Auftragstaktik is German for “mission-type tactics” or “mission-oriented tactics”, and it’s the main non-genetic reason they were so fearsome in battle back in the 20th century. Basically the idea is to delegate command authority to the lowest possible level, because the guys who are actually in the shit have a much better sense of the tactical realities than the guys back at headquarters. So long as the guys at the front are adequately briefed about command’s strategic objectives, they can, and should, make the tactical decisions in their areas of responsibility.
They started developing it before WWI, but proof of concept was in the trenches, and it succeeded spectacularly. It’s hard to exaggerate just how outmanned and outgunned the Germans were in that conflict, and I don’t have the exact numbers to hand, but one especially fearsome measure was “artillery density”. On the German side, the preparatory barrage before an attack averaged, at best, something like 1 shell per square foot (this is from memory, so doubtless incorrect, but you get the idea). The Allies achieved something like one shell per square inch, and there you have it …
… or there you should’ve had it, if the Allies had anything close to German-level command-and-control. But they didn’t. British WW1 memoirs, especially, are full of the kinds of ludicrous fuckups that Joseph Heller wouldn’t dare put in his novels. Robert Graves (yeah, I know, not the world’s most trustworthy source) had an especially funny scene where his company got this elaborate set of orders to move to such-and-such coordinates, build an elaborate strongpoint (laid out in minute detail), then move on to some other coordinates and do something else, again spelled out to the nth degree.
Those coordinates were, of course, a mile and a half behind enemy lines.
Or consider that silly movie 1917. If you haven’t seen it, don’t. If you have, and you know a little bit about WWI, you’ll remember how ludicrous the premise was. You don’t need to send a squad, Saving Private Ryan-style, to get a message to a distant dugout where they’re waiting to jump off for an attack. For one thing, there’s this little gadget called a “radio”, and by 1917 they were portable enough to get there. But even if not, there’s this other gadget called a “telephone”, and any C-and-C bunker anywhere along the line would have one, no matter how fast the advance was moving. Finally, even if they didn’t have either of those, the supporting artillery park sure as hell would’ve — just ring them up and call off the preparatory barrage, and I promise you, none of those troops would’ve moved an inch, even if it meant shooting Colonel Sherlock Holmes right in his prissy, pencil-mustached mug.
If you know a bit more about WWI, that kind of ludicrous, plot-ruining stupidity seems like the most accurate thing in the movie, because that kind of bullshit happened all the time. Telephone wires were always getting cut by shellfire, for instance, and since none of the red tabs [staff officers] back at the base would dream of seeing the situation for themselves, field soldiers were always getting scads of contradictory orders, sent at bewildering times. More than one advance was held up by frontline troops having to send runners back to check the orders of other runners, which had been countermanded by yet other runners, coming up with telephone messages …
The guys in the opposing trenches, meanwhile, were just getting on with it. Graves again (and again, I know), quoting from memory, wondered what the High Command would’ve done had they known that for the better part of a year, the entire sector opposite the Royal Welch Fusiliers had been held by no one higher than a corporal.
Severian, “Auftragstaktik: Logic and Anti-Logic”, Founding Questions, 2021-11-18.
March 13, 2022
QotD: The Kaiser’s army and their Auftragstaktik innovations
March 12, 2022
Napoleon’s Grand European Army Marches Against Russia
Real Time History
Published 11 Mar 2022Get Nebula and CuriosityStream in a great bundle deal: https://curiositystream.com/realtimeh…
When Napoleon marched his Grande Armée into Russia in 1812, he had assembled the biggest army in modern European history. Only half of his troops came from territories of the expanded French Empire. Tens of thousands of troops also came from Poland, Prussia, Austria, and the German States as well as Southern Europe.
» SUPPORT US ON PATREON
https://patreon.com/realtimehistory» THANK YOU TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Brun, Jean-François. “Le cheval dans la Grande Armée“, Revue historique des armées (249), 2007.
Del Negro, Piero. “Les Italiens dans la Grande Armée. La campagne de Russie et le patriotisme italien“, Revue historique des armées (250), 2008.
Elting, John. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon’s Grande Armée. 1997.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Nieuwazny, Andrzej. “Les Polonais de la Grande Armée“, in Rey, Marie-Pierre and Thierry Lentz, eds. 1812, la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.» OUR STORE
Website: https://realtimehistory.net»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Above Zero
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Digital Maps: Canadian Research and Mapping Association (CRMA)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Simon Buckmaster
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
March 7, 2022
In The Highest Tradition — Episode 4
British Army Documentaries
Published 30 Oct 2021The fourth in a six-part series that delves into the world of regimental tradition. It looks at the illustrious history of the Royal Scots Greys with an account of how a French Imperial Eagle was won at Waterloo, and covers the tragic events of the Charge of the Light Brigade, the origins of the Victoria Cross, and follows the transition from horse to the tank.
© 1989
This production is for viewing purposes only and should not be reproduced without prior consent.
This film is part of a comprehensive collection of contemporary Military Training programmes and supporting documentation including scripts, storyboards and cue sheets.
All material is stored and archived. World War II and post-war material along with all original film material are held by the Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive.
February 9, 2022
In The Highest Tradition – Episode 1
British Army Documentaries
Published 18 Oct 2021[From the episode transcript – “Apart from discipline what emerges when you delve into British military tradition is that there’s no such entity as a British army. What you find is a confederation of regiments hopefully fighting on the same side all fiercely preserving their individuality by being as different from one another as possible.”]
First transmitted in 1989, this is the first episode in a six-part series that delves into the world of regimental tradition. This programme includes looks at the origins of Emperor Joseph Bonaparte’s chamber pot, a druid oration, and the story of a goat who escaped being eaten to become a regimental mascot.
© 1989
This production is for viewing purposes only and should not be reproduced without prior consent.
This film is part of a comprehensive collection of contemporary Military Training programmes and supporting documentation including scripts, storyboards and cue sheets.
All material is stored and archived. World War II and post-war material along with all original film material are held by the Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive.
February 2, 2022
QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with Stormtroopers (Stoßtruppen)
One way to respond to a novel tactical problem is with novel tactics. And the impetus for this kind of thinking is fairly clear: if your own artillery is the problem digging you into a hole, then find a way to use less of it.
The mature form of this tactical framework is often called “Hutier” tactics, after German general Oskar Emil von Hitier, though he was hardly the sole or even chief inventor of the method. In its mature form, the technique went thusly: instead of attacking with large waves of infantry which cleared each objective in sequential order, attacks ought to be proceeded by smaller units, carefully trained with the layout of the enemy positions. Those units, rather than having a very rigid plan of attack, would be given those general objectives and left to figure for themselves how to accomplish them (“mission tactics” or Auftragstaktik), giving them more freedom to make decisions based on local conditions and the ground.
These elite spearhead units, called Stoßtruppen or “Stormtroopers” were well equipped (in particular with a higher amount of automatic firearms and hand grenades, along with flamethrowers). Importantly, they were directed to bypass enemy strong-points and keep moving forward to meet their objectives. The idea here was that the follow-up waves of normal infantry could do the slow work of clearing out points where enemy resistance was strong, but the stormtroopers should aim to push as deeply as possible as rapidly as possible to disorient the defenders and rapidly envelop what defenses remained.
These sets of infantry tactics were in turn combined with the hurricane barrage, a style of artillery use which focused on much shorter but more intense artillery barrages, particularly associated with Colonel Georg “Breakthrough” Bruchmüller. Rather than attempting to pulverize defenses out of existence, the hurricane barrage was designed merely to force enemies into their dugouts and disorient the defenders; much of the fire was directed at longer ranges to disrupt roads and artillery in the enemy rear. The short barrage left the ground relatively more intact. Meanwhile, those elite infiltration units could be trained to follow the creeping barrage very closely (being instructed, for instance, to run into the shell explosions, since as the barrage advantages, no gun should ever strike the same spot twice; a fresh shell-hole was, in theory, safe). Attentive readers will recognize the basic foundations of the “move fast, disorient the enemy” methods of the “modern system” here.
So did infiltration tactics break the trench stalemate? No.
First, it is necessary to note that while infiltration tactics were perhaps most fully developed by the Germans, they were not unique to them. The French were experimenting with many of the same ideas at the same time. For instance, basic principles of infiltration were being published by the French General Headquarters as early as April, 1915. André Laffargue, a French infantry captain, actually published a pamphlet, which was fairly widely distributed in both the French and British armies by the end of 1915 and in the American army in 1916, on exactly this sort of method. In many cases, like at the Second Battle of Artois, these French tactics bore significant fruit with big advances, but ran into the problem that the gains were almost invariably lost in the face of German counter-attacks. The Russians, particularly under Aleksei Brusilov, also started using some of these techniques, although Brusilov was as much making a virtue of necessity as the Russians just didn’t have that much artillery or shells and had to make due with less and Russian commanders (including Brusilov!) seem to have only unevenly taken the lessons of his successes.
The problem here is speed: infiltration tactics could absolutely more efficiently overrun the front enemy lines and even potentially defeat multiple layers of a defense-in-depth. But after that was done and the shock of the initial push wore off, you were still facing the same calculus: the attacker’s reinforcements, shells, artillery and supplies had to cross broken ground to reach the new front lines, while the defender’s counter-attack could ride railways, move over undamaged roads and then through prepared communications trenches. In the race between leg infantry and trains, the trains always won. On the Eastern Front or against the Italians fighting under the Worst General In History at Caporetto (1917), the already badly weakened enemy might simply collapse, producing massive gains (but even at Caporetto, no breakthrough – shoving the enemy is not a breakthrough, to qualify as a breakthrough, you need to get to the “green fields beyond” that is open ground undefended by the enemy), but against a determined foe, as with the 1918 Spring Offensives, these tactics, absent any other factor, simply knocked big salients in the line. Salients which were, in the event, harder to defend and brought the Germans no closer to victory. Eventually – often quite rapidly – the front stabilized again and the deadlock reasserted itself. Restoring maneuver, the actual end-goal of these tactics, remained out of reach.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
February 1, 2022
US Armored Doctrine 1919-1942, Part 2
The Chieftain
Published 29 Jan 2022Continuing on this series of videos supporting the WW2 Channel, this is part one of a two-part look at how the US Army ended up with the armored force with which it entered combat in North Africa. https://www.youtube.com/c/WorldWarTwo
If you missed part 1… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLkJP…
Sources include:
Forging the Thunderbolt (Gillie)
Men on Iron Ponies (Morton)
Greasy Automatons and the Horsey Set (Tedesco)
A number of Center of Military History documents to include GHQ Maneuvers 1941 https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs…
A few other things I’ve forgotten about, but the above will get you 90% of the way there.Improved-Computer-And-Scout Car Fund:
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/The_Chieftain
Direct Paypal https://paypal.me/thechieftainshat1939 Cavalry Journal with Polish cavalry article.
https://mcoepublic.blob.core.usgovclo…
January 31, 2022
The Ram | Canada’s Most Successful Failure
Red Wrench Films
Published 4 Dec 2020A Canadian Franken-tank that pre-dated the M4 Sherman, the Ram would be an icon of Canada’s industry in the early war years. Ultimately a failure as a battle tank, variants of the vehicle would see combat in Normandy and beyond, as the Kangaroo APC which revolutionised mechanised warfare in 1944 and 1945.
Any feedback is greatly appreciated, I’m always trying to improve.
Any suggestions for the next video? Leave it down in the comments or message me. 🙂
((Like and subscribe))
Please note that the footage I can find on these vehicles is scarce and sometimes the video will not match properly or will perhaps be slightly inaccurate.
Sources:
https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/ca…
https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/mate…
https://www.friends-amis.org/index.ph…
http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2015/…Intuit256 by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/
January 25, 2022
US Armored Doctrine 1919-1942, Part 1
The Chieftain
Published 22 Jan 2022Continuing on this series of videos supporting the WW2 Channel, this is part one of a two-part look at how the US Army ended up with the armored force with which it entered combat in North Africa.
Sources include:
Forging the Thunderbolt (Gillie)
Men on Iron Ponies (Morton)
Greasy Automatons and the Horsey Set (Tedesco)
A number of Center of Military History documents
A few other things I’ve forgotten about, but the above will get you 90% of the way there.Improved-Computer-And-Scout Car Fund:
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/The_Chieftain
Direct Paypal https://paypal.me/thechieftainshatChristie Tank Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0APcE…
1930 Cavalry Journal.
https://mcoepublic.blob.core.usgovclo…
1939 Cavalry Journal
https://mcoepublic.blob.core.usgovclo…
Soviet doctrine video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7nr8…
Interview with Ken Estes on USMC tank history
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DBmN…
Assessment of USMC light tanks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gy4dw…
January 22, 2022
QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with artillery
While the popular conception was that the main problem was machine-gun fire making trench assaults over open ground simply impossible, the actual dynamic was more complex. In particular, it was possible to create the conditions for a successful assault on enemy forward positions – often with a neutral or favorable casualty ratio – through the use of heavy artillery barrages. The trap this created, however, was that the barrages themselves tore up the terrain and infrastructure the army would need to bring up reinforcements to secure, expand and then exploit any initial success. Defenders responded to artillery with defense-in-depth, meaning that while a well-planned assault, preceded by a barrage, might overrun the forward positions, the main battle position was already placed further back and well-prepared to retake the lost ground in counter-attacks. It was simply impossible for the attacker to bring fresh troops (and move up his artillery) over the shattered, broken ground faster than the defender could do the same over intact railroad networks. The more artillery the attacker used to get the advantage in that first attack, the worse the ground his reserves had to move over became as a result of the shelling, but one couldn’t dispense with the barrage because without it, taking that first line was impossible and so the trap was sprung.
(I should note I am using “railroad networks” as a catch-all for a lot of different kinds of communications and logistics networks. The key technologies here are railroads, regular roads (which might speed along either leg infantry, horse-mobile troops and logistics, or trucks), and telegraph lines. That last element is important: the telegraph enabled instant, secure communications in war, an extremely valuable advantage, but required actual physical wires to work. Speed of communication was essential in order for an attack to be supported, so that command could know where reserves were needed or where artillery needed to go. Radio was also an option at this point, but it was very much a new technology and importantly not secure. Transmissions could be encoded (but often weren’t) and radios were expensive, finicky high technology. Telegraphs were older and more reliable technology, but of course after a barrage the attacker would need to be stringing new wire along behind them connecting back to their own telegraph systems in order to keep communications up. A counter-attack, supported by its own barrage, was bound to cut these lines strung over no man’s land, while of course the defender’s lines in their rear remained intact.)
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
December 31, 2021
German Artillery Shells Paris Into Submission I GLORY & DEFEAT
Real Time History
Published 30 Dec 2021Sign up for Curiosity Stream and get Nebula bundled in and SAVE 26%: https://curiositystream.com/realtimeh…
The new year 1871 is about to bring upon a new German Empire. German leadership, especially Bismarck, is exceedingly frustrated with the dragged out Franco-Prussian War that the Germans have all but won for months now. The decision is finally made to bombard Paris into submission and the German guns surrounding Paris open fire.
» THANK YOU TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» OUR PODCAST
https://realtimehistory.net/podcast – interviews with historians and background info for the show.» LITERATURE
Arand, Tobias: 1870/71. Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg erzählt in Einzelschicksalen. Hamburg 2018Bourguinat, Nicolas and Gilles Vogt: La guerre franco-allemande de 1870. Une histoire globale. Paris 2020
Gouttman, Alain: La grande défaite. 1870-1871. Paris 2015
https://www.volksbund.de/nachrichten/… (zuletzt besucht am 21.11.2021)
» SOURCES
Allorant, Salomé u.a. (Hrsg.): La République au défi de la guerre. Lettres et carnet de lAnnée terrible (1870-1871). Amiens 2015Goncourt, Edmond de: Journal des Goncourts. II.1. 1870-1871. Paris 1890
Hérisson, Maurice d’: Journal d’un officier d’ordonnance. Paris 1885
Meisner, Heinrich Otto (Hrsg.): Kaiser Friedrich III. Kriegstagebuch von 1870/71. Berlin, Leipzig 1926
N. N. (Htrsg.): Bismarcks Briefe an seine Gattin aus dem Kriege 1870-71. Stuttgart, Berlin 1903
Pflugk-Hartung; Julius von: Krieg und Sieg 1870-71. Bd. I. Kulturgeschichte. Berlin 1896
Schikorsky, Isa (Hrsg.): “Wenn doch dies Elend ein Ende hätte”. Ein Briefwechsel aus dem Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71. Köln, Weimar, Wien 1999
Zeitz, Karl: Kriegserinnerungen eines Feldzugsfreiwilligen aus den Jahren 1870 und 1871. Altenburg 1905
» OUR STORE
Website: https://realtimehistory.net»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Cathérine Pfauth, Prof. Dr. Tobias Arand, Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Above Zero
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Philipp Appelt
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Maps: Battlefield Design
Research by: Cathérine Pfauth, Prof. Dr. Tobias Arand
Fact checking: Cathérine Pfauth, Prof. Dr. Tobias ArandChannel Design: Battlefield Design
Contains licensed material by getty images
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2021
November 27, 2021
Armored Vehicles of Operation Torch Pt. 2: America and Britain (and France) – by the Chieftain
World War Two
Published 26 Nov 2021Part two of Chieftain’s return to the North African campaign. Here he looks at the armored fighting vehicles of the British and Americans with a small bit on the French as well. We see the introduction of the iconic Sherman and the varied fortunes of British designs.
(more…)
November 18, 2021
When artillery became powerful enough to literally destroy castles
In Quillette, Paul Lockhart recounts one of the early artillery successes in European siege warfare, the reduction of the English-held fortifications at Odruik:
Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, was a warrior’s warrior. Hawk-nosed, ambitious, and brash, Philip had been a soldier since childhood. He was still a smooth-faced boy of 14 when he fought alongside his father, King John II of France, in the battle of Poitiers in 1356. Like King John, he was taken prisoner by the English when Edward, the Black Prince of Wales, vanquished the French on the field at Poitiers. A decade later, the duke, always looking for an advantage over the Englishmen who had invaded his country, embraced a novel technology: gunpowder.
This mysterious Asian invention had been known in Europe for more than a century, and for nearly that long European armies had used it as a weapon of war — or, more precisely, as the substance that made another recent innovation, the cannon, work. So far, gunpowder artillery had not shown great promise. Cannon had been used as siege engines in European warfare at least as early as the 1320s. But for all the trouble and effort they demanded, they had not proven themselves to be much more effective than conventional siege weapons such as catapults and trebuchets, machines that used mechanical energy to hurl projectiles at castle walls. Certainly, the early cannon did not appear to be effective enough to justify their cost, which was substantial.
But Philip the Bold saw promise in the new weapons, especially the huge siege guns that came to be known as bombards, and in 1369 he began to invest heavily in them. France and England were then locked in the on-again, off-again series of dynastic conflicts known today as the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453). In 1377, when Duke Philip’s brother and sovereign, King Charles V of France, ordered him to attack the English in the Calais region, the duke answered the call, bringing with him more than 100 new cannon, including one monster of a gun that fired a stone cannonball weighing some 450 livres (around 485 pounds).
One of the duke’s intended targets was the English-held castle at Odruik, built with stout masonry walls and surrounded by a thick layer of outworks. Odruik would be a tough nut to crack. Its defenders seemed to think so, too, and were confident that they could hold out against Duke Philip’s army, even as the duke’s men began to put their huge siege cannon into position in full view of the castle walls.
The first few shots from Philip’s siege-battery hammered Odruik’s outer walls into dust. Soon, the stone cannonballs were sailing through the walls as if they weren’t there; soon after that, the outer walls actually weren’t there. After Philip’s guns had fired a grand total of about 200 rounds, much of Odruik’s once-proud walls lay in ruin, and before the duke could send his men through the breach and into the castle, Odruik’s defenders capitulated.
Philip the Bold’s triumph at Odruik in 1377 was a harbinger of things to come, a revealer of unsettling truths. Gunpowder artillery had been used in sieges before, but Odruik was its first overwhelming and clear-cut victory over a castle. The siege of Odruik demonstrated that — when the guns were big enough, and when there were enough of them — cannon were more powerful than any siege engine yet invented, and could knock down castles in a matter of hours. What happened at Odruik would be repeated over and over again at castles throughout continental Europe and the British Isles through the remainder of the Middle Ages and beyond.
It was one of the accepted “rules” of war that a besieged town that surrendered before the beseiging army conducted an infantry assault would be spared from sack … the theory being that once the fortifications had been overcome, the final outcome was not in doubt and the defenders lost no honour from the surrender. You can certainly understand why the citizens of the defended town would be eager to avoid the plunder and rapine of an assaulting army once the walls were breached.
November 12, 2021
Armored Vehicles of Operation Torch Pt. 1, by the Chieftain
World War Two
Published 11 Nov 2021Chieftain returns to the North African theatre to talk us through the armored fighting vehicles in action around the time of Operation Torch. This episode is part one of two with Chieftain covering the German and Italian vehicles. Here, Chieftain looks at everything from the fearsome Tiger to the nemesis of LRDG: the Sahariana.
(more…)
September 2, 2021
Tank Chats #122 | Sherman 105 | The Tank Museum
The Tank Museum
Published 9 Apr 2021The Tank Museum’s Historian David Fletcher presents a Tank Chat on the only M4 variant of Sherman in The Tank Museum’s collection. This particular example is armed with the 105mm millimetre howitzer, designed for firing High Explosive in a close support role. Join David to find out more.
Support the work of The Tank Museum on Patreon: ► https://www.patreon.com/tankmuseum
Visit The Tank Museum SHOP & become a Friend: ►tankmuseumshop.orgTwitter: ► https://twitter.com/TankMuseum
Instagram: ► https://www.instagram.com/tankmuseum/
#tankmuseum #tanks