Quotulatiousness

May 12, 2024

The fascinating story of HMS Challenger (K07)

Filed under: Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Sir Humphrey pens a long blog post about a late Cold War Royal Navy ship — officially just a “diving support vessel”, but apparently much more capable — most naval fans may never have heard about:

HMS Challenger (K07) at Kiel, West Germany in 1985.
Photo by John Cook via Wikimedia Commons.

The story of HMS Challenger remains one of the most unusual of all post war Royal Navy vessels. Born in the late Cold War, she was in the eyes of the public a “white elephant” commissioned and never operationally used and sold after just a few years’ service at the end of the Cold War. She was to the few public that had heard of her, “the Warship that never was”. But revealing files in the National Archives tell a story of a ship that was designed to fill a range of highly secretive intelligence support functions and clandestine espionage activity that, had she been successful, would have made her perhaps one of the most vital intelligence collection assets in the UK. This article is about the untold story of HMS Challenger and why she deserves far more recognition than enjoyed to date.

The background of the Challenger story can be traced to the mid 1970s when the Royal Navy used the, by then positively venerable, warship HMS Reclaim to conduct diving support work. The Reclaim, commissioned in 1949 was the last warship in the RN to be designed and fitted with sails, that were occasionally used. Employed in diving support and salvage ops for 30 years, she was a vital asset for the recovery of crashed aircraft, support to diving and other assorted duties. But by 1975 she was also very old and out of date and requiring replacement (she paid off as the oldest operational vessel in the Royal Navy in 1979).

To replace her the Royal Navy developed Naval Staff Requirement 7003 and 7741, which were approved in 1976. These requirements set out the need for a replacement and the capabilities that were required. By this stage of the Cold War the world was a very different place both operationally and technologically from when HMS Reclaim entered service. There were significantly more undersea cables laid across the Atlantic, while the SOSUS network (a deep-water network of sonar systems intended to detect Russian submarines) had been delivered and expanded into UK waters in the early 1970s under project BACK SCRATCH. Additionally the Royal Navy had introduced a few years previously the Resolution class SSBN, which by 1976 had four submarines providing a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) with their Polaris missiles, as well as wider nuclear submarine operations. At the same time new technology was emerging including better diving capability, the rise of miniature submarines capable of both operating at immense depths and also the rise of rescue submarines for stranded nuclear submarines. Additionally technology had improved increasing the ability to recover items from the seabed.

When brought together this provided the RN with the opportunity to think afresh about how to replace Reclaim. The result was a set of requirements that were defined as follows:

    The objective of NSR 7003 was to provide the Royal Navy with a Vessel and equipment capable of carrying out seabed operations. The requirement … is to find, inspect, work on and recover items on the seabed at all depths down to 300m with some capability to greater depths.

The specific missions for which the requirement was looking to cater for broke down into three main areas:

  1. Inspection, neutralisation or recovery of military equipment, including weapons;
  2. Operations in support of national offshore interests including research;
  3. Assistance with submarine escape and rescue and with underwater salvage

This represented a significant leap forward compared to Reclaim, which was limited to diving at up to 90m in very limited conditions, and would have provided the Royal Navy with an entirely new level of capabilities.

The decision was taken to proceed with the requirement and Challenger was ordered in 1979 and commissioned in 1983. What then follows is a sorry story of a ship being brought into service and having practically everything that could go wrong, going wrong. This article will not go into any depth on the story of what failed, as to do so would be a lengthy story. Suffice to say that a combination of faulty equipment, manufacturing challenges, fires and other damages and the reality that technical aspirations were not matched by practical delivery in reality meant that Challenger never really became operational.

Used for a series of trials until the late 1980s to prove her systems and see if they would work, she struggled to achieve what was expected of her. She had some success recovering toxic chemicals from the seabed from a sunken merchant ship in the 1980s and then conducting other demonstrations, such as deep diving and supporting submarine rescue trials. But she never lived up to the expectations placed on her, and at a time when the costs required to get her to the level of capability were far too high, and the defence budget was under pressure at a point when the Warsaw Pact threat was rapidly collapsing, the decision was taken to pay her off as a failed experiment even before the wider Options for Change plan was announced. This much is widely known to the public, but what is nowhere near as well known is the missions that Challenger was intended to carry out. Had she been successful, it would have made a very real difference to RN capabilities.

Why did the Royal Navy seem so determined to make a success of Challenger for so many years, to the extent of throwing ever more money at her, given these problems? In short because the missions she was designed to do made it worthwhile. Files in the archives clearly show that beyond the public line of “research” she was designed to carry out exceptionally sensitive missions. Although the original Naval Staff Requirement focused on three areas, by the time she entered service, this had expanded to at least 9 (possibly more). These were:

  1. Strategic Deterrent Force Security
  2. Seabed surveillance device support
  3. Nuclear weapon recovery
  4. Recovery of security and military sensitive material
  5. Crashed military aircraft recovery
  6. Submarine escape and rescue operations
  7. Salvage operations
  8. MOD research and data collection for other than intelligence agencies
  9. Miscellaneous operations in support of other government agencies

It can be seen that far from being just a diving support platform, Challenger was in fact an absolutely central part in providing assurance to the protection of CASD and ensuring the security of the nuclear deterrent and SOSUS. How would she have done this?

The files show that in the 1980s the UK had a different attitude to the US about protection of these routes due to geographic differences.

Germany Surrenders! – WW2 – Week 298 – May 11, 1945

World War Two
Published 11 May 2024

Germany signs not one, but two unconditional surrenders and the war in Europe is officially over … although that does not mean that all the fighting in Europe is, for there is fighting and surrenders all over Europe all week. The Japanese launch a counteroffensive on Okinawa; the Chinese launch one in Western Hunan; the Australians advance on Borneo and New Guinea; and the fight continues on Luzon in the Philippines, so there is still an awful lot of the world war to come, even with the end of the war in Europe.

00:00 Intro
00:40 The German Surrender
03:23 Fighting And Surrenders In The East
06:53 The Prague Uprising
15:50 The Last Surrenders In Europe
18:42 The Polish Situation
20:25 The War In China And The South Seas
23:17 Summary
24:44 Conclusion
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Javier Milei and the “Malvinas” question

Colby Cosh on how Argentine President Javier Milei handled British press inquiries about the Malvinas Falkland Islands like a boss:

I’ve been relishing a classic feast of British press overreaction to a BBC interview with the colourful libertarian president of Argentina, Javier Milei. The Beeb’s Ione Wells visited Milei at the Casa Rosada last week in Buenos Aires for a chat, and nothing like this could possibly happen without some talk about those damned islands — the Falklands or las Malvinas, depending on which country you believe to be their rightful sovereign.

Argentine leaders have to be careful how they talk about the Falklands (and about their uninhabited dependencies elsewhere in the South Atlantic). For decades regimes of left and right in Argentina have opportunistically kept the disputed islands at the forefront of the public imagination, fostering a spirit of delayed revenge. Sometimes this leads to daft verbal outbursts about “colonialism”, alongside game-playing with supplies and access to the islands. The constitution of Argentina contains language asserting “legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty” over the rocks.

So anything a current Argentine leader says about the Falklands is bound to be scrutinized closely at home and in the United Kingdom. Milei is naturally impulsive, and has the particular problem that he is a political admirer of the late Margaret Thatcher. Wells tried to provoke him by bringing up the 1982 sinking of the General Belgrano and the consequent deaths of 323 Argentine sailors, which is still a slightly controversial episode of the Falklands War among the most self-hating shades of U.K. political opinion.

Milei, who had arranged a little display of Thatcher memorabilia in the room where the interview was held, sliced right through Wells’s Gordian knot. “Criticizing someone because of their nationality or race is very intellectually precarious,” he told Wells. “I have heard lots of speeches by Margaret Thatcher. She was brilliant. So what’s the problem?”

Even if you venerate Thatcher, who ordered the sinking of the Belgrano in very cold blood, you can perceive that this is a non sequitur. Milei is under no obligation to like a fellow neoliberal who was a military enemy of his own country. But one does remember that British statesmen have often been willing to express admiration for Napoleon I, Washington, Rommel and other killers of large numbers of British soldiers.

Whitneyville Rolling Block for the Montreal Riot Squad

Filed under: Cancon, History, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published Feb 2, 2024

In 1875 the Montreal City Police decided that they wanted to equip a riot squad in case of public disturbance. They initially requested funds for 50 revolvers, but this changed to 60 carbines instead, and these were purchased via broker in 1876 from the Whitneyville Armory. Whitneyville was a factory that made a variety of independently patented designs, and their rolling block design was actually protected by a different patent (the Whitney-Laidley) than Remington’s, despite the very similar appearances of the two guns.

The Montreal Rolling Blocks were carbines, fitted with long bayonets and chambered for a .43 caliber black powder cartridge. They were engraved “Montreal Police” on the barrels, and were actually never fired in anger, nor even deployed. They remained in government possession until the 1960s, when they were finally sold off. This example is here for me to film courtesy of Mike Carrick of Arms Heritage Magazine.
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QotD: What is Putin’s endgame in Ukraine?

It would appear that Putin, Xi, etc. are coming to see themselves as the leaders in a worldwide battle against Juggalisme. That might be wishcasting — they are practical men, after all, and let me state, unequivocally and for the record, that I do NOT want to be ruled by Russians or Chinese. They are not my people. Nonetheless, it does seem clear they understand that the source of their problems is beyond what we think of as geopolitics. The United States is “agreement incapable”, as I guess the term d’art is, because it’s not rational, or even predictably irrational.

That was the monarchist critique of representative government that hit closest to home: Foreign policy needs to be supple and responsive; it must be able to move quickly, to make big changes in narrow time windows. In a real crisis, you simply don’t have time to convene a Parliament to debate stuff. N.b. they were saying this in the late 18th century; it’s so much worse now. And another observation from that time that is even truer today: A “democratic” foreign policy can never be consistent. You simply can’t plan long-term when there’s partial to complete governmental overhaul every few years.

That the US managed to muddle through for as long as it did was really a combo of two things: time (as a function of distance), and a near-peer enemy.

Neither of those is integral to the system, and neither is within the system’s control. Until recently, American foreign policy had to take into account the fact that on-the-spot commanders would have to make decisions on their own recognizance. Even with phone communications, the man on the ground in the Fulda Gap has to make decisions basically without reference to Washington. It forced him to be conservative — in other words, it discouraged adventurism.

Same way with the near-peer enemy. The looming shadow of the USSR forced regular reality checks inside the US Apparat. A whole bunch of possibilities were foreclosed by default — our response to any given situation had to take the likely Soviet reaction into account. As with the time/distance factor, this forced a kind of conservatism that looked a lot like sclerosis, but at least it deterred adventurism.

The history of the later 20th century is the history of those constraints being removed. In Vietnam, for instance, you had LBJ and McNamara sitting in a room in the White House, personally directing airstrikes in near-realtime. If “news” reports are to be believed, Obama was on the horn with that SEAL team going after Bin Laden right up to the very moment the chopper landed. Knowing these things are technically possible is catnip to politicians — they already assume they’re omnicompetent, and so now they want to be “advising” the commanding general even as the battle rages.

And if that’s catnip, then the end of the USSR was catnip on steroids. Why not play fuck-fuck games everywhere, all at once? Who’s gonna stop us? China? They chose to pass. They saw what happened to the USSR when it locked itself into an ideological death spiral vis-a-vis the Struggle Against International Capitalism. American policymakers only understand Soviet-style bluff and bluster. The Chinese play the long game.

NOT because they’re Inscrutable Orientals, I hasten to add — they’re as Juggalicious as our Clowns, in their way — but because the generation currently in power came up hard, and so they are adults. That’s all. They are not spoiled, petulant children. The next generation of Chinese leadership — assuming we live to see it — will really be something, and not in a good way.

So, what does Putin want? I dunno, and I’m not sure he knows, because I’m not sure he can know. I’m sure his broadest goal is “to stop getting fucked with by idiots”, but how can that be achieved? There shall be no durable peace in this world until there is Regime Change in [Washington, DC], and I’m not talking about the other half of the Uniparty winning an election or two. I think Putin knows that, but what can he really do about it? I think he’s going to be forced to annex a fair amount of territory and set up a totally demilitarized buffer zone. It won’t work, but it’s the least-worst practical option.

Severian, “Friday Mailbag”, Founding Questions, 2024-02-09.

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