January 11, 2012
January 6, 2012
Ten years later: Ron Paul’s 2002 predictions
December 9, 2011
US Marine Corps has to economize on V-22 Osprey . . . by buying more helicopters
The USMC is very happy with their V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor for its speed and durability, but it is still far more expensive than ordinary helicopters. As a result of the high individual cost of V-22’s, the USMC is having to buy upgraded CH-53 helicopters to carry some of the burden:
The U.S. Marine Corps recently admitted that the lifetime cost of operating their new V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft had increased 64 percent over the last three years (to $121.5 billion). Although the marines MV-22s have flown over 100,000 hours in Afghanistan and have an excellent safety and reliability record, they are very expensive. With major cuts in the defense budget coming, there is pressure to cease production of the MV-22, and put more money into cheaper helicopters. That is already happening.
Four years ago the U.S. Marine Corps began working on an updated version of their heavy, CH-53E, transport helicopters. The new version was the CH-53K. First flight of a CH-53K was to take place this year, with first CH-53Ks entering service in 2015. But now this has all been delayed. First flight won’t take place until 2013, and the CH-53K won’t enter service until 2018. Technical problems are blamed, although helicopter advocates imply that the marines don’t want to take money away from their MV-22 program to keep the CH-53K program on schedule.
There is still a lot of enthusiasm for the CH-53K. Two years ago, the marines decided to replace their elderly CH-53Ds with CH-53Ks, rather than the more expensive MV-22s. The CH-53K was to cost about $27 million each, compared to about three times that for an MV-22. However, delaying the introduction of the CH-53K will cost over a billion dollars, and add about $5 million to the cost of each CH-53K. Replacing the CH-53Ds means more CH-53Ks, for a total of about 200. It’s expected that the final costs of the CH-53D will be higher, but still about half the cost of an MV-22.
Image from Sikorsky website.
October 23, 2011
The CIA’s new boss and the new rules
Strategy Page discusses the new rules for the CIA under the new boss, David Petraeus:
The CIA has a new boss, David Petraeus, who formerly commanded American military forces in Afghanistan. With the arrival of Petraeus, the CIA is changing how it goes about determining the situation in Afghanistan. From now on, CIA analysts will discuss the situation with military commanders before they submit their monthly reports, rather than argue with the military leaders after the fact when people note that the military and CIA analysis comes to different conclusions. The CIA may still disagree with the military, but now they have to answer military assertions that contradict what the CIA believes.
Although this new policy was announced after Petraeus took over at the CIA recently, it was actually in the works for months. It was held up when it became clear that Petraeus was going to be the new CIA chief. Petraeus approved the new policy, which he had long been asking for.
All this came about because CIA analysts eventually noted that the military commanders were using different criteria for “success” and that often had uncovered aspects of the situation that the CIA analysts were missing. So, even before Petraeus showed up at CIA headquarters, the intelligence analysts had decided to work more cooperatively with their military counterparts, if only to ensure that all the bases were covered.
The CIA analysts always were at a disadvantage in Afghanistan, and Iraq, because the military was getting their information first hand, while the CIA often was getting it second or third hand. Moreover, the military was more aware of the fact that “success” in Afghanistan depended a lot on what you believed was possible, and what you knew was actually going on. In some cases, the CIA analysts did not appreciate what impact American field operations were having. Afghanistan, to outsiders has always been a murky place, and difficult to read.
October 9, 2011
Keylogger infects computers at USAF base where Afghani UAV missions are controlled
This sounds more like an irritation than a serious attack, but it would be instructive to find out how the keylogger was introduced into what one assumes is a secure location:
A computer virus that captures the strokes on a keyboard has infected networks used by pilots who control US air force drones flown on the front line, according to a report.
Wired magazine reported that the spyware has resisted efforts to remove it from computers in the cockpits at Creech air force base in Nevada, where pilots remotely fly Predator and Reaper drones in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
The story said there were no confirmed reports that classified data had been stolen and that the virus did not stop pilots from flying missions. Network security specialists were uncertain whether the virus was part of a directed attack or accidentally infected the networks, the story said.
The air force said in a statement that it did not discuss threats to its computer networks because it could help hackers refine their tactics.
October 6, 2011
Britain suffered higher proportional casualties than the US in Afghanistan
A brief item from Strategy Page on the relative casualties suffered by the major allied combatants over the course of the Afghanistan campaign:
In ten years of combat in Afghanistan, some 2,700 foreign troops have died. Most (67 percent) were American. The next two nations in terms of combat losses were Britain (14.1 percent) and Canada (5.8 percent). Adjusted for population size, Britain suffered five percent more combat deaths than the United States. On the same basis, Canada suffered about 80 percent as many deaths as the United States.
All three of these nations had their troops in the south (Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where most of the heroin came from) or along the southeast border (mainly Pakistan’s North Waziristan area, long a sanctuary for Islamic terror groups). There were a few other NATO nations, plus Australia, that had small contingents in the south, but most NATO nations put their troops in more peaceful north, with orders to stay out of trouble and avoid casualties.
October 5, 2011
The tight spot Pakistan finds itself in
More on the Pakistani situation from Strategy Page:
In Pakistan, decades of anti-American and anti-Indian propaganda, and support for Islamic radicalism, has brought the country to the brink of disaster. The U.S. has stopped being discreet and secretive about Pakistani military and intelligence (ISI) attacks on Americans during the last decade. These attacks were played down in the hope that Pakistan could be persuaded to eliminate the pro-terrorist people in the army and ISI. This didn’t happen. The army and the ISI needed the Islamic radicals, to keep tensions with India high (via Pakistani-backed terror attacks in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.) The army/ISI leaders fear loss of their large share of the national economy if the Indian “threat” is viewed more realistically. The political parties, which are corrupt, and often allies of the military, have backed the generals in their opposition to American demands to crack down on Islamic terrorism. Most Pakistanis believe that the United States cannot possibly operate in Afghanistan without the support of Pakistan. This despite vigorous NATO efforts to shift their supply lines from Pakistan to Central Asia. Pakistan believes that possession of nuclear weapons will keep the United States from doing anything drastic, like more raids into Pakistan to destroy terrorists. The May raid to kill Osama bin Laden shows that the U.S. could, and would, do this. Now Pakistan has said it will not shut down Islamic terrorist sanctuaries in North Waziristan (in the northeast) and Quetta (in the southwest). The U.S. says that if the Pakistanis won’t the U.S. will. Pakistan says that if America tries that, it will mean war. It’s no secret that the U.S. has made plans to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons, and India has just signed a cooperation treaty with Afghanistan. Pakistanis like to believe that they have America in a corner, but it’s becoming more likely that it is Pakistan that has painted itself into a corner. Pakistan has long complained of being surrounded by conspiracies and enemies. Now, because of Pakistani support for Islamic terrorism, those fears are about to become true. Pakistan denies any responsibility for this, insisting that it is the victim. That will make no difference in the end, other than to provide some incredulous footnotes in the histories of the late, great, Pakistan.
October 3, 2011
The key to peace in Afghanistan? The Pakistani army and the ISI
Strategy Page explains why Afghanistan will not be peaceful until the Pakistani army and their local equivalent of the CIA stop meddling:
The U.S. and Afghanistan still believe a negotiated peace is possible, but Pakistan, not the Taliban, must be the counterparty. And it’s not Pakistan the country that must negotiate, but the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the Pakistani ISI/military intelligence organization). These two organizations have been running their own foreign policy for decades. The army/ISI has gotten rich by gaining control over a large chunk of the national economy and government budget. It’s all done with coercion, corruption and constant anti-Indian/anti-American propaganda. The Pakistani Army cannot justify its privileged position unless they convince the Pakistani people that there is a major threat out there. So the army/ISI has created fearsome foes. This includes Afghanistan, which they portray as a puppet for India and America and a major threat to Pakistan. Most Afghans reject this, and see the Taliban as a Pakistani tool. While many Afghans appreciate scattered Taliban efforts to reduce corruption, they mainly want less violence. The Taliban has been the major source of violence for nearly two decades, and most Afghans want peace. The Taliban want control, above all else. But now, facing severe combat losses, lower morale and defections, increased terror attacks are believed more for internal purposes (to build Taliban morale) than to weaken the Afghan government.
Afghanistan is looking north, towards Central Asia, for economic growth, and as a safer way to move goods into and out of the country. Pakistan is seen as more of an enemy, and not a reliable economic partner. Central Asia, on the other hand, is more stable, and offers as many economic opportunities. Afghanistan calls this the “Silk Road Solution” in memory of the ancient trade route between China and the Middle East (and India), which ran through western Afghanistan. Ocean going European sailing ships put the Silk Road out of business five centuries ago, but the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 has opened Central Asia to more customers and suppliers, including Afghanistan. The Silk Road is returning, as a local economic thoroughfare.
As part of the new approach to Pakistan, the U.S. has revealed that many deaths of American troops along the Afghan border were actually caused by Pakistani troops, not Taliban fighters. These details had been kept quiet for years, to maintain good relations with Pakistan. But now the Pakistani army and ISI are seen as out-of-control, so the gloves are off.
September 14, 2011
The risk of terrorism doesn’t justify current US military spending
August 17, 2011
RCAF finds that equipment is easier to obtain than trained crews
From Strategy Page:
Canada is finding it’s easier to buy new helicopters, than find the people it needs to operate and maintain them. Such is the case with a new CH-47 transport helicopter squadron, which will require 482 pilots, maintainers and support staff. Pilots are in training, as are some of the maintainers.
The problems is that the Royal Canadian Air Force has only 14,500 personnel and it’s difficult to round up 482 specialists for a new squadron. The new unit does not reach full strength until 2014, and three years is believed sufficient to recruit or transfer the people needed for the new unit. But maybe not, because it’s always a problem with smaller armed forces in this age of ever evolving technology. The U.S. Air Force has 330,000 personnel, and has been downsizing for the last two decades. All those people give you a lot more flexibility, and fewer problems in forming new units.
Canada has been leasing and trying to buy CH-47s for the past four years. That’s because the CH-47 is the best helicopter for use in Afghanistan, having proved able to deal with the dust and high altitude operations better than other transport choppers. The CH-47 has been engineered, over the years, to deal with the dust, and always had the engine power to handle high altitude operations. For these reasons, Canada is buying fifteen more CH-47Fs and forming another air force squadron to operate them.
July 23, 2011
Today’s drive-by smear courtesy of the Globe & Mail
The Globe‘s Steve Rennie must think he’s blown the lid off a dark, sordid conspiracy, the way he reports on the booze tab of the Canadian embassy in Kabul:
Canada’s diplomatic corps in Kabul did not go thirsty.
Hospitality forms show embassy staff and dignitaries drank plenty of booze while posted to Afghanistan, an Islamic country where imbibing is not just taboo, it’s against the law.
But aren’t the grounds of an official embassy are considered to be part of the country whose embassy it is? If so, then the embassy grounds are under Canadian jurisdiction, where alcohol is quite legal.
The embassy consumed close to 3,000 bottles of alcoholic beverages from mid-2007 to last November. The tab for the beer, wine and hard liquor was at least $20,000.
Unfortunately, no numbers of people are provided — we’re invited to imagine all this booze being consumed by a few red-nosed diplomats with livers the size of Etobicoke. No, later in the article, he mentions that it was more than just a couple of soused embassy officials keeping the bar open:
There were sendoffs for departing staffers and shindigs to welcome new ones. The embassy entertained visiting generals, diplomats, journalists and politicians.
At about this point, after sneering at the diplomat’s choices of beer, Rennie realizes perhaps he needs to heighten the contrast, by showing that the soldiers and civilians operating in Kandahar had it tougher:
It was not the same for Canadians serving in the country’s restive south. Booze was banned at Kandahar Airfield and at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City. Soldiers, diplomats and civilians stationed there had to wait until holidays or special events for a cold one. And there was little danger of getting tipsy with a strict two-beer limit.
But as Rennie had already pointed out, the Kandahar installations were in the middle of an Islamic country that formally prohibits booze. Even if it’s a Canadian Armed Forces base, it has to observe the laws of the country in which it’s situation — it’s not Canadian soil in the way the embassy is. Not to mention that Kandahar was a fricking war zone: armies that drink booze while on active operations against an enemy are less effective armies.
Oh, but then we’re back to those awful alcoholics in the diplomatic corps, who were drinking in “an Islamic country where imbibing is not just taboo, it’s against the law”. Rennie must have forgotten writing that in the first few paragraphs, as it doesn’t mesh well with this later assertion:
Beyond the fortified walls of the embassy, there is no shortage of watering holes around Kabul for the many diplomats, aid workers and journalists who call the city home.
At one time, some popular hang outs included the Tex-Mex restaurant La Cantina and the Gandamak Lodge, a guest house with a British pub in the basement set up by a BBC journalist a decade ago after the Taliban regime fell.
Under Afghan law, anyone caught drinking alcohol can be fined, jailed or whipped. But these punishments are rarely handed down.
Didn’t you just trump your own ace there?
H/T to Chris Myrick for posting the link to this article on Google+, saying “I don’t blame them at all. I imagine Kabul would be intolerable otherwise.”
July 17, 2011
Nick Gillespie and Matt Welch on a libertarian foreign policy
The third part of an interview with Gillespie and Welch, covering libertarian foreign policy ideas:
July 14, 2011
Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan being spun as a Taliban victory
To the surprise of nobody, the Taliban is claiming a clear win in driving the Canadian infidels out of Afghanistan:
During nine years of operations in Afghanistan, 157 Canadian troops died (87 percent because of the Taliban.) For most of that time, Canada suffered, proportionately, twice as many dead in Afghanistan as the United States. During this period, the U.S. had ten times as many troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. also has ten times the population of Canada, so the 3,000 Canadians are making the same scale of effort, but suffering more losses in the process. But most of those losses were not from “fighting the Taliban,” but from mines in the road. Back in early 2007, 81 percent of Canadian deaths were from IEDs (roadside bombs). But that declined as Canadian troops received more bomb resistant armored vehicles.
Since the Taliban couldn’t cope with Canadian troops in head-to-head combat, they devoted much of their roadside bombing effort against the Canadians. But in the last year, the Taliban were only able to kill four Canadian troops. Still, the constant Taliban propaganda about how killing even a few Canadian troops would eventually force the Canadians to withdraw, is believed by most Afghans. Canada decided to withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan back in 2008, and more American troops have moved in to replace them.
It’s ironic that the reason the government of the day originally committed troops to the Afghanistan campaign was that they thought it would be “safer” than being involved in Iraq. Rather than being seen to support George Bush, the Canadian contingent was sent to a “less tainted” operation instead. The party that sent the troops in the first place lost few opportunities to call for them to leave, once the current government was in power.
July 7, 2011
The end of Canada’s combat deployment in Afghanistan
Matthew Fisher reports on the handover ceremony:
Canada’s first war in more than half a century ended at 11:18 a.m. local time Thursday, about 300 metres away from where the first Canadian combat troops set foot in Kandahar on Jan. 19, 2002.
The seventh and last Canadian to command Task Force Kandahar, Brig.-Gen. Dean Milner, signed over responsibility for Canada’s battle space to Col. Todd Wood of the 1st Stryker Combat Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, as NATO’s senior officer in the south, U.S. Army Maj.-Gen. James Terry, presided.
Milner repeatedly returned to the close friendships he had forged with Afghan security forces during a sometimes emotional address at the “transfer of authority” parade. In particular, he singled out his Afghan partner, Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Habibi for “leading from the front.”
July 5, 2011
Miss Taliban beauty contest called off after all contestants turn out to be men
Okay, the real story:
AFGHAN police have arrested seven armed insurgents who disguised themselves as women by wearing burqas, officials said.
Interior ministry spokesman Siddiq Siddiqi said that the men, who carried light weapons with at least one in a suicide vest, were captured in Jalalabad, the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar.
He said the men wore the all-enveloping veil as part of their disguise and were planning attacks on government targets, but gave no further details.
H/T to Roger Henry, who notes:
Have a look at these delectable Afghan stunners, Afghanistan’s best!
I do so like the look of coy modesty, what possibly could have given them away?
They could do with a little grooming.
