Capital ships could also only defeat their opponents’ armour IF they could find them and hit them accurately. Which was hardly a given, as only the British – with the eight WWI 15″ guns on Warspite — and Germans — with the nine modern 11″[!] guns on Scharnhorst — actually hit any moving target at 26,000 yards or more. (Both in relatively clear conditions in daylight, and both well inside the theoretical 35,000-45,000 yard full range of most battleship guns.)
[Three years later, in foul weather at night during the Battle of North Cape, the Germans had their fears that British radar had advanced far beyond theirs in gunfire direction completely confirmed, when Scharnhorst was pounded to scrap by Duke of York and a few cruisers in a battle where even the British cruisers could engage and score hits at ranges that didn’t allow Scharnhorst to reply accurately.]
No other navy came even close to hitting anything actually moving at any speed at 26,000 yards (though West Virginia managed within about 15% of it with 22,800 yards using the latest radar at Surigao Strait in late ’44). Certainly not the radar-deficient Italians and Japanese.
At night, or in bad weather, that meant radar-efficient nations had an unsurpassable advantage, particularly for fast moving targets at sea like those hit by Warspite and Scharnhorst.
[Although one USN 16″ battleship peppered stationary French targets in a port at even longer ranges, some USN engagements — like Guadalcanal — were at Jutland distances, if not closer. (5,000-8,000 yards, even though the US ships had radar … Which would have been fine if the USN had been consciously doing a Matapan-style 3,500 yard ambush, but South Dakota‘s radar and other power went down to “electrical fault”, and she accidentally wandered within 5,000 yards and was battered at close range, “leaving the ship in Lee’s words ‘deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent'”. Fortunately Washington‘s working radar allowed her to sneak up on the Japanese and win the battle.) ]
At Surigao Straits those USN battleships with more modern radar — the late war rebuilds West Virginia, California and Tennessee — spotted the enemy at over 30,000 yards, and opened fire at 22,000 yards, actually getting some hits with the opening salvos! But some ships with less effective radar — Maryland (eight 16″) — had to wait for visual sightings of shell splashes before joining in, and Pennsylvania (twelve 14″) with her older Mark III radar, failed to spot the enemy at all.
How many and how big your guns are, or what their range is, doesn’t matter a damn if you never see your opponent!
[Though please note, in every battle of the war, the navy which has the choice — either through speed in daylight, or radar superiority at night or in heavy weather — always closed the range to their maximum advantage (if not to point-blank where possible) before engaging.]
So instead of endlessly debating the value of ten or twelve 14″ versus eight 15″ or 16″ or even nine 11″ or 16″; or of 20 degree versus 30 degree or 40 degree elevation; or of heavier slower shells versus lighter faster ones: I tend to accept that most heavy guns could penetrate most armour, and just wonder whether they could only hit anything in good light and good weather, or if they were completely blind in the wrong conditions?
Nigel Davies, “Real Battleships for WWII – Part I – defining a battleship”, rethinking history, 2021-01-23.
May 7, 2021
QotD: Battleship gunnery in WW2
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