Colby Cosh tests Betteridge’s Law by asking if the protests in Hong Kong are the birth pangs of a new nation (commonsense and a slight knowledge of Chinese history militate against answering “yes”):
For the past week, Hong Kong has been taking another step toward figuring out exactly what it is. In an unprecedented display of resistance to Chinese power, literally innumerable hordes have been taking to the streets of HK, protesting the Communist Party-anointed chief executive and her effort to introduce a law allowing for the extradition of citizens to the mainland.
To anyone who follows Hong Kong affairs, these protests seem different qualitatively from those of the past. Earlier, related demonstrations like the Umbrella Movement of 2014 could be dismissed as economic unrest acted out by the young and irresponsible — by people who had not yet entered into, or who feared being excluded from, the strange social bargain between mainland power and HK’s wealth. 2019’s mass action is new: now everyone is marching. The revolt against the extradition bill is led by students, but persons of all ages — in some cases, multiple generations of the same family — are taking to the streets. Business owners are displaying sympathy with the marchers by means of small gestures. Commuters, who would normally be as annoyed with chaos and delay as any Torontonian trying to manoeuvre around a human rights demo, are signalling solidarity. The Hong Kong legal profession, aware that unrestricted extradition would annihilate their distinct system and the freedoms China promised to preserve, staged its own silent protest march. Hongkongers abroad are joining in symbolically.
Is this the birth of a nation? Those who wanted to push Hong Kong in the direction of formal independence have always been politely outnumbered. But the challenging, explosive assertion that “Hong Kong is not China” has become a routine feature of Hong Kong life.
Hong Kong was relinquished to China in 1997 after Britain secured paper guarantees that its independent judiciary and Commonwealth-style legal procedures would survive at least until 2047. When the handover was executed, the number 2047 meant — to the British trying to extract themselves from their last imperial briar patch — “far enough in the future for mainland China to have liberalized a bit.” The advent of Xi Jinping has since shown that progress, alas, does not proceed in a predictable linear way.