Strategy Page on the latest setback to the F-35 program:

U.S. Department of Defense officials are trying to slow down production of the new F-35 fighter because testing is revealing more design problems than anticipated. If the current production schedule remains in place there is a high risk that very expensive modifications will be needed for F-35s that have entered service. The air force has already ordered 58 F-35s to be produced before all testing is completed and plans to produce 472 F-35s this way. The Department of Defense is more concerned about the additional costs than the air force, which just wants to get the aircraft into production as quickly as possible. The air force fears that the production orders will be cut even further if the F-35 does not enter service quickly.

There are more disputes between the Department of Defense and the air force. For example, the two are trying to agree on what the F-35 will cost. The air force insists that it is $65 million each, while the Department of Defense says when all costs are included it will be more like $111 million each. Another number being debated is how many F-35s will actually be produced. The air force assumes 2,443 for the air force, navy, and marines but the Department of Defense is not so sure that many will eventually be built. Total development cost is now put at $65 billion, which comes to over $25 million per aircraft if 2,443 are built. Development costs for the new U.S. F-35 fighter-bomber has grown by more than a third over the last few years. The additional development costs are accompanied by additional delays. Current estimates are that the F-35 will enter service in another 6-7 years. The Department of Defense believes production and development costs will continue to rise and that the number to be built will decline. Both trends increase the average aircraft cost. Based on past experience the higher Department of Defense estimates are more likely to be accurate.

After all the F-35 bashing around here lately, it’s only fair that we give equal time to the other hyper-expensive fighter, the F-22:

The U.S. Air Force is upgrading its F-22 fighters, at a cost of $39 million each. This is just the latest of several upgrades for the F-22, which entered service six years ago. Upgrading combat aircraft is common, and necessary. But the F-22 upgrades have been more expensive than previous aircraft. The F-22 is also more expensive to maintain. That costs $44,000 per flight hour, compared to $30,000 per hour for the older F-15 that the F-22 is replacing. The F-22 per-hour cost is nearly twice what it is for the F-16. While it requires 19 man hours of maintenance for each F-16 flight hour, the F-22 requires 34 hours. The manufacturer originally said it would be less than ten hours. Most of this additional F-22 expense (and man hours) is for special materials and labor needed to keep the aircraft invisible to radar.

The main problem is the radar absorbent material used on the aircraft. The B-2 had a similar problem, which was eventually brought under control. But even then, the B-2 cost more than twice as much to operate than the half century old B-52. The B-2 and F-22 use different types of radar absorbent materials, so many of the B-2 solutions will not work for the F-22. Some of the F-22 electronics were not as reliable as the air force expected.

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In addition, the F-22 costs more than three times as much as the aircraft it was to replace. The air force wants to build more than 187, and has allies in Congress who want the jobs (and votes) continued production would generate. But the Department of Defense was reluctant to spend that kind of money, especially when there so many other programs seeking funds (like electronic warfare aircraft, UAVs and upgrades for F-15s and F-16s). Thus, two years ago, the Department of Defense decided to terminate F-22 production at 187 aircraft. This resulted in each aircraft costing (including development and production spending), $332 million. Just the production costs of the last F-22s built was $153.2 million. Added to the cost of the last few aircraft was a $147 million fee the Department of Defense agreed to pay if the production line was shut down. This goes to pay for shutting down facilities and terminating contracts with hundreds of supplies.

The F-22 is a superb aircraft, probably the most capable fighter in the world. But the development and manufacturing costs kept rising until it became too expensive for the media, voters and politicians. The air force was able to build it, but they couldn’t sell it to the people who paid the bills.

On the other hand, a bit of good news from last week: at least the F-22 is allowed to fly again.

The delays in the production of the F-35 are forcing the USAF to extend the service life of hundreds of aging F-16 aircraft:

The U.S. Air Force will refurbish several hundred of its 22 ton F-16 fighters, because their replacement, the 31 ton F-35 is not arriving in time. The F-35 began development in the 1990s and was supposed to enter service in 2011. That has since slipped to 2017, or the end of the decade, depending on who you believe. Whichever date proves accurate, the air force has a problem. Its F-16s are old, and by 2016 many will be too old to operate. The average age of existing F-16s is over 20 years, and the average aircraft has over 5,000 flight hours on it. Two years ago, the first Block 40 F-16 passed 7,000 hours. Three years ago, the first of the earliest models (a Block 25) F-16 passed 7,000 hours.

Depending on how late the F-35 is, the air force will refurbish 300-600 Block 40 and 50 aircraft. The work will concentrate on extending the life of the airframe, plus some electronics upgrades. The air force does this sort of thing frequently to all aircraft models. It’s called SLEP (Service Life Extension Program), and this one is special only because it concentrates on very old aircraft and is intended to keep these birds viable for another 5-10 years.

The F-16C was originally designed for a service life of 4,000 hours in the air. But advances in engineering, materials and maintenance techniques have extended that to over 8,000 hours. Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, F-16s sent to these areas will fly over a thousand hours a year more than what they would fly in peacetime. The current planned SLEP will extend F-16C flight hours to 10,000 (10K) or more.

The months-long grounding is over:

On September 21st, the U.S. Air Force will allow its F-22 fighters to fly again. The aircraft had been grounded for 140 days because of problems with the pilot’s oxygen system. The air force is not giving out many details on exactly what the problems is, although they say a report on the F-22 oxygen system will be out by the end of the year. Each F-22 will undergo a detailed inspection before it is cleared to fly. This may have something to do with earlier remarks about toxins somehow getting into the pilot’s air supply. The problem was always about something bad in the air supply. This has kept all 168 F-22s grounded since May. The only exception was a squadron based on the Virginia coast, that was given permission to fly out of the way of hurricane Karina. Those F-22s encountered no problems with their air supply.

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During the grounding, pilots and ground crews used simulators and (for the ground crews) maintenance exercises on the grounded aircraft to keep their skills sharp. In addition, everyone helped checking out a growing list of aircraft components in support of the search for the breathing problem). The air force was also under time pressure to fix the problem. That’s because after 210 days on the ground, aircrew have to undergo extensive retraining to regain combat flying status. This added a little more urgency to fixing the problem quickly. The grounding also left a dozen F-22s stranded at a training base, where they were for live weapons exercises. At least six new F-22s could not be delivered because of the grounding.