued anyway, just more discreetly. The Taliban tried to crack down on homosexuality in general, especially in the south, around Kandahar (the “capital” of the pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes.) Didn’t work. Casual homosexuality has long been the custom down there, and Afghans from other parts of the country (especially non-Pushtuns) have a large repertoire of humor and insults about the proclivities of those Kandaharis (one of the more printable ones is about how birds flying over Kandahar have to do so with one wing, as the other one must be used to cover the avian backside.)

February 21, 2010

Sports bulletin: Canada defeats US 16-2 in hockey

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Sports, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 12:36

But that’s not the Olympic match-up, that’s in Kandahar:

“Half of our team is in Iraq” was one of the good-natured excuses offered by U.S. troops to explain Canada’s 16-2 victory over the United States in a ball-hockey game on Sunday that had all the passion, but none of the drama, expected of the Olympic ice hockey tilt between the two countries later in the day in Vancouver.

The lopsided score was a fair indication of the play before a crowd of nearly 1,000 often deliriously happy soldiers at the smartly laid out ball-hockey rink that Canada built at Kandahar Airfield in 2006.

Honestly taken aback by a Canadian offer to balance the game by swapping a few players when the score stood 10-1 in Canada’s favour, U.S. army Col. Mark Murray, invoked the immortal words of Gen. Anthony McAuliffe, commander of the 101st Airborne, who responded to a Nazi ultimatum to surrender during the Battle of the Bulge, by replying: “Nuts! It will be a cold day in hell before we do that.”

February 18, 2010

Artillery in Afghanistan

Filed under: Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:35

The most useful artillery for US troops in Afghanistan is reported to be the HIMARS rocket launcher system:

HIMARS carriers only one six MLRS rocket container (instead of two in the original MLRS vehicle), but the 12 ton truck can fit into a C-130 transport (unlike the 22 ton tracked MLRS) and is much cheaper to operate. The first HIMARS entered service in 2005, about a year after GPS guided rockets did.

The 680 pound GMLRS (guided multiple launch rocket system) missile is as GPS guided 227mm rocket that entered service six years ago. It was designed to have a range of 70 kilometers and the ability to land within meters of its intended target, at any range. This is possible because it uses GPS (plus a back up inertial guidance system) to find its target. Two years ago, the army tested GMLRS at max range (about 85 kilometers) and found that it worked fine. This enables one HIMARS vehicle to provide support over a frontage of 170 kilometers, or, in places like Afghanistan, where the fighting can be anywhere, an area of over 20,000 square kilometers. This is a huge footprint for a single weapon (an individual HIMARS vehicle), and fundamentally changes the way you deploy artillery in combat.


HIMARS: High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

January 29, 2010

This is more than a slight confusion of terminology

Filed under: Asia, Health, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:33

Jon (my former virtual landlord) sent along a link to this FoxNews story indicating that there is a long road ahead — sociologically speaking — for Afghanistan:

An unclassified study from a military research unit in southern Afghanistan details how homosexual behavior is unusually common among men in the large ethnic group known as Pashtuns — though they seem to be in complete denial about it.

The study, obtained by Fox News, found that Pashtun men commonly have sex with other men, admire other men physically, have sexual relationships with boys and shun women both socially and sexually — yet they completely reject the label of “homosexual.” The research was conducted as part of a longstanding effort to better understand Afghan culture and improve Western interaction with the local people.

The research unit, which was attached to a Marine battalion in southern Afghanistan, acknowledged that the behavior of some Afghan men has left Western forces “frequently confused.”

The report details the bizarre interactions a U.S. Army medic and her colleagues had with Afghan men in the southern province of Kandahar.

[. . .]

Apparently, according to the report, Pashtun men interpret the Islamic prohibition on homosexuality to mean they cannot “love” another man — but that doesn’t mean they can’t use men for “sexual gratification.”

Trying to use a western term, which almost certainly has highly negative connotations to Afghans who may have encountered it, isn’t likely to be helpful in dealing with the Pashtuns. Labelling is the least of the concerns, I’d think.

The U.S. army medic also told members of the research unit that she and her colleagues had to explain to a local man how to get his wife pregnant.

The report said: “When it was explained to him what was necessary, he reacted with disgust and asked, ‘How could one feel desire to be with a woman, who God has made unclean, when one could be with a man, who is clean? Surely this must be wrong.'”

January 26, 2010

CF improve medical evacuation by adding medical technicians to crews

Filed under: Cancon, Health, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 07:35

Strategy Page reports on a change in crew composition for Canadian Forces medical evacuation helicopters:

Canadian forces have added a medical technician to the crews of their medical evacuation helicopters, joining a trend that has played a part in saving the lives of many troops wounded in combat, or injured in a combat zone. Previously, Canadian troops had relied on American, or other NATO, air evacuation services. But now Canada has suitable helicopters (CH-146s) for that work, and established an air ambulance service. Following a four year old recommendation by their own military planners, Canada trained medical technicians to work on the medevac choppers, and thus increase the chances that badly wounded soldiers would survive. Canada has also upgraded all of its combat medical care during its years of operations in Afghanistan. This is part of a trend that has been going on since World War II. It’s all about having more medical care available sooner.

The fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan has brought about a major change in how the United States deals with combat casualties. The result is that over 90 percent of the troops wounded, survive their wounds. That’s the highest rate in history. There are several reasons for this. The main one is that medics, and the troops themselves, are being trained to deliver more complex, and effective first aid more quickly. Military doctors now talk of the “platinum 10 minutes,” meaning that if you can keep the wounded soldier, especially the ones who are hurt real bad, alive for ten minutes, their chances of survival go way up. Medics have been equipped and trained to perform procedures previously done only by physicians, while troops are trained to do some procedures previously handled only by medics.

January 5, 2010

A decade of war

Filed under: Africa, Asia, Europe, History, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:19

Strategy Page has an annotated list of the last decade’s wars, declared and undeclared, and armed confrontations just short of warfare:

It’s actually been a decade of less and less war. There’s also been a lot of déjà vu, with many wars seeming to be endless. Some wars are like that. So what were all the current hot spots like a decade ago, and what happened to them? Below is a list, with the short version of what happened (check out archives for the much longer version).

Afghanistan was sort of under the control of the Pakistani backed Taliban in 2000. But the civil war, that began in the late 1970s, was still going on. The Taliban were winning, slowly, fueled by taxes on the heroin trade. But the Taliban were increasingly unpopular, mainly for trying to impose lifestyle rules on a hostile population. September 11, 2001 brought in the Americans to help the factions still fighting the Taliban, and within three months, the Taliban were out of power, and fleeing to Pakistan. A democracy was established, but corruption and tribal rivalries crippled it from the start. The Pushtun tribes resented the domination of the non-Pushtun tribes (60 percent of the population), and this enabled the Taliban to rebuild and undertake a terror campaign to regain control of the country. It’s a suicide mission (even most Pushtuns oppose them), but that’s pretty normal for Afghanistan.

[. . .]

Iraq- Saddam Hussein was under siege at the beginning of the decade, refusing to comply with the terms of his defeat in the 1991 war over Kuwait. Saddam, as he later admitted, had no weapons of mass destruction, but did not want the Iranians (who wanted to kill him for invading in 1980) to know. It was a successful deception, so much so that all the world’s intel agencies agreed that Saddam had these weapons, and that was used to justify the U.S./British invasion of 2003. There followed five years of terrorism, as the Sunni Arab minority (which Saddam had led) tried to murder their way back into power. That didn’t work, and Iraq ends the decade with a booming, not shrinking, economy, and a bloody resolution to some long time political disputes.

December 24, 2009

Jonathan Kay in praise of Paul Martin

Filed under: Cancon, Middle East, Military, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 11:52

In a column ostensibly about the triumph of Canada’s conservatives, Jonathan Kay makes a pitch for both Paul Martin and former Governor General Adrienne Clarkson as unsung political heroes:

Paul Martin will forever be known primarily as the guy who fumbled Jean Chrétien’s dynasty away to Stephen Harper. But if there were more justice in the world — or at least among pundits — he would get his due for making the single most momentous prime ministerial decision of the decade: sending a Canadian combat mission to Kandahar in 2005.

At the time, it hardly seemed epic: Most Canadians didn’t know Kandahar from Kunduz. But the military wonks immediately could tell this was a game-changer. Putting our troops in Kandahar, at the ideological and political center of Taliban territory, meant the Liberals were shedding decades of peacekeeper posturing, and were putting the country on a very real war footing.

[. . .]

Martin didn’t throw a dart at a map of Afghanistan. He fought for Kandahar in the face of U.S. skepticism — even though he knew it would mean body bags, and even though he probably could have landed the Canadian Forces a relatively cushy Euro-style sentry-duty assignment in the northern part of the country.

Our deployment set the stage for many of the other, seemingly unrelated, changes in Canadian policy and politics that followed in the latter part of the decade. A nation at war doesn’t think about itself in the same way as a nation at peace. We got more respect in foreign capitals. We began to take care of our military. We even started to treat our country’s identity and history more seriously.

And equally surprising, the praise for Adrienne Clarkson:

Nor should we ignore the contribution of Adrienne Clarkson. Whatever her elitist, media pedigree, the Canadian Forces had no better friend than the former Governor General. She was a constant presence at Remembrance Day events at home, as well as WWII anniversary ceremonies in Europe. She spent New Year’s with CF members in Afghanistan — twice; and even celebrated Christmas with our naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

That she was a woman, a former CBC staffer, and a visible minority, only increased the symbolic importance of her outreach. It showed Canada that our military is fighting for all us, not just white guys with brush cuts in Shilo and Petawawa.

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