CDR Salamander on the lessons to be learned from the latest dramatic turn in the Russo-Ukrainian war with Ukraine carefully avoiding letting their American supporters know about the attack before it went in:
[This] picture from 2012 of Norfolk is what I want you to think about.
We talked about the superbly executed Ukrainian attack on Russian bomber bases for most of yesterday’s Midrats, and what keeps coming to mind for me is not the details of that attack, but the stark warning it is giving us.
The threat of drone strikes isn’t a new warning, but in my mind it intersect almost perfectly with the self-inflicted vulnerability of the US Navy’s fleet — its concentration.
The growing utility of attack drones isn’t an insight that is unique to the Russo-Ukrainian War. The topic has come up here and on Midrats for almost two decades. We’re not alone. Heck, broad thinking people like our friend Matt Hipple was pondering it over at CIMSEC thirteen years ago a few months before the picture at the top of the post was made.
I’ll tie in the picture a bit, but let’s take a moment to give the Ukrainians credit where credit is due. They executed precision strikes against the RUS bomber fleet across the entire two-thirds of the Euro-Asian landmass.
We will find out more details, a dozen or 40+ high-demand/low-density strategic bombers were taken off the battle line. RUS is not building any more of them. As missile carriers, they have been a cornerstone of the city terrors for most of the last four years. You would be hard-pressed to find a more honorable, or legitimate target.
Streiff over at Red State has a good summary with what we think we know as of Sunday afternoon:
The airbases are the home to Russia’s fleet of Tu-22, Tu-95M, and Tu-160 nuclear-capable strategic bombers as well as AS-50 battle management aircraft. They were located from the Siberian Far East to the Arctic Circle. The furthest target, Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk, is over 2700 miles from Ukraine.
Reports indicate that at least 41 aircraft were hit. The unofficial tally indicates 24 Tu-22, 8 Tu-95MS, and 5 Tu-16 were hit. MiG-31 fighters and Il-76 transports were also hit. To put this in context, open-source data says Russia’s bomber inventory is about 58 Tu-22, 47 Tu-95MS, and 15 Tu-160. These planes are the ones used to launch most of the missiles fired at Ukrainian cities.
By any standard, this was a devastating attack. Nearly half of the Tu-22, a quarter of the Tu-95MS, and a third of the Tu-160 fleet, representing just over 30 percent of Russia’s strategic bomber force, were damaged or destroyed in one attack. When you consider the operational readiness rate, Russia probably has less than 50 aircraft capable of flying … on the bright side, they have plenty of aircraft to cannibalize for parts. The Tu-22 and Tu-95MS production lines are closed, and the Tu-160 production is one, yes, one per year. For all intents and purposes, this represents a permanent decrease in the size of the Russian strategic bomber fleet.
Before we discuss what the USA needs to take away, let’s look at the top-4 primary and second-order effects this will have on the Russian Federation.
First Order Effects
- Fewer raiding assets to use against UKR.
- The weakest leg of their nuclear triad (bombers are dual use) is even weaker.
- PSYOP defeat as RUS now know even their most valuable weapons, stationed deep into RUS rear, are vulnerable.
- Paranoia elevated into an already paranoid national psyche under duress of year four of a grinding war.
Second Order Effects
- Inefficiencies in both civilian logistics and manpower are the natural response to every tractor-trailer being a weapons delivery vehicle at range … and the need to defend important bases as a result, sinks into an already stressed nation.
- Loss of face. RUS launched a war of choice against nation 1/4th its size and much weaker than it from any measure, and four years on, still has only made marginal progress. Now that nation proved it can operate with impunity anywhere inside RUS. The “R” in BRICS is not impressing its friends.
- It shouldn’t, but this is going to get the nuclear autists the jitters. All theory, but yes, UKR took out one-third or more of the fully mission capable nuclear capable bombers that form one leg — but as mentioned above the weakest leg — of RUS’s nuclear deterrence. Those who work in the theory-dominated nuclear world will have all their gauges twitching, yes, but in the end analysis, it won’t matter.
- UKR morale just got a big boost. Wars of attrition usually last until one side or the other loses either the material ability or the will to fight. At least from the “will” line of operation, that decisive point just shifted to the right.
Simply a superb operation. How do you defend against weapons like this disguised in a trailer’s false roof?
