This then leaves the army in a bit of a quandary. It has focused on delivery of a global division as its benchmark at a time when the politicians simply do not want to do this. It has focused on keeping 82,000 troops when it can’t afford to keep them all equipped, and to meet the political priority of protecting certain regimental capbadges, it has been forced to sacrifice its far more valuable logistics, communications and other enablers that keep it as a genuinely effective force.
Talking to friends in the army, there is a real sense of anger and frustration among many mid-level officers. The veterans of [Operation] HERRICK feel that the army hasn’t learned lessons and remains bound by tradition and an inability to really learn. Candidly, many feel that the UK “lost” in Afghanistan and hasn’t yet accepted this fact. They feel the army is overly top heavy and rigid and unable to really adapt to 21st century warfare. Suggestions that much of the army exists as a structure to support rapid expansion in the future is met with a hollow snort of derision – we could never do a WW1-style rapid expansion again for the legacy reserve stocks of weapons and equipment have long since been disposed of as part of the move to RAB accounting in the early 2000s.
The operations that the army is likely to be involved in are either low level defence engagement, or as part of NATO reassurance in Eastern Europe. The chances of needing BAOR established again are slim – if we get to the stage where the UK is trading shots with the Russians, then things will be quickly escalating beyond the point where conventional weapons are of value. Home defence remains an issue, although the days of Exercise “Brave Defender” will never be repeated — the threat is completely different. There is simply no credible home threat that needs the army to deploy against invasion or insurrection. It is telling that there has been a move to get back into the Aid to the Civil Power role again, if only because having troops able to do flood relief helps generate positive headlines.
Whenever brave efforts are made to try and look again at how things can be done differently to free up funding (such as closing RHQs or making sense of the archaic HQ and regimental structure) leaks to the press ensure a media and Parliamentary furore that prevents real change being put into play. This stops the army from being able to genuinely restructure itself because the moment it tries to do so, some tired old headline such as “we don’t have an army anymore, only a militia” (an utter fallacy) appears and men of a certain generation with angry moustaches and blazers with badges and purchased medals write to their MPs. In a Parliament without a majority, it only takes a minor backbench rebellion to threaten chaos, meaning no minister will risk reform if it angers the backbenches.
The army today faces a structural and existential crisis. Too large to be properly funded, and politically barred from restructuring itself (although the recent 2017 manifesto pledge is merely to preserve the headline strength of the forces, not the individual services, so there is still hope). Denied a credible enemy that it can prepare to fight against, it has no clear rationale for why it needs to operate at a large scale when the political decision makers are increasingly set against boots on the ground for long term commitment.
Sir Humphrey, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like a Deployable Division?”, Thin Pinstriped Line, 2017-08-06.
October 13, 2019
QotD: The modern British army is custom-tailored to resist reform of any meaningful type
Comments Off on QotD: The modern British army is custom-tailored to resist reform of any meaningful type
No Comments
No comments yet.
RSS feed for comments on this post.
Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.
