Quotulatiousness

December 10, 2025

Murmurs of dissent from within Canada’s supply management cartel

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Business, Cancon, Food, Government — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

At Juno News, Sylvain Charlebois shares a sign of internal dissent inside the supply management system that prioritizes protecting producers at the cost of significantly higher prices and reduced choice for Canadian consumers — not to mention getting Trump’s attention (and anger) for shutting out American competitors:

Every once in a while, someone inside a tightly protected system decides to say the quiet part out loud. That is what Joel Fox, a dairy farmer from the Trenton, Ontario area, did recently in the Ontario Farmer newspaper. In a candid open letter, Fox questioned why established dairy farmers like himself continue to receive increasingly large government payouts — even though the sector is not shrinking, but expanding. His piece, titled “We continue to privatize gains, socialize losses“, did not come from an economist or a critic of supply management. It came from someone who benefits from it. And yet his message was unmistakable: the numbers no longer add up.

Fox’s letter marks something we have not seen in years — a rare moment of internal dissent from a system that usually speaks with one voice. It is the first meaningful crack since the viral milk-dumping video by Ontario dairy farmer Jerry Huigen, who filmed himself being forced to dump thousands of litres of perfectly good milk because of quota rules. Huigen’s video exposed contradictions inside supply management, but the system quickly closed ranks. Until now. Fox has reopened a conversation that has been dormant for far too long.

In his letter, Fox admitted he would cash his latest $14,000 Dairy Direct Payment Program (DDPP) cheque, despite believing the program wastes taxpayer money. The DDPP was created to offset supposed losses from trade agreements like CETA, CPTPP, and CUSMA. These deals were expected to reduce Canada’s dairy market. But those “losses” are theoretical — based on models and assumptions about future erosion in market share. Meanwhile, domestic dairy demand has strengthened.

Which raises the obvious question: why are we compensating dairy farmers for producing less when they are, in fact, producing more?

This month, dairy farmers received another 1% quota increase, on top of several increases totalling 4% to 5% in recent years. Quota — the right to produce milk — only increases when more supply is needed. If trade deals had truly devastated the sector, quota would be falling, not rising. Instead, Canada’s population has grown by nearly six million since 2015, processors have expanded, and consumption remains stable. The market is expanding.

Understanding what quota is makes the contradiction clearer. Quota is a government-created financial asset worth $24,000 to $27,000 per kilogram of butterfat. A mid-sized dairy farm may hold $2.5 million in quota. Over the past few years, cumulative quota increases of 5% or more have automatically added $120,000 to $135,000 to the value of a typical farm’s quota — entirely free. Larger farms see even greater windfalls. Across the entire dairy system, these increases represent hundreds of millions of dollars in newly created quota value, likely exceeding $500 million in added wealth — generated not through innovation or productivity, but by regulatory decision.

November 22, 2025

Ottawa is working hard … to keep beef prices high for consumers

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Cancon, Economics, Food, Government — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

It’s not your imagination, beef is still much more expensive than it used to be (we no longer buy any “good” cuts of meat, settling for ground beef and “stewing beef” when we do the shopping). But rest assured, the feds are working diligently … to prevent beef prices from falling:

We recently received information from a reliable industry source about how the federal government is administering beef import permits. If accurate, it raises serious concerns about whether Ottawa is knowingly sustaining an outdated and opaque system that keeps beef prices unnecessarily high. At a time when many families are struggling with food costs, this is more than a bureaucratic issue — it directly affects affordability.

Canada’s beef import rules operate under a tariff-rate quota system. A limited volume of beef can enter the country at a low tariff, but anything beyond that is slapped with a steep import charge. When supply tightens or when specialty products are required, supplemental import permits are meant to provide flexibility and help stabilize the market. For years, the system worked reasonably well.

But the structure behind the process has not kept pace with today’s realities. The committee originally created to provide guidance — the Beef and Veal Tariff Rate Quota Advisory Committee — has not met since 2015. For a decade, no formal mechanism has existed for importers, retailers, or independent distributors to participate in discussions with government about how permits are allocated. Instead, decisions have shifted informally toward a small group of influential players, including major domestic processors who have a vested interest in limiting imports. The transparency and balance once built into the system have eroded.

Adding to this complexity is the broader concentration of market power in the sector. Beef packing and processing in Canada is dominated by two foreign-owned private companies: Cargill, based in the United States, and JBS, headquartered in Brazil. Together, they control the overwhelming majority of beef slaughter and processing in this country. When a sector is this concentrated, and when a federal system restricts competition through import controls, the beneficiaries are obvious. Any policy that tightens import access — intentionally or not — further entrenches the dominance of these two multinational giants.

The consequences are no longer theoretical. Our source described a case where a long-established importer has beef sitting in bonded storage in Canada. The product is legally imported and properly documented. The importer applied for a supplemental permit to release it into the market at the regular tariff rate. The application was refused. The justification offered — that the beef had been purchased abroad at a price “too low” compared with U.S. prices — makes little economic sense. The product did not come from the U.S., and competitive pricing has never been grounds for rejecting a permit. With no permit, the importer must wait until the next quota year or pay the full over-quota tariff. Ironically, the only reason paying the tariff is even possible now is because beef prices have climbed so sharply. The federal government, of course, collects that tariff revenue.

Cases like this raise an uncomfortable question: does Ottawa actually want to keep beef prices high? If the goal were genuinely affordability, the government could issue supplemental permits when supply conditions justify them. It could restore a functioning advisory committee to ensure balanced input. It could provide clear and transparent criteria for permit decisions. Instead, legitimate requests are rejected, supply is restricted even when product is physically present in the country, and both processors and Ottawa benefit from elevated prices.

January 2, 2025

How to solve Britain’s housing crisis

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Business, Government — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Tim Worstall outlines why just increasing the number of building permits allowed won’t — by itself — increase the total number of houses built. This is because the process of awarding the permits has been largely captured by the biggest players, and the supply is artificially restricted by local governments:

Kensington High Street at the intersection with Kensington Church Street. Kensington, London, England.
Photo by Ghouston via Wikimedia Commons.

The first bit is to diagnose the problem properly. If the big builders won’t build because they don’t want to then and therefore we want to find other builders who will and do want to. And the important part of this is that the big builders do indeed have market power. It costs a lot — a lorra lots — of money to be able to get a scheme through planning. Thus we not only have that problem of a shortage of places to build — because planning — but we’ve also handed market power to those able to build — because planning.

The answer is to shoot the planners, obviously. But then that always is the correct answer. Here, more specifically, we need to flood the zone with permissions. Really, grossly, oversupply. Like issue 15 million permits. Say. At which point the value of a permit is zero. So, anyone with a scrap of land can gain a permit and build.

This brings back the small housebuilder. Instead of being held back by the ideals of half a dozen national builders we’ve got 50,000 blokes all looking to build 2 or 3 houses a year. Or 10 or 20 even.

There’s no way that the big builders can then delay building on their plots. For they don’t have market power any more. And even if they do want to delay then it doesn’t matter a damn.

And this always is the way that you deal with those with market power. You flood that zone with supply so as to destroy their market power.

October 12, 2024

Canadians don’t hate their banks enough

Filed under: Business, Cancon, Economics, Government — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

In the latest SHuSH newsletter, Ken Whyte follows up on an earlier item thanks to the many Canadians who responded with their own tales of woe in their dealings with Canadian banks:

Since I mentioned a couple of weeks ago that we have published Andrew Spence’s Fleeced: Canadians Versus Their Banks, the latest edition of Sutherland Quarterly, I’ve been inundated with people’s horror stories of their dealings with Canada’s chartered banks. Jack David’s tale in the above interview is a classic of the genre.

In Fleeced, Andrew lays out in aggravating detail how Canadian banks, although chartered by the federal government to facilitate economic activity in the broader economy, do all they can to avoid lending to small and medium businesses, never mind that small and medium businesses employ two-thirds of our private-sector labour force and account for half of Canada’s gross domestic product.

By OECD standards, small businesses in Canada are starved of bank credit, and when they are able to secure a loan, they pay through the nose. The spread between interest rates on loans to small businesses and large businesses in Canada is a whopping 2.48 percent, compared to .42 percent in the US — more than five times higher.

Why? Because Canada’s banks are a tight little oligopoly, impervious to meaningful competition. Their cozy situation allows them to be exceedingly greedy. Their profits and returns to shareholders are wildly beyond those of banks in the US and UK (and, as Andrew demonstrates, their returns from their Canadian operations are far in excess of those from the US market, meaning they screw the home market hardest.)

Our banks never miss an opportunity to impose a new fee, or off-load risk. From their perspective, small business involves too much risk — some of them will inevitably fail. The banks prefer that publishers and dry-cleaners and restaurateurs either finance themselves by pledging their homes, or use their credit cards to cover fluctuations in cash flow or make investments that will help them hire, expand, and grow. And that’s what entrepreneurs do. According to a survey by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, only one in five respondents accessed a bank loan or line of credit. Half of respondents financed themselves, tapped existing equity and personal lines of credit, and about 30 percent used their high-interest credit cards.

By severely rationing credit and making it exceedingly expensive, Canada’s banks siphon off an ungodly share of entrepreneurial profit to themselves while leaving the entrepreneur with all the risk. Their insistence on putting their own profits above service to the Canadian economy is one of the main reasons Canada has such a slow-growing, unproductive economy and a stagnant standard of living.

There is much else in this slim volume to make your blood boil: exorbitant fees on chequing and savings accounts; mutual fund expenses that torpedo investments; ridiculous mortgage restrictions, infuriating customer service …

Fleeced: Canadians Versus Their Banks is a stunning exposé of the inner workings of our six major banks — something only a reformed banker and financial services veteran such as Andrew could write. He also explodes the myth that a bloated, uncompetitive banking sector is the price we have to pay for stability in times of financial crisis.

We are in desperate need of banking reform in Canada. Read this book and you’ll be shouting at your member of Parliament for prompt action.

September 29, 2024

Fleeced: Canadians Versus Their Banks by Andrew Spence

Filed under: Books, Business, Cancon, Economics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In the latest SHuSH newsletter, Ken Whyte talks about one of Sutherland House’s most recent publications:

I could write about eight versions of this post based on the many revelations in Andrew Spence’s Fleeced: Canadians Versus Their Banks, the latest edition of Sutherland Quarterly, released this week. I’m going to run with the version most relevant to my fellow publishers and small business people in Canada.

Andrew lays out in aggravating detail how Canadian banks, although chartered by the federal government to facilitate economic activity in the broader economy, do all they can to avoid lending to small and medium businesses, never mind that small and medium businesses employ two-thirds of our private-sector labour force and account for half of Canada’s gross domestic product.

By OECD standards, small businesses in Canada are starved of bank credit, and when they are able to secure a loan, they pay through the nose. The spread between interest rates on loans to small businesses and large businesses in Canada is a whopping 2.48 percent, compared to .42 percent in the US—more than five times higher.

Why? Because Canada’s banks are a tight little oligopoly, impervious to meaningful competition. Their cozy situation allows them to be exceedingly greedy. Their profits and returns to shareholders are wildly beyond those of banks in the US and UK (and, as Andrew demonstrates, their returns from their Canadian operations are far in excess of those from the US market, meaning they screw the home market hardest.)

Our banks never miss an opportunity to impose a new fee, or off-load risk. From their perspective, small business involves too much risk — some of them will inevitably fail. The banks prefer that publishers and dry-cleaners and restaurateurs either finance themselves by pledging their homes, or use their credit cards to cover fluctuations in cash flow or make investments that will help them hire, expand, and grow. And that’s what entrepreneurs do. According to a survey by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, only one in five respondents accessed a bank loan or line of credit. Half of respondents financed themselves, tapped existing equity and personal lines of credit, and about 30 percent used their high-interest credit cards.

(The banks, incidentally, claim they need to keep credit card rates around 20 percent because their clients are high credit risks when their own data shows the risk is minimal. They simply prefer to gouge customers. To a banker, forcing hundreds of thousands of small businesses to use their credit cards to finance their businesses rather than giving them proper small business loans at reasonable rates is great business.)

By severely rationing credit and making it exceedingly expensive, Canada’s banks siphon off an ungodly share of entrepreneurial profit to themselves while leaving the entrepreneur with all the risk. Their insistence on putting their own profits above service to the Canadian economy is one of the main reasons Canada has such a slow-growing, unproductive economy and a stagnant standard of living.

There is much else in this slim volume to make your blood boil: exorbitant fees on chequing and savings accounts; mutual fund expenses that torpedo investments; ridiculous mortgage restrictions, infuriating customer service …

February 4, 2024

QotD: American railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission

Filed under: Business, Government, History, Quotations, Railways, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

The railroads [in the decades immediately following the U.S. civil war] saw advantages to regulation. Unstable prices, disliked by rail customers, could also be detrimental to the railroads. A recession in 1884 led to the failure of a number of railroads, and the railroads wanted to undertake pooling arrangements for their mutual profitability. Thus, the railroad industry, which was very competitive, wanted the ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission] to stabilize rates, regulate routes, and protect their profitability. Essentially, the ICC cartelized the industry, allowing it to be more profitable than it could have been in a more competitive unregulated environment.

Randy Holcombe, Liberty in Peril: Democracy and Power in American History, (2019).

Powered by WordPress