Yes, I know we’ve gone through this discussion before (and the comment thread on that first entry is still a good summary of the counter-arguments). Air-to-air combat has become only a small part of what the air forces of the world are expected to do: ground support, while generally disdained by air force brass hats, is the most common combat task now. Here’s the state of play, according to Strategy Page, as far as the future of air combat is concerned:
The last decade has revolutionized air warfare, and air forces. This revolution was brought about by two technologies (smart bombs and UAVs) that have been around for decades but, over a decade ago, became reliable and capable enough to have a decisive effect on warfare. Now UAVs armed with smart bombs are poised to replace manned aircraft. Moreover, the proliferation of GPS guided weapons and short range guided missiles have greatly reduced the need for ground strikes by manned or unmanned aircraft. Since World War II, air forces have demanded, and obtained, a disproportionate share of military budgets. No more.
[. . .]
Underlying all of this is the appearance of so many cheaper, reliable, precision weapons in the last decade. This has changed tactics on the ground. While the air force doesn’t like to dwell on this, it’s the war on the ground that is decisive, not what’s going on in the air. This proliferation of precision has also changed the way smart bombs were designed. With the ability to put a weapon within a meter of the aiming point (using laser guidance) or 5-10 meters (using GPS), smaller is now better, at least in urban areas where there are a lot of civilians about, troops have changed the way they fight. There is more movement in urban warfare because of all this precision firepower, and fewer friendly fire casualties from bombs and artillery. But it’s not just the air force and their smart bombs that have brought this on. The army had precision missiles on the ground long before JDAM came along. Now the army has more of them. Thus, over the last five years, there has been a competition between the army and air force to develop smaller, cheaper and more precise, missiles and bombs.
[. . .]
The air force is not happy about the army having a large force of armed UAVs. Many air force generals believe the army should not have the MQ-1C, or at least not use them with weapons. That has already caused some spats in the Pentagon over the issue, but so far the army has prevailed.
The army argument is that these larger UAVs work better for them if they are under the direct control of combat brigades. The air force sees that as inefficient, and would prefer to have one large pool of larger UAVs, that could be deployed as needed. This difference of opinion reflects basic differences in how the army and air force deploy and use their combat forces. The army has found that a critical factor in battlefield success is teamwork among members of a unit, and subordinate units in a brigade. While the air force accepts this as a critical performance issue for their aircraft squadrons, they deem it irrelevant for army use of UAVs. Seeing army MQ-1Cs doing visual and electronic reconnaissance and firing missiles at ground targets, the air force sees itself losing control of missions it has dominated since its founding in 1948.
[. . .]
Meanwhile, the navy has taken the lead in developing larger, jet propelled UAVs like the 15 ton, X-47B. This UAV uses a F100-PW-220 engine, which is currently used in the F-16 and F-15. The X-47B can carry two tons of bombs or missiles and maneuver like a jet fighter. The X-47B is fast and agile enough to carry out air-to-air missions. With the right software, it can do this autonomously (without human intervention). This is being worked on, and the navy already has perfected the software that enables a UAV to land on aircraft carriers.
The coming decade will see more and more UAVs replacing manned aircraft. Thus after only a century in action, manned combat aircraft are on their way out.
The army argument is that these larger UAVs work better for them if they are under the direct control of combat brigades. The air force sees that as inefficient, and would prefer to have one large pool of larger UAVs, that could be deployed as needed.
It’s funny seeing the army argue for a model that’s worked for the Marines since the 1940s.
Comment by Brian Dunbar — September 15, 2011 @ 17:53
Well, as you day, the counter-argument has been posited before. I don’t see anything on Strategy Page’s writeup to contradict it.
Even if the X-47 becomes a fully autonomous drone that can launch, fight and recover all by itself without control signals from a carrier or satcom link… Try to imagine a political leader with the balls to order a drone air force into combat with no humans in the decision making loop.
No US president has ever authorised something as “simple” as BVR air-air kills; they have always wanted human eyes to validate an airborne target before the missiles come off the rails. That’s not going to change because we will soon have the capability to let drones do it.
And as for strike missions, the UCAV target sets are still going to be generated by humans in the Pentagon based on whatever the intel of the day is. Mishaps like nailing the Chinese embassy in Belgrade can still happen; if it’s given to the UCAV as a valid target, and the target package was based on faulty intelligence, you will still end up with a monumental screw-up. The UCAV is not going to second-guess the package planners any more than the human pilot did.
Comment by Chris Taylor — September 16, 2011 @ 01:04
Well, as you day, the counter-argument has been posited before. I don’t see anything on Strategy Page’s writeup to contradict it.
Which is why I explicitly pointed back to the extensive material you provided in that original comment thread: it’s a good resource on this point.
Try to imagine a political leader with the balls to order a drone air force into combat with no humans in the decision making loop.
Or, contrarily, might it encourage snap decisions to employ military force if the leadership knows that they’re not putting (as many) young human voters into the firing line? It’d be just a more updated version of firing cruise missiles at a random target to draw attention away from a domestic embarrassment.
Comment by Nicholas — September 16, 2011 @ 09:11
Try to imagine a political leader with the balls to order a drone air force into combat with no humans in the decision making loop.
I can. Not today, maybe not soon. But sooner than we think.
Because a drone air force will be lethal and cheap.
I am not discounting your arguments, Chris. I think that the motivations above will drive innovation forward to work around them.
Comment by Brian Dunbar — September 16, 2011 @ 11:39
Nicholas: Or, contrarily, might it encourage snap decisions to employ military force if the leadership knows that they’re not putting (as many) young human voters into the firing line?
Brian: Because a drone air force will be lethal and cheap.
I should be more specific. I can see a day when that rolls around too, but I don’t think it’ll be with us for very long.
Sure, drone hordes will hazard fewer soldier/sailor/airman lives, and in the short term, that’s attractive. It’ll remain attractive right up until a drone horde commits a Chinese embassy/USS Vincennes/KAL 007 type incident. Then the policymaker in office at the time will go down in history as the evil emperor (or possibly empress) who ordered the machine army to slaughter a bucketload of innocent civilians. Everyone involved—the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon bureaucracy—will rush to cover their ass and generate good PR by putting humans back in the loop, vowing never again, etc etc.
That’s where I see it going, in essence.
Comment by Chris Taylor — September 16, 2011 @ 11:57
I agree with you on the likely outcome of such an action. I was pointing out that a short-sighted political leader with domestic trouble flaring up (does the White House still employ interns?) might see this enhanced strike capability as being lower risk in the short term and make the kind of mistake you list.
Comment by Nicholas — September 16, 2011 @ 12:08
That’s where I see it going, in essence.
I don’t see it. We have all kinds of regrettable accidents with conventional weapons, now, and we don’t put them away in favor of earlier generations of weapons.
It might depend on the PR, how it’s spun, and who dies.
Comment by Brian Dunbar — September 16, 2011 @ 14:07
We have all kinds of regrettable accidents with conventional weapons, now, and we don’t put them away in favor of earlier generations of weapons.
True, for the most part. There are chemical weapons; we keep refining their development, but no Western nation has employed them in combat since 1935.
But we’ve also spent a couple generations seeding the ground with anti-robot paranoia, telling people that the machines will one day supersede us and wipe us out (Hello, Terminator, Matrix and Battlestar Galactica franchises). When those dire visions of the future appear to be on the horizon, people’s irrationality will come to the fore and the decisions will be guided by emotion, not reason. We may restrict another class of weapons, just as we did before, in spite of their actual tactical utility.
Comment by Chris Taylor — September 16, 2011 @ 19:42
Y’know, I’ve clearly been missing out on the opportunity to spark interesting and informative comment threads up to now. In future, I’ll have to highlight more “end of the (military) world as we know it” predictions. 😉
Comment by Nicholas — September 16, 2011 @ 20:48