The Economist looks at a possible way to address the known weaknesses of the current internet security defaults:
[A] comprehensive solution would let domain owners confirm that the names and machine numbers issued by a given CA are kosher. Under DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), a standard being developed by Mr Schultze and others at the Internet Engineering Task Force, a browser retrieves a certificate from a web server, but checks with the DNS whether the certificate is in fact the one that was issued to a given domain owner. So, though a CA will still provide a validation step, the domain owner will have had to give it the thumbs up first. To prevent malevolent fiddling the DNS infrastructure itself needs to be secured, too. A long-running effort to do this, known as DNSSEC, hit a key milestone in 2010 and may have enough pieces in place soon to be usable. This is important because DANE would be incomplete without it.
Whilst all current browsers must be updated to take advantage of DANE, the new system can coexist with the old, and a gradual transition can be made. Browser plug-ins could bridge the gap before browser makers build in DANE, too. Those that want the added robustness of the new system — whether individuals, companies, or governments — may accelerate the adoption of updated browsers as DANE becomes available.
These moves do not provide total assurance that what your browser is told about an internet site’s identity and security is true. Trust, but verify — and verify again.
