World War Two
Published 15 Jun 2021Naval infantrymen have long been a feature of warfare. In the build-up to 1939, they took on new functions and tactics. The Royal Marines, the US Marine Corps, Black Death, Kaiheidan, and more are ready for all-out amphibious warfare in the Pacific Theatre and beyond.
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June 16, 2021
By Sea, By Land – A Global History of the Marines – WW2 Special
“One nation, indivisible”?
As a child in England and then in Canada, I was used to the relatively low-key acknowledgements of the Crown and the nation which may be why I was quite befuddled watching American TV portrayal of the in-your-face patriotic displays of the United States, especially the Pledge of Allegiance required of schoolchildren. It seemed oddly statist and even collectivist (although I didn’t know those terms at the time) for a country that constantly seemed to be patting itself on the back as the “home of the free”. I later learned that the Pledge hadn’t even been invented until nearly a century after the nation had been established (and the current version was devised and popularized by a noted utopian socialist, then adopted by Congress in 1942). Tom Mullen explores how the Pledge came about and considers the idea that it is time to drop it:
An Atlanta, Georgia, charter school announced last week its intention to discontinue the practice of having students stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance during its schoolwide morning meetings at the beginning of each school day, opting to allow students to recite the pledge in their classrooms instead. Predictably, conservatives were immediately triggered by this “anti-American” decision, prompting the school to reverse its decision shortly after.
The uproar over periodic resistance to reciting the pledge typically originates with Constitution-waving, Tea Party conservatives. Ironically, the pledge itself is not only un-American but antithetical to the most important principle underpinning the Constitution as originally ratified.
[…]
Then, there’s “indivisible”. One would think a federation born by its constituent states seceding from the nation to which they formerly belonged would make the point obvious enough. But the Declaration makes it explicit:
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
It would be impossible to exercise that right — that duty, as the Declaration later calls it — if the republic were indivisible. The strictest constructionists of the time didn’t consider the nation indivisible. Thomas Jefferson didn’t threaten to send troops to New England when some of its states considered seceding upon his election. Quite the opposite. And in an 1804 letter to Joseph Priestly, he deemed a potential split in the union between “Atlantic and Mississippi confederacies” not only possible but “not very important to the happiness of either part.”
The people advocating “one nation, indivisible” in those days were big government Federalists like Hamilton, whose proposals to remake the United States into precisely that were flatly rejected in 1787.
Proponents of absolute, national rule like to quip this question was “settled” by the American Civil War. That’s like saying Polish independence was “settled” by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939.
In fact, it is precisely the trend towards “one nation” that has caused American politics to become so rancorous, to the point of boiling over into violence, over the course of the last several decades. This continent is inhabited by a multitude of very different cultures, which can coexist peacefully if left to govern themselves. But as the “federal” government increasingly seeks to impose a one-size-fits-all legal framework over people who never agreed to give it that power, the resistance is going to get more and more strident. If there is any chance to achieve peace among America’s warring factions, a return to a more truly federal system is likely the only way.
Getting rid of the un-American pledge to the imaginary nation would be a good, symbolic start.
Tank Chats #111 | Sherman M4A1 (76) W | The Tank Museum
The Tank Museum
Published 20 Nov 2020Join The Tank Museum’s Historian David Fletcher as he discusses the Sherman M4A1 (76) W, a late war variant of the Sherman M4A1 which was introduced into service in the summer of 1944. The M4A1 (76) W still had a cast hull, but improved frontal armour, a more powerful version of the Continental radial engine and was up-gunned from the original M4A1, with a 76mm gun.
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QotD: The Shah of Iran
The Shah that emerges from these pages would be almost a tragic figure, if they gave us a better feel for him as a person, that is to say as a living being rather than a mere policy-maker. He was by nature a vacillator, thrust by inheritance and a destiny beyond his control into a position in which vacillation would eventually prove fatal. In addition to self-doubt, however, he was also inclined to vainglory, oscillating between the two, retreating from crises and ostentatiously parading himself, and boasting, when things seemed to be going well. He thought that he had both the right and the duty, genuinely for the sake of his country, to rule rather than reign, but while he had the ideas of an autocrat, he also had those of an ordinary decent person who baulked at the shedding of much blood, the only way, in the end, that he could have preserved his throne (and possibly not even then).
He was intelligent and wily, and his achievements were not negligible. He managed to wrest control of Iran’s oil first from the British and then from the international oil consortium that succeeded them. He played the oil market with great skill. He instituted an important land reform that genuinely benefitted the peasantry, expanded education, and had a full understanding of the importance of technology in the modernization of Iran necessary if it were to be anything other than a dependent state. His foreign policy was flexible, pragmatic, and shrewd. He needed the Americans but did not trust them (or anybody else, for that matter), realising that in politics there were no friendships, only common interests. This was to be borne out in the most terrible and tragic way during his last few years of exile, with which this book does not deal. Where there is no friendship, there is no gratitude for services rendered.
His failures were at least as great as his successes, and in the end more important from the point of view of his personal destiny. He so hollowed out political life in Iran, in order to exercise power as a true autocrat, that it came to have two poles: sycophancy and plotting against him. Sycophancy is a terribly addictive drug, no doubt a permanent temptation of the powerful (and therefore a good reason to restrict political terms of office); you can never have enough of it, nor can it ever be outrageous enough.
Unfortunately for the Shah, no one is sycophantic from principle, indeed sycophants tend (rightly) to despise themselves, fully aware that they are acting from the most naked of self-interest. There is no rat that leaves a sinking ship faster than a sycophant deserting a lost cause. A sycophant will take a risk to preserve his skin, but not to preserve his master.
Theodore Dalrymple, “Downfall of the House of Pahlavi”, The Iconoclast, 2021-03-03.