Quotulatiousness

April 24, 2013

More on the currency choices facing an independent Scotland

Filed under: Britain, Economics, Europe — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:49

John Kay works through the short list of options about money that a newly independent Scotland would need to decide about:

Speculation about Scotland’s currency future would begin on the day Scotland voted for independence — or the day on which a poll showed that this result was likely. Scotland would have three main options — the euro, the pound sterling, or its own distinct money.

The euro is the official currency of the EU, and Scotland would in principle be committed to its adoption. But there would be little enthusiasm for that course in either Edinburgh or Brussels, and Scotland — like the UK — would not meet the criteria on debt and deficits for joining the euro. A vague Scottish aspiration to join the single currency at some distant date would probably satisfy everyone.

The sensible outcome would be continued currency union with England — or with the entity that, in deference to Wales and Northern Ireland, participants in the Scottish debate call rUK — rest of UK. Scotland might ask for — and get — a Scottish economist on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (not a representative of Scotland — the rules of the committee preclude representative roles). But that would be the extent of Scottish influence on monetary policy.

[. . .]

If I represented the Scottish government in the extensive negotiations required by the creation of an independent state, I would try to secure a monetary union with England, and expect to fail. Given experience in the eurozone, today’s conventional wisdom is that monetary union is feasible only as part of a move towards eventual fiscal union. But desire to break up fiscal union was always a major — perhaps the principal — motive for independence in the first place.

Scotland could continue to use the pound unilaterally, whether the Bank of England liked it or not — as Ecuador uses the dollar and Montenegro the euro. But this is not really an attractive course, and the only countries that have adopted it are those — such as Ecuador and Montenegro — whose monetary histories are so dire that they prefer to entrust their policies to foreigners.

April 23, 2013

Independent Scotland would not be in currency union with the UK

Filed under: Britain, Economics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:08

In the Guardian, Patrick Wintour and Severin Carrell cover the latest provocative notion coming out of London, directed at the Scottish separatists:

An independent Scotland would be forced to adopt new currency arrangements that would be a “very deep dive into uncharted waters”, George Osborne has warned. The chancellor said an independent Scotland would be unable to operate with a currency linked to sterling, let alone be able to form a currency union with it.

“The best arrangement is if they stay in the UK,” he said.

Osborne said he thought it “unlikely” the rest of UK would agree to a currency union with Scotland, noticeably hardening his rhetoric against Alex Salmond’s proposal.

Speaking on BBC Radio Scotland, the chancellor said: “Why would it want to risk a currency union? We’ve got a currency union in Europe and it’s called the euro, and look at all the problems that has had trying to co-ordinate the economic policies of different countries.”

Setting out the options, the chancellor said: “I think Scotland could either join the euro, and Alex Salmond is very nervous of saying that, or Scotland can set up its own currency. That is what lots of countries do, but Alex Salmond is again nervous of saying that.

“They can use the pound without our consent, like Panama uses the American dollar, or they can negotiate with the rest of the UK to form a currency zone. But Britain has had poor experience with things like the ERM [exchange rate mechanism], when it has tried to lock or peg its currency together with other currencies. So it is not clear that it would be in the rest of the UK’s interest to enter into a euro-style currency zone with the rest of Scotland.”

April 18, 2013

Reason.tv: Why Bitcoin is Here to Stay

Filed under: Economics, Technology — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 10:29

Don’t bet on the decentralized currency Bitcoin as a retirement investment, says Mercatus Center policy analyst Jerry Brito, but go long on it as the payment system of the future. Reason‘s Nick Gillespie talks with Brito, the editor of the new anthology Copyright Unbalanced, about Bitcoin bubbles and why governments are so afraid of this virtual payment system.

April 15, 2013

Tabatha Southey and the “Grapes of Math”

Filed under: Economics, Humour, Liberty, Technology — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:14

In the Globe and Mail Tabatha Southey hears the laments of readers “We need a new John Steinbeck for the Great Bitcoin Depression”, and she delivers:

Pa was a simple man, a techno-anarchist by trade, and long after the Bitcoin bust, he stayed on with the mining. “Don’t know nothin’ else,” Ma said, although she once suggested migrant IT work, at least until her own contract was renewed at the hospital where she worked most of her grown days for a pediatric endocrinologist’s wage.

Pa sat on the sofa, the whir of the computer fans all but drowning out the Cato Institute podcast he’d downloaded the night before. He’s there, frozen in my childhood, Pa, mining, mining, mining, with nothing but his iPhone, his laptop and, for a while, my sister’s old Tamagotchi, which he found in the couch cushions while looking for the remote, to amuse him.

Dodging viruses like crop-dusters, Pa is experiencing hard times. He never did come to trust that ol’ anti-virus software. Said it was reporting on him to the Federal Reserve. And always the dust, the dust, the dust, which may have been because Pa never did get round to changing the furnace filters. His time, he said, best spent elsewhere.

Pa, oh, Pa. He never did stop spreading the word of Ron Paul on completely unrelated news items.

April 14, 2013

Competition and co-operation in a free market

Filed under: Business, Economics, Liberty — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:15

Sheldon Richman suggests that some people’s objections to free trade and free markets isn’t so much ethical as aesthetic:

Market advocates tend to respect the intellect of their fellow human beings. You can tell by their reliance on philosophical, moral, economic, and historical arguments when trying to persuade others. But what if most people’s aversion to the market isn’t founded in philosophy, morality, economics, or history? What if their objection is aesthetic?

More and more I’ve come to think this is the case, and I believe I witnessed an example recently at a lecture I gave at St. Lawrence University. During the Q&A a woman asked, in all sincerity, why society couldn’t do without money, since so many bad things are associated with it. She also suggested that cooperation is better than market competition. I replied that since money facilitates exchange and exchange is cooperation, it follows that money facilitates cooperation — a lovely thing, indeed. Government, I added, corrupts money.

I also said that competition is what happens when we are free to decide with whom we will cooperate. I don’t know if my response prompted her to rethink her objections to the market, but I am confident her objection was aesthetic. For her, money and competition are ugly. Perhaps I didn’t respond on an aesthetic level; it’s something I have to work on. But I tried, and so must we all when we encounter these sorts of objections.

Like that nice woman, many decent people dislike markets because they find them unattractive. And they associate markets with other things they find unattractive besides money and competition: (rugged, atomistic) individualism, selfishness, and profit. F.A. Hayek noticed this, writing in “Individualism: True and False”, “the belief that individualism approves and encourages human selfishness is one of the main reasons why so many people dislike it.” If that’s the case, philosophical, moral, economic, and historical arguments may fall on deaf ears. The objections must be met on an aesthetic level.

April 12, 2013

The Economist explains how Bitcoins work

Filed under: Economics, Technology — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 09:28

A brief overview of the much-talked-about digital currency:

BITCOIN, the world’s “first decentralised digital currency”, was launched in 2009 by a mysterious person (or persons) known only by the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. It has been in the news this week as the value of an individual Bitcoin, which was just $20 at the beginning of February, hit record highs above $250, before falling abruptly to below $150 on April 11th. What exactly is Bitcoin, and how does it work?

Unlike traditional currencies, which are issued by central banks, Bitcoin has no central monetary authority. Instead it is underpinned by a peer-to-peer computer network made up of its users’ machines, akin to the networks that underpin BitTorrent, a file-sharing system, and Skype, an audio, video and chat service. Bitcoins are mathematically generated as the computers in this network execute difficult number-crunching tasks, a procedure known as Bitcoin “mining”. The mathematics of the Bitcoin system were set up so that it becomes progressively more difficult to “mine” Bitcoins over time, and the total number that can ever be mined is limited to around 21m. There is therefore no way for a central bank to issue a flood of new Bitcoins and devalue those already in circulation.

And a bit more technical detail:

All transactions are secured using public-key encryption, a technique which underpins many online dealings. It works by generating two mathematically related keys in such a way that the encrypting key cannot be used to decrypt a message and vice versa. One of these, the private key, is retained by a single individual. The other key is made public. In the case of Bitcoin transactions, the intended recipient’s public key is used to encode payments, which can then only be retrieved with the help of the associated private key. The payer, meanwhile, uses his own private key to approve any transfers to a recipient’s account.

This provides a degree of security against theft. But it does not prevent an owner of Bitcoins from spending his Bitcoins twice—the virtual analogue of counterfeiting. In a centralised system, this is done by clearing all transactions through a single database. A transaction in which the same user tries to spend the same money a second time (without having first got it back through another transaction) can then be rejected as invalid.

The whole premise of Bitcoin is to do away with a centralised system. But tracking transactions in a sprawling, dispersed network is tricky. Indeed, many software developers long thought it was impossible. It is the problem that plagued earlier attempts to establish virtual currencies; the only way to prevent double spending was to create a central authority. And if that is needed, people might as well stick with the government devil they know.

To get around this problem, Bitcoins do not resemble banknotes with unique serial numbers. There are no virtual banknote files with an immutable digital identity flitting around the system. Instead, there is a list of all transactions approved to date. These transactions come in two varieties. In some, currency is created; in others, nominal amounts of currency are transferred between parties.

April 10, 2013

If there’s a “Bitcoin bubble”, it doesn’t predict long term success or failure for the currency

Filed under: Economics, History, Technology — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:55

In Forbes, Tim Worstall explains that calling the current rise in Bitcoin value a bubble does not actually pass a judgement on whether Bitcoin will be a long term success:

And yes, I’m still of the opinion that Bitcoin is in a bubble. You know the walks like a duck, quacks like a duck idea? If it does those then it’s a duck. And the price changes that we’re seeing in Bitcoin make me and many other observers think that Bitcoin really is in a bubble. Indeed, there’s some nice work here showing that many of the Bitcoins in existence are being hoarded and that in itself is bubble behaviour.

However, do let me make one more thing clear: whether or not Bitcoin is in a bubble or not doesn’t mean that Bitcoin will succeed or not. They are entirely different questions, as different as is your wife Welsh or is your dog female? They really have no connection with each other at all.

Let us take the standard bubble example always used, the Dutch tulipmania. We could use others, the South Sea Bubble, the dot com boom, or we could even use an entirely different set of examples, say the introduction of the automobile. That last being when a new technology arrived without a speculative bubble around it.

The point of the first three, and let’s stick with tulips, is that there really was a quite obvious bubble in the prices of them. Most of the participants in the bubble (as with the other two) knew quite well that it was a bubble too. Prices were way out of line with any sort of “true value”. However, do note this very well: the tulip did indeed go on to become an important part of the Dutch economy. Indeed, it’s still there right now. Vast fields of tulips are grown there every year to supply cut flowers and bulbs for replanting that are shipped all over Europe. It’s actually become so important that other flowers, grown outside Europe, are still marketed through Holland as that’s where all the skill and infrastructure is.

April 9, 2013

Bitcoins as Tulips or viable virtual gold?

Filed under: Economics, Law, Liberty — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:27

In the New Yorker, Maria Bustillos reviews the history of bitcoins:

In many ways, bitcoins function essentially like any other currency, and are accepted as payment by a growing number of merchants, both online and in the real world. But they are generated at a predetermined rate by an open-source computer program, which was set in motion in January of 2009. This program produced each one of the nearly eleven million bitcoins in circulation (with a total value just over a billion dollars at the current rate of exchange), and it runs on a massive peer-to-peer network of some twenty thousand independent nodes, which are generally very powerful (and expensive) G.P.U. or ASIC computer systems optimized to compete for new bitcoins. (Standards vary, but there seems to be a consensus forming around Bitcoin, capitalized, for the system, the software, and the network it runs on, and bitcoin, lowercase, for the currency itself.)

[. . .]

There is an upper limit of twenty-one million new coins built into the software; the last one is projected to be mined in 2140. After that, it is presumed that there will be enough traffic to keep rewards flowing in the form of transaction fees rather than mining new coins. For now, the bitcoins are initially issued to the miners, but are distributed when miners buy things with them or sell them to non-miners (such as jumpy Spanish bank depositors) who desire an alternative currency. The chain of ownership of every bitcoin in circulation is verified and registered with a timestamp on all twenty thousand network nodes. This prevents double spending, since no coin can be exchanged without the authentication of some twenty thousand independent cyber-witnesses. In order to hack the network, you would have to deceive over half of these computers at the same time, a progressively more difficult task and, even today, a very formidable one.

[. . .]

A casual review of Nakamoto’s various blog posts and bulletin-board comments also confirms that, from the first, Bitcoin was devised as a system for removing the possibility of corruption from the issuance and exchange of currency. Or, to put it another way: rather than trusting in governments, central banks, or other third-party institutions to secure the value of the currency and guarantee transactions, Bitcoin would place its trust in mathematics. At the P2P Foundation, Nakamoto wrote a blog post describing the difference between bitcoin and fiat currency:

    [Bitcoin is] completely decentralized, with no central server or trusted parties, because everything is based on crypto proof instead of trust. The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be trusted to hold our money and transfer it electronically, but they lend it out in waves of credit bubbles with barely a fraction in reserve. We have to trust them with our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our accounts… With e-currency based on cryptographic proof, without the need to trust a third party middleman, money can be secure and transactions effortless.

* * *

Much of what has been written so far about bitcoins has centered on the perceived dangers of their relative anonymity, the irreversibility of transactions, and on the fact that they can be used for money laundering and for criminal dealings, such as buying drugs on the encrypted Web site Silk Road. This fearmongering is a red herring, and has so far prevented the rational evaluation of the potential benefits and shortcomings of crypto-currency.

Cash is also anonymous; it is also used in money laundering and illegal transactions. Like bitcoins, stolen cash is difficult to recover, and a cash transaction can’t readily be traced back to the source. Nor is there immediate recourse for the reversal of transactions, as with credit-card chargebacks or bank refunds when one’s identity has been stolen. However, I find it difficult to believe that anyone who has written critically of the dangers of bitcoin would prefer an economy where private cash transactions are illegal.

Update: Meet the $2 Million Bitcoin Pizza.

Floridian Laszlo Hanyecz thought it would be “interesting” to be able to say he paid for a pizza in bitcoins. He worked out a deal where he transferred 10,000 of his bitcoins to a guy in England, who ordered him two pizzas from Papa Johns.

Today, one Redditor notes, those 10,000 bitcoins would be worth about $2.3 million, thanks (in part) to folks fleeing unstable and politically risky state currencies in Cyprus and elsewhere.

Some news outlets are covering this as a “doh!” story. But these pizzas were a huge publicity boon for Bitcoin, contributing to the success of the currency today. If Lazslo had been a hoarder, perhaps his bitcoins would be worth very little now. Cashing in bitcoins for pizza when they were worth a fraction of a cent each is not obviously smarter or stupider than selling now would be, with bitcoins trading at $234. It’s a bet on which way the market is headed, that’s all.

March 25, 2013

The Cyprus “deal” decoded

Filed under: Economics, Europe, Russia — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:04

With a blog post entitled “THE CYPRUS HEIST GOES THROUGH: And it’s an Orwellian masterpiece“, you could say that this is an unfair summary of the situation:

Somewhere, George Orwell is spinning in his grave — although he wouldn’t be even remotely surprised by the 1984-style nonsense being hailed as a compromise by the Troikanauts and Nicosia’s embarrassed leaders.

This is the deal: the levy is called something else scrapped, and none of the deposits below €100,000 will be stolen included.

The new lunacy idea sees Laiki Bank closed. The entirety of its €4.2bn in deposits over €100,000 will be placed in a “bad bank”: why you would put healthy deposits in a bad bank eludes me, but we’re really just moving the stash around here: the bad bank’s resources will be confiscated. We’re talk a 100% haircut for all these savers.

And don’t be fooled by the Berlin propaganda about Russian money-laundering. First up, being a rich Russian doesn’t automatically make you a crook; and secondly, nowhere near all — possibly under half — are Russian anyway: UBS, several Israeli banks, a number of French banks will have depositor’s money taken out of them to pay for the ambitions of Brussels-am-Berlin.

There’s more: all the bondholders in Laiki also take a 100% haircut.

[. . .]

Entirely appropriate however was the choice of Wolfgang Schäuble to face the cameras and ‘explain’ why none of this would need the approval of the Cypriot Parliament. Just “approved by the 17 eurozone finance ministers comparatively quickly, after about two hours of further deliberations”. As to why it needed FinMin approval (but not that of the citizens’ representatives) get a load of this for jargonised bollocks:

“This plan will not require the approval of the Cypriot parliament because the losses on large depositors will be achieved through a restructuring of the island’s two largest banks and not a tax.”

Update: I think Tyler Cowen gets it exactly correct here:

The capital controls will have to be strict. What will the price of a Cypriot euro be, relative to a German euro? 50%? I call this Cyprus leaving the euro but keeping the word “euro” to save face. And yet they fail to reap most of the advantages of leaving the euro, such as having an independent monetary policy.

March 22, 2013

Cyprus: the state of play on Friday

Filed under: Economics, Europe — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:35

In the Telegraph, Thomas Pascoe summarizes the situation in Cyprus as of Friday morning:

As it stands this morning, there is a Plan B on the table after parliament voted down the proposal that every bank deposit in the country be subject to a deduction. The new plan only affects those with deposits over €100,000; however, it will require those depositors to take a loss of up to 40pc. As part of this package, the nation’s two large banks will be saved. However, the structure of the deal requires that one of the pair, Laiki, will be split into “good” and “bad” banks, with large depositors left to chance it in the bad bank.

A word on the thinking behind it. While you and I perceive deposits as secure money (and I have argued that to touch them is an abuse of power), technocrats in Brussels take a different view. They tend to view deposits in the technical sense of being loans to banks. You give the bank your money in exchange for interest, and can call the loan at any time (provided not everyone else is doing the same thing, which is the situation now). The bank loans most of your deposit on again. When countries struggle with too much debt, those who have loaned them money get “haircuts”, or less back than they gave. Following this thinking, the EU’s argument is that if we lend money to failing banks, we too must take a haircut to keep them solvent.

[. . .]

So the compromise deal is an ugly one, involving a precedent (confiscation of deposits) which will cast a pallor over the entire European banking system. But the problems are equally great with any other solution. If the banks are left to fail, depositors lose everything except the scraps recovered by administrators. To argue that they, and the country, must be funded directly by the EU, requires the continued willingness of Germany to act against its own economic interests and support an entire continent on its shoulders, impossible without fiscal and political consolidation which no electorate would assent to at present (not that they are asked, usually).

In my opinion, there is no faster way to destroy confidence in your retail banking sector than stealing the money from depositors with no recourse. I have no idea why the European Union is so hell-bent on crushing the banks, but perhaps they have some looney-tunes notion that they can supplant the existing bank system with something directly operated by the ECB or the EU itself.

March 21, 2013

The choices for Cyprus don’t seem to include saving the banks

Filed under: Economics, Europe — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 11:04

In Forbes, Tim Worstall sums up the real problem facing Cypriots:

There’s a very large portion of the European political elite who believe, take on faith (for there’s certainly no convincing real world evidence about it) that the creation of the euro is part of the inevitable creation of the European State. And as such it is entirely irreversible. It’s not just that people once in the euro shouldn’t leave it: it’s that it is simply inconceivable that anyone ever would leave it. Either wish to leave it or be allowed to leave it.

Wherein lies the danger to said European dreams and it’s tiny Cyprus that poses said danger.

As both Krugman and Yglesias point out, the Cypriot banking system is bust, gone. Even if it needn’t have happened this way having the system closed for at least a week is going to lead to bank runs when they finally reopen. The economy is most certainly going to stutter if not be deeply depressed as a result of that banking system going. Given that a substantial part of the economy is about offshore finance, and that that’s not going to survive the banking system crash, there will also, whatever else happens, be substantial declines in GDP.

It’s most certainly true that leaving the euro will cause all of those things to happen. But if they’re going to happen anyway then why not leave the euro? Why not bring back the Cyprus Pound? That is, do an Iceland?

[. . .]

But here’s the thing: there’s still that religious insistence among the federasts that the euro is irreversible, a part of the future of the politics and economy of the continent. And if Cyprus does leave and does recover without too much paid then what reason for Greece, or Spain, Portugal, to stay in? If going bust and going back to one’s own currency is, as Iceland showed (although they kept, rather than went back to), less painful that the austerity required to stay in the euro then, well, why stay in the euro?

March 18, 2013

Will the Cyprus bailout set the fuse to a new Great Depression?

Filed under: Economics, Europe, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 00:01

History may not repeat itself, but it’s quite likely that it paraphrases itself instead:

So, this is going to be a very sour reading of what has happened in Cyprus this weekend. It will also be a very partisan one, possibly even a partial one. But if Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz were right in their insistence that it was actually the Federal Reserve that caused the Great Depression (which is something that Ben Bernanke himself has insisted that the Fed will not repeat) then one way of interpreting what has happened is that the European Central Bank has just set us all up for another Depression. The trigger is that “tax” of a little over 6% on all depositors.

This isn’t an analysis that you’ll be able to get all economists to sign up to. But the basic story told by Friedman and Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United States was that the 1929 crash was indeed a serious crash. But it would not have led to the Great Depression without the Federal Reserve making some serious mistakes. Two of which were to allow the intertwined collapses of both the money supply and the banking system. Given that it is the banks that create credit and thus the wider money supply they are, to a great extent, the same thing.

[. . .]

But please note the central part of Friedman’s argument. Yes, there was the crash. Yes, there would have been a deep and painful recession as a result. But the tipping of that recession into depression was a result of the cascading series of bank failures in the absence of deposit insurance: that led to the calamitous shrinking of credit and the money supply.

So let us now look at Europe and the eurozone. Certainly there’s been a crash (or even a Crash). We’ve so far avoided the depression part (although not everywhere. Greece is certainly in one, Spain possibly and looking out my window at rural Portugal I see certain signs of a reversion to a non-cash economy.) but the important question is whether we manage to continue to do so?

[. . .]

Yes, I do know, they’ve called it a tax: but here we’ve got to make reference to that duck thing. The difference between a 6% or more “tax” on your bank deposit and a failure of the previously agreed deposit insurance to protect your deposit is quackery enough that it’s a duck.

As I’ve said before the importance of this is moot at present. It depends on who believes what. If the citizenry believe that they don’t have deposit insurance any more (whether we call this a tax or a duck) then we will see more mass withdrawals from banks and we will see more bank failures. And cascading bank failures are exactly the thing that will tumble us into a new depression.

January 27, 2013

Reason.tv: Two Cheers for the Coming Collapse of the U.S. Economy!

Filed under: Economics, Government, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 11:13

“At some point, holders of Treasury securities are going to recognize that these unfunded liabilities are going to affect the fiscal capabilities of the government and then you’re going to have the same situation that happened in Greece happening in the U.S.,” says Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, who is a professor of economics at San Jose State University and the author of a recent paper on the consequences of a U.S. government default. “In the short run it’s going to be painful, but in the long run it’ll be a good thing.”

Reason‘s Nick Gillespie sat down with Hummel at FreedomFest 2012 for a wide-ranging discussion on monetary policy, business cycle theory, the longevity of the welfare state, and why libertarians who rail against the Fed are like “generals fighting the last war.”

Held each July in Las Vegas, FreedomFest is attended by around 2,000 limited-government enthusiasts and libertarians a year. Reason TV spoke with over two dozen speakers and attendees.

January 25, 2013

The wrong maple leaf forever: the new $20 bill controversy

Filed under: Cancon, Humour — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 10:00

Oh, hang your heads in shame, Canadians: you put the wrong maple leaf on your new $20 bill. The entire rest of the civilized world is laughing and pointing:

The mix-up began a hundred-some years ago when Canada, a small club founded by French misfit children, decided to create its own currency. These bills and coins would function much the same as Chuck E. Cheese tickets at a modern-day Chuck E. Cheese, in that it would be tradeable for goods (and services). It would be valid in all of Canada.

For many years, the system was a success. Canadians used their Canadian money with ease. Every once in a while a Canadian penny or dime would slip down into the United States but that was no big deal because all the coins look about the same and everyone could just leave them in tip jars, like “not my problem.”

Then, in 2011, Canada decided to redesign their banknotes.

“Paper is out and polymer is IN!” Canada exclaimed in an email newsletter that the rest of the world deleted without reading.

The new bills were made out of plastic. They had fancy updated pictures and a holographic whoozy-whatsits and a big clear window to make them harder to counterfeit.

They featured a big ol’ maple leaf.

But not a Canadian maple leaf.

A Norwegian one.

“Big deal,” you say. “Leaves are leaves; who cares?”

The problem is that maple leaves are Canada’s thing. Like how some nations’ thing is communism, or being the world economic leader, or producing generation after generation of beautiful supermodels. Canada’s thing is that there are leaves there.

And they fucked it up.

H/T to David Akin for the link.

January 16, 2013

The odd concept that is “money”

Filed under: Economics, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 00:03

In his nominally NFL-related column, Gregg Easterbrook talks about the phenomenon that is money:

Currency is surprisingly abstract as a concept. Money is whatever you agree to accept in trade, with the understanding that others will accept it in turn. If there’s a $20 bill in your wallet or purse, you view it as valuable because you know that others will as well. If you have $1 million in a bank account, you view it as valuable because you know that others will as well. But you can’t eat a $20 bill or sleep under a bank account. Money is valuable only if others agree that it is.

Even if money is backed by some precious substance such as gold, the abstraction doesn’t change much. You can’t eat or wear gold. You view gold as valuable only because you know that others will as well. Whether a thin sheet of linen-like paper or a gold ingot or a string of digits on an electronic financial statement, money is, itself, worthless.

That money has value only when others think it does is why currencies collapse. The ruble and the Zimbabwean dollar lost value when no one wanted them, because a person holding this currency couldn’t be sure that others would also view it as valuable. But if Barack Obama ordered the minting of a trillion-dollar platinum coin, and it was viewed as having a trillion dollars’ worth of value, then it would.

[. . .]

Bear in mind, that’s how the past six years of irresponsible debt-based federal giveaways — two years under George W. Bush, now four years under Obama — have been funded. The Federal Reserve keeps buying Treasuries, or mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and similar federal agencies. That gives the executive branch money to spend. One division of government tells another, “Here is a new string of numbers,” and money comes into existence.

What’s underlying these transactions? Nada, beyond the belief that strings of numbers issued by the United States are more likely to be useful in trade than strings of numbers issued by, say, Greece. Because the credibility of the United States is so high, its strings of numbers bear heft. But if government keeps printing money and talking about obvious gimmicks such as trillion-dollar coins, how long will that credibility last?

Economists including Friedrich Hayek have contemplated the idea that privately issued money would be more solid than government-issued money, since privately issued money would be cross-checked by market forces, while government is run to please campaign donors. Governments from the Roman emperors of the far past to the liberal Scandinavian democracies of today insist that they alone control the supply of money. One reason is to ensure taxation. At a deeper level, governments know how easily it could all unravel, and money be viewed as worthless.

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