Television is the great propaganda weapon of the liberal democratic state, so it is a useful window into the thinking of the oligarchs. Movies and television shows still have to attract an audience, so they are usually the trailing edge of whatever the oligarchs are trying to impose on society, but the ads are a different matter. They are the leading edge of the latest Progressive fads. They know people will not abandon a show or movie just because the ads are offensive.
That’s what makes the ads a useful window into the black soul of our rulers. The ad makers are all from the ruling class. Look at the team photo of an ad agency and it looks like the faculty of an Ivy League college. There may be a little color in there for show, but otherwise it is all men with small hats and people who still write “Episcopalian” when asked about their religion. The advertising agencies that produce these ads are the special forces of the Judeo-Puritan ruling class.
The Z Man, “Turn Off, Tune Out and Drop Out”, The Z Blog, 2020-09-04.
May 13, 2026
QotD: The advertising business
May 12, 2026
What happened to the people who took Joe Biden’s advice and learned to code?
It was only a few years ago that snooty media personalities were constantly echoing President Joe Biden’s advice to unemployed workers: “Learn to code”. Then, of course, the media hit hard times and the advice was then being snarkily offered to newly unemployed media folks. But what about the (few) who actually did “learn to code”, only to be swept away again as the clankers surged in to eliminate a lot of basic coding jobs?
How to Understand What AI Just Did to People Who Took Joe Biden’s Advice and Learned to Code.
A simple, concrete example.
Oddly enough, I have a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science. This means I know 7 algorithms for sorting a list into alphabetical order. I understand the tradeoffs between their execution time, code complexity, and memory demand. I learned the specialized lingo for describing execution time.
The algorithms are surprisingly complex and subtle. I spent months learning to code them.
Now that hard-won knowledge has been replaced by, “Claude, write a module to sort this list. Optimize for execution time.”
Millions of good people just lost their professions and must now invest in a new one.
Right now, knowing how to sort a list probably gives me a small advantage when I code with AI. But I will soon lose even that tiny return on my investment, as AI improves.
Certainly AI will create some new opportunities, probably a lot of them.
But count your blessings, if you did not spend years learning to code like I did.
And:
Here is the counterpoint: Learning to code gave coders an advantage when relearning to code with AI.
That advantage is their ticket to a seat in the new AI world.
The big question now is how many seats exist.
To which ESR responded:
Your position is reasonable, but wrong.
Having learned to code is still valuable in the new world of AI, not because you’re wrong about coding itself having become disposable, but because of the capabilities and mindset you developed while learning to code, some of which are difficult to learn in any other way.
You didn’t become a professional programmer. But I’m willing to bet that your intuition about how to design software is far better because you wrestled with code. And that is *not* a skill that LLMs are replacing — ignore the noisy hype about this.
I’m also willing to bet that some of what you learned as a programmer in training translated into problem-decomposition skills that have served you well as an economist.
If one is not a complete dullard (and you are certainly not a complete dullard) learning to code teaches not just craft skills but a mindset — a set of heuristics for carving reality at its joints. There are other ways to get this — I think for example of Richard Feynman who got there by thinking very hard about physics. And it is not guaranteed that every programmer will develop this right mindset.
But many of us do. And most of the other ways to develop it seem also to produce it only as a side effect, but less reliably than learning to code does.
So don’t write off learning to code. Maybe someday we’ll develop educational methods that can teach those higher-level skills more directly. That would be an excellent thing, if it’s possible. But until it gets here, learning to code will still have value that is not easy to duplicate in any other way.
May 11, 2026
The History of SPI: Part 1 / Simulations Publications Inc. / Wargaming History
Legendary Tactics
Published 18 Dec 2025Remember the golden age of wargaming? This is THE definitive history of SPI (Simulations Publications, Inc.), one of the most influential publishers in tabletop gaming. From its groundbreaking magazine Strategy & Tactics to iconic titles like War in the East, StarForce, and Terrible Swift Sword, SPI reshaped what board wargames could be — and built a passionate community along the way.
This is Part 1, where we delve into the origins of SPI and Strategy & Tactics Magazine, and the people and games that were part of it.
(more…)
May 7, 2026
Great success! Honda “postpones” their Ontario EV project
As part of their mindless fanboyism for anything remotely related to “Net Zero”, the federal government and the Ontario provincial government have been serving up subsidies for electric vehicles and hastening the “inevitable transition” away from internal combustion vehicles. Through legislation and regulation, they’ve been doing everything they can to close down the traditional car and truck manufacturing sector and replace them with zero emission vehicles. The various governments have handed out subsidies amounting to billions, and yet one after another after another the much ballyhoo’d EV factories, battery plants, and other futuristic projects fall by the wayside, leaving very little in exchange for those billions:
There was a time, not very long ago, when Liberal politicians treated EV battery announcements like moon landings.
Hard hats. Safety glasses. Giant ceremonial cheques. Breathless speeches about “the future”. Every battery plant was “historic”. Every subsidy package was “transformational”. Every corporate press conference looked like a motivational seminar for people who think buzzwords are infrastructure.
All we were missing was a fog machine and Bono.
Meanwhile ordinary Canadians were standing in grocery aisles doing mental math over bacon prices, delaying dental work, and wondering whether they could survive another winter utility bill without sacrificing whatever scraps remained of their savings.
But while Canadians were trying to keep their heads above water, Ottawa was busy launching one of the most expensive industrial subsidy experiments in modern Canadian history.
The Honda EV project in Ontario was supposed to be one of the crown jewels of this brave new green economy. Politicians lined up in hard hats and safety glasses like a traveling theatre troupe performing The Future Is Here. Canadians were assured this was proof the country was becoming an EV superpower.
Turns out it may have been more of a very expensive PowerPoint presentation with taxpayer financing attached.
[…]
In March 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed Mark Carney as an informal economic adviser during the COVID recovery period. Over the following years, Carney increasingly promoted “green transition” investment frameworks, climate-linked financial systems, ESG-focused economic planning, and massive public-private investment partnerships tied to decarbonization strategies.
Which is important context now, because the EV subsidy era did not emerge out of thin air. It grew out of a broader worldview that treated government-directed green investment as both economic policy and moral mission. The assumption underneath all of this was breathtakingly simple:
“If government wants it badly enough, reality will cooperate.”
That is usually where things begin going sideways.
Canadians were told the EV transition was inevitable. Questions about affordability, charging infrastructure, winter range, electrical grid capacity, or consumer demand were often brushed aside like annoying little details raised by peasants who simply lacked sufficient enlightenment.
Then came the subsidy gold rush.
[…]
Corporations are not charities. They are not loyal patriots. They are not emotionally attached to government slogans.
They follow incentives. They chase profitability. They change direction when conditions change.
That is exactly what Honda did.
Meanwhile Canadians are left holding the bill for another “historic transformation” that produced:
- endless announcements
- glossy photo ops
- consultant buzzwords
- government self-congratulation
- escalating subsidy exposure
- and corporate renegotiations every time market conditions shifted
- while producing no completed Honda EV manufacturing hub and no fleet of Canadian-built EVs rolling proudly off Ontario assembly lines.
What remains instead is a stalled megaproject, a confused tariff policy, a government spinning contradictory narratives depending on the week, and taxpayers once again discovering they were voluntold into becoming venture capitalists for political vanity projects.
Apparently this is what “economic leadership” looks like now.
Hard hats. Press releases. Fifty-plus billion dollars in EV-related exposure. And a factory plan slowly evaporating into the mist while Chinese EVs roll through the front gate anyway.
May 4, 2026
Our genetic heritage and our culture
On Substack, Helen Dale and Lorenzo Warby look at our genetic inheritance and how it continues to shape our culture:
From Wikipedia:
The Neolithic Y-chromosome bottleneck refers to a period around 5000 BC where the diversity in the male y-chromosome dropped precipitously across Africa, Europe and Asia, to a level equivalent to reproduction occurring with a ratio between men and women of 1:17. Discovered in 2015, the research suggests that the reason for the bottleneck may not be a reduction in the number of males, but a drastic decrease in the percentage of males with reproductive success in Neolithic agropastoralist cultures, compared to the previous hunter gatherers.
The development of farming and then animal herding greatly increased the number of humans — which continued to have evolutionary consequences for our species — and created productive assets (farms and animal herds) worth fighting over. Successful male teams (typically organised as clans) wiped out unsuccessful male teams and took their women as spoils.
Hence, there is a dramatic bottleneck in male lineages but not in female lineages. This pattern stopped with the development of chiefdoms and especially states, though not so much on the Steppes, whose states were more like super-chiefdoms and where intense competition over resources (and women) continued.1
This had consequences. A major one is that the male expression of human genes became dramatically better at forming and maintaining teams — as there was drastic selection pressure for that — but the female expression of human genes did not.
This is why young schoolboy sporting teams regularly crush adult women’s national teams in team sports such as soccer. It is not that schoolboys have the strength advantage over women associated with adult men (they are often not particularly advantaged around age 14-15). It’s simply that human males are much more likely to “get” teamwork at a visceral level.
At least some of the differences in the statistical distribution of cognitive traits between men and women comes from this genetic bottleneck’s intense selection pressure differences. This is particularly clear in social patterns. For instance, men readily form hierarchies — often using physical cues such as height to do so.
Men focus on roles, suppressing or otherwise managing their emotions to do so. They regularly test each other — hence ragging each other, making appalling jokes, etc. Such mechanisms generate trust, as they test whether you will fold under pressure, whether one can say outrageous things and still get support. Hence the popular quip:
Men insult each other but they don’t mean it. Women compliment each other but they also don’t mean it.
Men roast each other as tests because so much male interaction is about teamwork, and the roles and reliability that requires, while women typically look to emotional connection. Given that the latter requires a lot of interaction to build up trust, yes, female friendships can be quite intense, but relations between human females can also be viciously unstable and fissile.
These differences have other social consequences. Men are notably more positive about free speech than women, because men often see speech as a test while women are more likely to see it as a threat. As universities have feminised, the male-female differences on free speech among students have become more pronounced. Men are systematically more tolerant of alternative points of view than are women.
Orwell’s famous comment in his novel 1984:
It was always the women, and above all the young ones, who were the most bigoted adherents of the Party, the swallowers of slogans, the amateur spies and nosers-out of unorthodoxy.
Was a great novelist doing what great novelists do: noticing.
As part of the teamwork focus, men tend to be the social solidarity sex while women are not. Women are much less likely to have friends of lower socio-economic status than are men. For women, such friends are much less likely to be worth the emotional investment. For men, they may be useful members of a future team.
As institutions, occupations and public discourse become more feminised, there has been a shift in patterns of language. A massive study of patterns of language use found a dramatic shift since the 1980s, such that:
our results suggest that over the past decades, there has been a marked shift in public interest from the collective to the individual, and from rationality toward emotion.
All this means that male-dominated institutions and spaces will be generally better, often much better, at generating and managing feedback than female-dominated spaces. When people note that feminising institutions and occupations have a strong tendency to become less functional, it is precisely because they are worse at generating and managing feedback, and at generating and maintaining trust.
- This paper attempts to explain the extreme narrowing of surviving male lineages by the adoption of patrilineal systems and polygyny. While the shift to patrilineal systems in itself does increase unequal lineage success—as does polygyny—much of the point of the shift to patrilineality was precisely that warriors who grow up together are better warrior teams.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence of violence after the shrinkage of male lineages dramatically slowed — and then reversed — with the development of chiefdoms, and especially states. These suppressed violence, but not patrilineality or polygyny. In many societies, polygyny actually intensified with the rise of states.
The bottleneck effects continued to echo down populations. The extraordinary reproductive success of particular male lineages is associated either with pastoralist violence and conquest and/or early state creation. Further, the notion that the majority of male lineages just passively accepted their reproductive exclusion flies in the face of a huge amount of evidence — especially as the examples of very successful pastoral lineages occurred in societies with notoriously high levels of violence, including as raiders, such as across the Steppes and in Ireland.
Moreover, polygyny is associated with higher rates of violence, single-spouse marriage with higher social cohesion. Nor was the creation and maintenance of states typically a peaceful process: periodic violent peaks in Chinese history, for example, were extraordinary. It was precisely the creation of a reproductively-excluded underclass that provided so much of the impetus for the banditry and mass peasant revolts that are such a feature of Chinese history. So, while patrilineality and polygyny were definitely factors in the wildly differentiated success rates of male lineages, considerable levels of violence and contestation over resources and women — that selected in favour of male teamwork — were clearly also very much in play.
April 30, 2026
Latest luxury belief just dropped: “microlooting”
Rob Henderson identifies the latest addition to the broad suite of luxury beliefs held by the over-educated, over-privileged people who will never bear the costs of their anti-civilizational thoughts:
In a 1955 essay titled “The English Aristocracy”, novelist Nancy Mitford suggested that as goods became more affordable, England’s upper classes could no longer rely on material possessions to distinguish themselves from the masses. Instead, Mitford wrote, “it is solely by their language that the upper classes nowadays are distinguished”.
Jia Tolentino and Hasan Piker proved this point last week in a conversation hosted by Nadja Spiegelman at the New York Times. It unfolded in a carefully staged loft that signaled taste and status. Ms. Spiegelman proposed a new word for shoplifting: “microlooting”. Mr. Piker later remarked that “many Americans, I think, are totally oblivious to this political language”.
“Stealing” sounds so tawdry. Microlooting is cleaner — a minor offense laundered into a boutique act of political protest. Indeed, much of upper middle class life is about rebranding disreputable behaviors to retain one’s position in the social hierarchy. The pattern is familiar. Mitford sorted vocabulary into “U” (upper class) and “non-U”. U-speakers said “vegetables” and “spectacles” and “lavatory”. Non-U speakers said “greens” and “glasses” and “toilet”.
Today, the favored words of the upper class come from a mishmash of therapy culture and human resources. Lazing off at work has become “acting your wage”. Saying no means “setting boundaries”. Infidelity is “ethical nonmonogamy”. Prostitution is “sex work”. Divorce can be called “conscious uncoupling”. Neglecting close relationships is “protecting your peace”. Listening to someone vent is “emotional labor”. Recall that in 2021 the AP Stylebook announced that a “mistress” must now be called a “companion, friend or lover”.
And shoplifting is “microlooting”.
Five years ago, I texted a high-school friend who had been released from prison. “Good news”, I told him. “You’re not an ex-felon anymore, you’re a justice-involved person.” He replied, “Okay Rob, you’re not a college graduate anymore, you’re a classroom-involved person.”
At UnHerd, Poppy Sowerby pours scorn on the well-to-do New Yorkers’ sudden discovery that “five finger discounts” are fun and socially conscious ways to strike back at “the man”:
The New Yorker columnist Jia Tolentino, the NYT‘s Nadja Spiegelman, and Hasan Piker — the midwit Marxist streamer accused of electrocuting his dog and who admitted having solicited a prostitute (not so against the free market now, ey?) — gabbed about “microlooting” — small thefts justified by the fact that, as Spiegelman puts it, “It’s so hard to live ethically in an unethical society”. Quick-fire scenarios are floated; stealing from the Louvre, Piker says, is “cool”. Stealing from supermarket chains is “not a big deal” in a “utilitarian sense”, says Tolentino. And Spiegelman wonders why she should “have to pay for organic avocados” when Jeff Bezos “has too much money” (Amazon, which he founded, acquired Whole Foods in 2017). Antisocial behaviour is justified here — explicitly or tacitly — under the lazy logic of “protest”.
Unlike microlooting, however, Tolentino finds “getting iced coffee in a plastic cup … profoundly selfish, immoral [and] collectively destructive” — presumably the bimbo-coding of that drink is unrelated. The lines of moral permissibility seem to be drawn, in other words, along the exact same lines of what these rich, educated progressives consider “cool”.
And that’s the real problem. Progressives have always found extravagant ways to reframe the ills which they personally enjoy — prostitution, pornography, choking women. Now shoplifting gets the same treatment. Tolentino is not really stealing lemons because it’s a way of flipping the bird at Bezos; she’s stealing them because she wants them. Nor are the barrier-bumpers actually trying to signal their dissatisfaction with the frequency or cleanliness of public transport — reasoning I have actually heard with my own ears, despite the fact these things can only be improved by the very funding the free riders are withholding; they are bumping barriers because they just don’t want to pay. Nicking groceries and dodging fares are age-old problems. What’s new is the towering cowardice of those who can’t admit that they, like most people, act mainly out of self-interested desire.
The appealing but deceptive idea that low-level criminality is a laudable demonstration against “the system” in fact conceals envy towards those in that “system” who, like Bezos, have known success. This resentment is particularly native to the media class, whose peers tend to out-earn them in higher-salaried fields like law and finance — conferring on writers like Spiegelman and Tolentino the faintly plausible whiff of bookish martyrdom. Nevertheless, and particularly in New York, mag luminaries can still live in $2.2 million brownstones in Clinton Hill; sticking it to the man by pilfering in the produce aisle might pass in grim artists’ squats, but five-finger discounts are harder to justify on six-figure salaries.
Update, 1 May: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
The History of BROWN SAUCE: HP Sauce, A1 Sauce, OK Sauce and Chef Sauce
Tweedy Misc
Published 7 Nov 2025Have you ever wondered how British “brown sauce” came about? What is it made from? Who invented it? When was it invented? Which brown sauce is the oldest? When did we start calling it “brown sauce”?
In this video we look into what exactly brown sauce is (and isn’t), we look into ingredients of a number of iconic brands (and some supermarket own brands) and explore the history of the five brown sauces which defined the category: A1 Sauce, OK Sauce, HP Sauce, Daddies Favourite Sauce and Chef Sauce.
Some links to Wikipedia etc in case it helps figure out what this is all about:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_s…
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HP_Sauce
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A.1._Sauce
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daddies
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OK_Sauce
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chef_Br…If you’re finding the wobbling bottles are a problem for you, here’s a version of the video without any wobbling: • History of Brown Sauce (No Wobbling!)
This video was made using Davinci Resolve 20, with a lot of the still images made using Canva.
Chapters:
0:00 Introduction
0:16 What is brown sauce?
2:33 Supermarket own brand brown sauces
4:02 History of brown sauce
4:48 A1 Sauce
10:49 OK Sauce
15:31 HP Sauce
17:06 Daddies Favourite Sauce
19:06 Chef Sauce
23:50 Conclusion
April 29, 2026
Carney elbows out Canadian veterans to support an American company
On his Substack, Brian Lilley points out another glaring inconsistency between Prime Minister Mark Carney’s rah-rah pro-Canadian rhetoric and his anti-Canadian actions:
This story should outrage everyone, regardless of political stripe.
But considering the positions taken by progressive Liberals in this country concerning Donald Trump, it should really outrage them. Sadly, like with Trudeau or whichever politician people seem to support these days, Carney’s backers won’t see the error of his ways.
When I was a young army cadet, the first person I would see checking into the James Street Armouries in Hamilton — now known as the John Weir Foote Armoury after a ceremony I was part of in 1990 — well, the first person I would see would be the Commissionaire. Back in the mid-80s these were mostly people who were veterans of the Korean War or our peacekeeping missions who were now charged with providing security at federal buildings.
Founded in 1925 to give meaningful employment to veterans of the First World War, the Corps of Commissionaires has been providing security services at federal buildings, and others, for just over 100 years. Since shortly after the Second World War, the Commissionaires have had a special relationship with the federal government when it comes to providing security.
Just recently, the Carney government — the Elbows Up and Canada Strong folks — ended the arrangement that gave the Commissionaires first right of refusal on security at federal department buildings. They ended the agreement with the not-for-profit organization that is still the biggest employer of veterans in the country at the behest of a global company scooping up security contracts from the Trump admin including ICE detention centres like Alligator Alcatraz.
You can love Trump or hate him but don’t tell me you are Elbows Up, that we are experiencing a rupture, that the old relationship is over, that being close to the Americans is dangerous and then do this.
I detailed it all in my latest column for the Toronto Sun including who was behind this, how it went down, and why it is outrageous.
From the Commissionaires website:
The Canadian Corps of Commissionaires was eventually founded in 1925, specifically to employ Canadian veterans of the First World War. We were initially established in Montreal, then Toronto and Vancouver, to look after these men and women and provide them with transitional and permanent jobs, primarily in the security field. The Right Honourable John Buchan, Governor General of Canada, became the Corps’ first patron in 1937. Viceregal patronage has been an 81-year tradition since then.
In the early years, we mostly provided guarding services for government institutions. From 1925 to 1948, Commissionaires expanded throughout Canada.
In 1950, with the opening of the St. John’s, Newfoundland division, Commissionaires was operating services from coast to coast.
By 1982, Commissionaires exceeded 10,000 employees.
April 27, 2026
QotD: The false economy of reducing plastic packaging for food products
One morning in 1996, I sat with a class of fifth-graders in Manhattan as they gazed mournfully at a photo of a supermarket package of red apples. It was part of a slide presentation by the director of environmental education for the Environmental Action Coalition, the guest lecturer at that day’s science class.
“Look at the plastic, the Styrofoam or cardboard underneath,” she told the class. “Do you need this much wrapping when you buy things?”
“Noooo,” the fifth-graders replied.
It was all so obvious to them, the fifth-graders as well as their lecturer. She was barely out of college, but she thought that she knew more about selling produce than supermarket executives and packaging engineers who had spent their careers studying this question. She was sure that plastic wrap and Styrofoam were wasteful and harmful to the environment because she had never seriously considered the alternative or wondered why those products were introduced.
To merchants and shoppers in the late 1920s, there was nothing wasteful about the revolutionary packaging material introduced by DuPont. Cellophane seemed miraculous because it was not only moisture-proof but also transparent. “EYE IT before you BUY IT,” DuPont advertised, and shoppers welcomed this new feature enabling them to judge the quality of produce and meat before they paid up. Cellophane kept things fresh much longer, an advantage advertised to everyone from homemakers to soldiers. During World War II, a DuPont ad showed a German soldier looking on enviously as American prisoners of war opened packages of cigarettes from home that were wrapped in cellophane: “The prisoners who have better cigarettes than their guards.”
Soviet citizens in the 1980s were similarly envious of Westerners’ new plastic grocery bags, which sold for $5 apiece on the black market in Moscow. The bags were coveted partly as a status symbol (a hard-to-get imported product) and partly because they were so light and compact. In a shortage-plagued economy, Muscovites never knew when a scarce item would suddenly become available in a nearby store, so they wanted to have an empty bag with them, just in case.
American merchants and shoppers switched from paper to plastic packaging because it reduced waste. Plastic was cheaper because it required fewer resources to manufacture. It required less energy to transport because it was lighter. Plastic took up less space in landfills than paper, and it further reduced the volume of household trash because it preserved food longer. The typical household in Mexico City, for example, generated more garbage than an American household because it bought fewer packaged products and ended up discarding more food that had spoiled.
But activists eager to find some reason to oppose disposable products have ignored these advantages. They blame America’s throwaway society for polluting the oceans with plastic, though virtually all that pollution comes from either fishing vessels or from developing countries with primitive waste-management systems — mostly the Asian countries that were importing plastic recyclables from America. Instead of castigating American consumers, environmentalists should blame themselves for creating the recycling programs that sent plastic to countries where it was allowed to leak into rivers. The best way to protect marine life is to throw used plastic into the trash, not the recycling bin, so that it goes straight to a well-lined local landfill instead of ending up in the ocean.
And instead of campaigning to ban plastic grocery bags, green activists should be promoting their environmental advantages. Banning them results in higher carbon emissions because the substitutes are thicker and heavier, requiring more materials and energy to manufacture and transport, and these paper bags and tote bags typically aren’t reused often enough to offset their initial carbon footprint. Greens may feel virtuous lugging groceries home in a paper or tote bag, but the shoppers choosing plastic are actually doing more to combat global warming and reduce consumption of natural resources.
John Tierney, “Let’s Hold On to the Throwaway Society”, City Journal, 2020-09-13.
April 25, 2026
“… as the review of USMCA approaches. Dairy is once again at the center of the storm”
Dr. Sylvain Charlebois on the strong hints the US government has been dropping that Canada’s stance on our restrictive dairy cartel — euphemistically referred to as “supply management” — is going to be a key negotiating point in the upcoming USMCA trade negotiations:
The warning came quietly, but it was unmistakable. According to a Reuters report carried by The Western Producer, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer made it clear: Canada’s dairy dispute will be resolved one of two ways, through negotiation or through enforcement.
That is not diplomatic nuance. That is a choice.
And it comes at a delicate moment, as the review of USMCA approaches. Dairy is once again at the center of the storm. It always is. Canada’s supply management system, long defended domestically, continues to frustrate U.S. officials over limited market access. As reported by Reuters, tensions remain high around how Canada administers its tariff-rate quotas.
None of this is new. What is new is the tone.
Recent commentary out of the United States, including sharp criticisms aimed at Mark Carney, reflects a growing impatience. Some of it is political theatre. But some of it signals something more consequential, a willingness to move from negotiation to enforcement if progress stalls.
In food trade, that shift matters.
Canada’s agri-food economy is deeply integrated with the United States. This is not a casual trading relationship. It is structural. Supply chains cross the border multiple times before products reach consumers. Roughly three-quarters of Canadian agri-food exports still head south. You do not casually antagonize the market that anchors your value chain.
The critique coming from voices like Brian Switzer, however undiplomatic, boils down to a familiar expectation. Canada should act like a predictable partner. Not subordinate, but steady. When that perception erodes, the consequences are rarely immediate. They emerge later, in tighter border controls, procurement shifts, or dispute panels.
And eventually, in prices.
April 20, 2026
Airline deregulation in the 1970s
The end result — democratizing air travel and enabling far more people to economically travel long distances — also meant that air travel became far more casual (people no longer dressed “properly” for flights) and economy flights began to more closely resemble long-distance buses, but overall it was a win:
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 stands as one of the most spectacular vindications of free market principles in modern American history. Before deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board controlled every aspect of commercial aviation: routes, schedules, and most critically, prices. Flying remained a luxury reserved for the wealthy elite, with fares artificially inflated by regulatory capture and government-sanctioned cartels.
Within a decade of deregulation, average airfares plummeted by 50% in real terms. The number of passengers more than doubled from 250 million in 1978 to over 500 million by 1990. New airlines like Southwest and JetBlue emerged with innovative business models that prioritized efficiency over bureaucratic compliance. Routes previously deemed “unprofitable” by government planners suddenly thrived under competitive pressure.
The regulatory regime had created exactly what free-market theory predicts: artificial scarcity, price distortions, and a complete disconnection from consumer preferences. Airlines competed on amenities instead of price because the CAB fixed fares at monopoly levels. They served cocktails and full meals while ordinary Americans couldn’t afford tickets. The moment government stepped aside, entrepreneurs discovered countless ways to serve previously ignored market segments.
Critics warned that deregulation would compromise safety and create chaos. Instead, aviation safety improved dramatically as airlines faced real liability for accidents and insurance companies imposed rigorous standards. Competition forced operational excellence in ways bureaucratic oversight never could. Hub-and-spoke networks emerged organically, maximizing efficiency without central planning.
The contrast couldn’t be starker: decades of stagnation under regulatory control versus explosive innovation and democratization under market freedom.
Yet the same politicians who celebrate affordable air travel continue strangling other industries with identical regulatory schemes.
April 19, 2026
AI’s missing economic impact
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Rational Aussie explains at least part of why the expected economic benefits of widespread adoption of artificial intelligence agents are … missing:
It’s funny how AI has made white collar work 10x faster already but there’s been basically no economic impact from it.
The reason is quite simple:
1. Most white collar work is bullshit, so speeding it up by 10x still equals a pile of bullshit at the end
2. Most white collar employees are using AI to do all their work for the week in 4 hours instead of 40, whilst telling their manager the deadline is still 40 hours away
We have been living in a fake economy for the better part of two decades. It is all a fugazi.
People who do real jobs in the real world get paid comparatively crap, and people who do fake jobs in the fiat Ponzi world get paid just enough fiat currency to pretend they are important. None of it amounts to anything productive nor valuable for the world though.
An entire generation doing fake email jobs, slide decks and excel sheets for corporations who ultimately produce nothing.
April 14, 2026
Bureaucrats often prefer regulations to taxes, because the costs are “hidden”
In Reason, J.D. Tuccille discusses the hidden impact of “red tape” on the economy — just because the government isn’t getting a cheque doesn’t mean that compliance is free:

President Trump prepares to cut a “red tape” display of regulations representative of 1960 and compared to the current numbers of regulations, Thursday, December 14, 2017, in the Roosevelt Room at the White House, announcing how the administration is keeping its promise to remove regulations burdening job creators and American taxpayers.
White House photo via Wikimedia Commons.
Anybody who runs a business or engages in regulated activities knows that government red tape imposes a significant burden. Those burdens can be very high, deterring entrepreneurs from launching companies, restraining the growth of those that already exist, and driving some people to operate illegally rather than try to deal with an administrative state that specializes in obstructionism. But just how much do federal regulations cost us? A new report from the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) tries to tally the price tag — and warns that Washington, D.C. needs major reform.
The Out-of-Control Regulatory State
That the regulatory state is out of control isn’t really a debatable point. The Federal Register lists 445 agencies with the legal authority to publish regulations. Forbes noted that “federal departments, agencies, and commissions issued 3,853 rules in 2016, while Congress passed and the president signed 214 bills into law”. In May of last year, the White House acknowledged that “the United States is drastically overregulated” and that “the Code of Federal Regulations contains over 48,000 sections, stretching over 175,000 pages … Worse, many carry potential criminal penalties for violations.”
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Compliance Costs Strangle the Economy
“Just as consumers shoulder much of the corporate income tax and tariff burden, regulatory compliance costs and mandates borne by businesses percolate through the economy and materialize as higher prices, lost jobs, and lower output,” writes Crews. “Off-budget regulatory costs can drag down the economy, just as overspending can.”
If you balk at the idea that federal regulations impose costs of over $2 trillion on Americans, you should be aware that CEI is restrained in its assessment. As the report points out, other sources assign even higher price tags to regulatory burdens. Three years ago, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) estimated that “the total cost of federal regulations in 2022 is an estimated $3.079 trillion (in 2023 dollars), an amount equal to 12% of U.S. GDP”. That NAM report added that “the annual cost burden for an average U.S. firm is $277,000, the equivalent of 19% of the average firm’s payroll expenses”. For manufacturers with fewer than 50 employees, the NAM put regulatory compliance costs at $50,100 per employee per year.
Compliance costs aren’t expressed in only monetary terms, they also require time and effort. According to the Office of Management and Budget, for Americans supplying required information to federal agencies “in FY2022, the total paperwork burden … was 10.34 billion hours, compared to 9.97 billion hours in FY2021”.
Of course, not everyone is equally impacted by government regulations. Generally speaking, the smaller the company, the harder it is to comply with all the relevant rules, so big companies often end up supporting demands for more regulation because it handicaps smaller competitors to a much greater degree.
April 12, 2026
“The ‘Green Energy Transition’ is … a watermelon, green on the outside and red on the inside”
On Substack, John Robson discusses the state of the fake green economy in the wake of a carbon market scandal where a now-bankrupt “green” company appears to have sold far more “carbon credits” than they should have:
One problem among many with the “Green Energy Transition” is that it was always a watermelon, green on the outside and red on the inside. It wasn’t market-driven, it was designed, and hyped, by people who didn’t care what people actually wanted to buy and indeed, in many cases, who actively believed that consumer preferences were inefficient and unenlightened. As when Bloomberg Green worries about “What a Clean Cookstove Company’s Bankruptcy Means for Carbon Markets”. Why one company’s bankruptcy should mean anything for “carbon markets” is less clear even than what a “clean cookstove” would be. One where you sprayed and wiped the backsplash as well as the main surface? But both are clearer than “carbon markets”. You just can’t go into a store and buy carbon. What are they talking about? Why, another face-plant by central planning, of course.
According to the article, in case you weren’t independently aware of it:
This year was supposed to be a turning point for carbon markets, with the United Nations’ long-delayed country-to-country trading system coming into force and airlines preparing to enter a mandatory program to offset their emissions.
Before we get to “a turning point for carbon markets” let us give a bit of attention to “supposed to be”. Supposed by whom? Perhaps people who think the United Nations was an efficient central planner, or some subset of them. But we’ll bet that nobody normal ever said to you, or anyone else, in the course of a chat last year, “2026 will be a turning point for carbon markets”. Nobody.
Also, who was going to compel airlines to enter a “mandatory program”? Laws are made at the national level, not internationally. Turns out it’s the UN too, via the International Civil Aviation Organization, so no one was going to bungle or cheat, obviously. What could go wrong?
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Why? If a company selling stoves went bankrupt in Peoria, would it cause people in Kenya, or Patagonia, or Tokyo to reconsider the whole issue of applying heat to transform food and decide that stoves, food or both were overrated? No. Of course not. The problem here is that this whole business of carbon credits was flummery.
First you made an estimate of how much harm carbon dioxide did which was nonsense. Then you made an estimate of how much CO2 some activity would release that was also nonsense. And then you made an estimate of how much CO2 some activity would not release (in this case cooking with ethanol in Mombasa) that was also nonsense. And on that basis you proposed to link the worlds of high finance, aviation and having stuff generally to a system that would have been economic rubbish even if it weren’t flashing a big bright sign “Defraud the gullible foreigners HERE!!!” Which it was.
Mathiness being in vogue, Bloomberg Green has a colourful chart explaining that “Cookstove credits are expected to become more important from 2027” that deserves as much respect as the journalistic passive voice typically does. Or perhaps even less.
The story also says:
Prices on Corsia, the marketplace for airlines where Koko was looking to sell its credits, fell as low as $12.25 from about $15 just before the firm’s collapse, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, and now sit at $12.85.
As prices for tulips softened abruptly in the Netherlands in 1637. Except at least there really were tulips and markets for same. Corsia is not a marketplace. It is, instead, the ICAO’s (remember: the International Civil Aviation Organization) “Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation”. As if ethanol stoves in Kenya, a land of some 53.3 million people who presumably only eat three meals a day on average, could offset the vast clouds of so-called “carbon pollution” that travellers, including the big-carbon-footprint bigmouths who lead most western countries, emit every day. The whole thing is speculation piled on ignorance atop mismeasurement built on the sand of dishonesty. What could go wrong?
The two kinds of enshittification
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, ESR explains the differences between the two kinds of enshittification we’re seeing these days:
It may be time to start distinguishing between classic two-sided enshittification and a more general single-sided variety.
When Corey Doctorow originally defined the term “enshittification” he was describing a very specific thing that can and does happen when a platform like Amazon or Google acts as a two-sided market-maker. They start by reducing friction for both buyers and sellers, get everybody locked in by the higher cost of doing volume business anywhere else, then start charging tolls on both sides and injecting spamware that nobody wants. Eventually even their search function becomes completely shitty.
The increasingly horrifying “agentic” train wreck that Windows 11 has become isn’t a two-sided platform in the same way, but the feel of its late stages is depressingly familiar. It’s so stuffed with bloatware, spamware, and spyware that its nominal function as an operating system to run programs for its users feels almost like an afterthought.
I’m going to call this “single-sided enshittification”, and point out that both kinds stem from the same fundamental disconnect. They’re both things that happen when the dominant revenue stream from a product is disconnected from the needs of its original users.
In both cases, an important factor, though not the only one, is the attack of the adtech vampires. So very much of the ugliness in enshittified platforms is downstream of the easy money that they offer product owners for allowing them to sink their fangs into the information stream.
I don’t have a solution to this problem. But if there is one, it starts with identifying the problem correctly. Enshittification — it’s not just for two-sided platforms anymore.
From the comments on the original post:
















