Quotulatiousness

November 16, 2024

You say you want a referendum …

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

In the above-the-paywall portion of his latest column, Paul Wells discusses the chances that we’re going to go into another maple-flavoured Groundhog Day marathon separation referendum in Quebec:

I’ve been thinking this for a while, but I haven’t written it down. We may be only a couple of years away from a national-unity crisis.

And the dwindling number of people with a working memory of the last crisis have retained instincts that will be useless if there’s another one. Any future Quebec sovereignty referendum campaign would be unrecognizably different from the first two, more chaotic and inherently unpredictable.

I’ve been doing some public speaking in Quebec lately, and it’s pretty clear from the Q&A sessions that even many francophone Quebecers haven’t thought through the ways in which a future sovereignty referendum might play out. So it’s time to start contemplating ghosts of Christmas yet to come.

The Trudeau Liberals aren’t the only political party in Canada that’s fallen and can’t get up. It’s looking grim for Quebec’s governing Coalition Avenir Québec too: Wednesday’s monthly Léger poll was the worst for Quebec’s governing party in eight years. Premier François Legault, who sailed to re-election in 2022 on the general impression that he had a unique sightline into the heart of the average Quebecer, has lumbered from crisis to crisis ever since. It’s rough when a leader whose intuition is his brand loses his touch.

What might make all of this a national story is the identity of the challenger who’s settling into Poilievre-esque polling dominance: Paul Saint-Pierre Plamondon, the young leader of the Parti Québécois. Yes, that Parti Québécois.

Plamondon can be a charming and agile political performer. His PQ is at 35% in the latest Léger, up three points from last month. Legault’s CAQ is at 24%, down three points. Liberals and the urban lefty francophone Québec Solidaire are under 20%. Checking the last Qc125 projection, we see these numbers suggest a solid PQ majority for the first time since — wow, since Lucien Bouchard’s only victory as PQ leader in 1998.

A new PQ leader would have the option — would, in fact, be under harsh pressure from his party members — to call a referendum on Quebec’s secession from Canada. Younger readers may be surprised to learn this has happened before, in 1980 and again in 1995. Forests have been felled and ink lakes drained to tell the tale of how those two campaigns went. Short version: Quebec’s still in Canada.

Support for sovereignty is at a relatively low 37% in the Léger poll, and it hasn’t risen in pace with the PQ’s increasing popularity. That makes it possible, perhaps even likely, that Saint-Pierre Plamondon could join a list of PQ leaders who’ve become premier but didn’t hold referendums — a list that includes Pierre Marc Johnson, Bouchard, Bernard Landry and Pauline Marois.

But the instruction manual for politics in the 21st century is a single page, on which is written, DON’T ASSUME THE BEST. On my list of no-referendum PQ premiers above, I note that Johnson, Bouchard and Landry simply inherited power from their predecessors. Marois had only a minority of seats in the National Assembly.

Based on a small sample — René Léveque, elected 1976, referendum 1980; Jacques Parizeau, elected 1994, referendum 1995 — we can propose this hypothesis: when the PQ takes power with a majority government after a long period in opposition, it holds a secession referendum.

Support for sovereignty was around 40% when Parizeau called the 1995 referendum. It climbed to nearly 50%.

So here’s a plausible future. A federal election a year from now produces a majority Conservative government led by Pierre Poilievre as prime minister. A Quebec election a year later, in 2026, produces a majority PQ government led by PSPP. He calls a referendum a year later on a relatively clear question.

Let’s consider the challenges for those who’d like Canada to continue with Quebec in it. The first one is obvious. The rest, based on my recent conversations in Quebec, apparently really aren’t.

As has been noted many, many times … if any of the referenda had been extended to the whole country, Quebec would have been an independent nation since 1995, if not 1980. To non-Quebec residents, it sometimes seems as if the federal government is actually an organization devoted to placating Quebec’s loud demands, rather than governing for all Canadians.

The 1980 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament

Filed under: Gaming, History — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

At Astral Codex Ten, Scott Alexander starts a post titled “The Early Christian Strategy” with some relevant back-story (fore-story?) involving game theory and the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma:

An example prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix drawn by CMG Lee using emojis from Wikimedia Commons.

In 1980, game theorist Robert Axelrod ran a famous Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament.

He asked other game theorists to send in their best strategies in the form of “bots”, short pieces of code that took an opponent’s actions as input and returned one of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma outputs of COOPERATE or DEFECT. For example, you might have a bot that COOPERATES a random 80% of the time, but DEFECTS against another bot that plays DEFECT more than 20% of the time, except on the last round, where it always DEFECTS, or if its opponent plays DEFECT in response to COOPERATE.

In the “tournament”, each bot “encountered” other bots at random for a hundred rounds of Prisoners’ Dilemma; after all the bots had finished their matches, the strategy with the highest total utility won.

To everyone’s surprise, the winner was a super-simple strategy called TIT-FOR-TAT:

  1. Always COOPERATE on the first move.
  2. Then do whatever your opponent did last round.

This was so boring that Axelrod sponsored a second tournament specifically for strategies that could displace TIT-FOR-TAT. When the dust cleared, TIT-FOR-TAT still won — although some strategies could beat it in head-to-head matches, they did worst against each other, and when all the points were added up TIT-FOR-TAT remained on top.

In certain situations, this strategy is dominated by a slight variant, TIT-FOR-TAT-WITH-FORGIVENESS. That is, in situations where a bot can “make mistakes” (eg “my finger slipped”), two copies of TIT-FOR-TAT can get stuck in an eternal DEFECT-DEFECT equilibrium against each other; the forgiveness-enabled version will try cooperating again after a while to see if its opponent follows. Otherwise, it’s still state-of-the-art.

The tournament became famous because – well, you can see how you can sort of round it off to morality. In a wide world of people trying every sort of con, the winning strategy is to be nice to people who help you out and punish people who hurt you. But in some situations, it’s also worth forgiving someone who harmed you once to see if they’ve become a better person. I find the occasional claims to have successfully grounded morality in self-interest to be facile, but you can at least see where they’re coming from here. And pragmatically, this is good, common-sense advice.

For example, compare it to one of the losers in Axelrod’s tournament. COOPERATE-BOT always cooperates. A world full of COOPERATE-BOTS would be near-utopian. But add a single instance of its evil twin, DEFECT-BOT, and it folds immediately. A smart human player, too, will easily defeat COOPERATE-BOT: the human will start by testing its boundaries, find that it has none, and play DEFECT thereafter (whereas a human playing against TIT-FOR-TAT would soon learn not to mess with it). Again, all of this seems natural and common-sensical. Infinitely-trusting people, who will always be nice to everyone no matter what, are easily exploited by the first sociopath to come around. You don’t want to be a sociopath yourself, but prudence dictates being less-than-infinitely nice, and reserving your good nature for people who deserve it.

Reality is more complicated than a game theory tournament. In Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, everyone can either benefit you or harm you an equal amount. In the real world, we have edge cases like poor people, who haven’t done anything evil but may not be able to reciprocate your generosity. Does TIT-FOR-TAT help the poor? Stand up for the downtrodden? Care for the sick? Domain error; the question never comes up.

Still, even if you can’t solve every moral problem, it’s at least suggestive that, in those domains where the question comes up, you should be TIT-FOR-TAT and not COOPERATE-BOT.

This is why I’m so fascinated by the early Christians. They played the doomed COOPERATE-BOT strategy and took over the world.

RT20: Croatia’s Insane Kludged 20mm Anti-Materiel Rifle

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published Jul 31, 2024

During its Homeland War, Croatia manufactured a wide variety of ad-hoc firearms including a number of anti-materiel rifles. The RT-20 was the largest of these, and its development began with the discovery of a stash of Yugoslav M55 anti-aircraft cannon barrels chambered for 20mm Hispano in a warehouse. These barrels were cut down, fitted with single-shot bolt actions, bipods, and bullpup stock assemblies and became the RT-20s. The most unusual element of the design is the use of gas vents about halfway down the barrel which open into a hollow tube which vents over the shooter’s shoulder. This creates a gas exhaust jet upon firing to help counteract recoil (and also reducing the muzzle velocity by about 25%). The recoil from firing is still pretty brutal, but the guns can be used — and were during the war for Croatia’s independence. A few remain in Croatian police inventory today …

A big thanks to the Croatian Police Museum (Muzej Policije) in Zagreb for giving me access to film this rare piece for you! Check them out at: https://muzej-policije.gov.hr
(more…)

QotD: Mao Zedong’s strategy of “protracted war” is a “strategy of the weak”

Filed under: History, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

… the strategy of protracted war [Wiki] has to be adapted for local circumstances and new communications technologies and the ways in which it can be so adapted. But before we talk about how the framework might apply to the current conflict in Ukraine (the one which resulted from Russia’s unprovoked, lawless invasion), I want to summarize the basic features that connect these different kinds of protracted war.

First, the party trying to win a protracted war accepts that they are unable to win a “war of quick decision” – because protracted war tends to be so destructive, if you have a decent shot at winning a war of quick decision, you take it. I do want to stress this – no power resorts to insurgency or protracted war by choice; they do it out of necessity. This is a strategy of the weak. Next, the goal of protracted war is to change the center of gravity of the conflict from a question of industrial and military might to a question of will – to make it about mobilizing people rather than industry or firepower. The longer the war can be protracted, the more opportunities will be provided to degrade enemy will and to reinforce friendly will (through propaganda, recruitment, etc.).

Those concerns produce the “phase” pattern where the war proceeds – ideally – in stages, precisely because the weaker party cannot try for a direct victory at the outset. In the first phase, it is assumes the stronger party will try to use their strength to force that war of quick decision (that they win). In response, the defender has to find ways to avoid the superior firepower of the stronger party, often by trading space for time or by using the supportive population as covering terrain or both. The goal of this phase is not to win but to stall out the attacker’s advance so that the war can be protracted; not losing counts as success early in a protracted war.

That success produces a period of strategic stalemate which enables the weaker party to continue to degrade the will of their enemy, all while building their own strength through recruitment and through equipment supplied by outside powers (which often requires a political effort directed at securing that outside support). Finally, once enemy will is sufficiently degraded and their foreign partners have been made to withdraw (through that same erosion of will), the originally weaker side can shift to conventional “positional” warfare, achieving its aims.

This is the basic pattern that ties together different sorts of protracted war: protraction, the focus on will, the consequent importance of the political effort alongside the military effort, and the succession of phases.

(For those who want more detail on this and also more of a sense of how protracted war, insurgency and terrorism interrelate as strategies of the weak, when I cover this topic in the military history survey, the textbook I use is W. Lee, Waging War: Conflict, Culture and Innovation in World History (2016). Chapter 14 covers these approaches and the responses to them and includes a more expensive bibliography of further reading. Mao’s On Protracted War can be found translated online. Many of Giáp’s writings on military theory are translated and gathered together in R. Stetler (ed.), The Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giáp (1970).)

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: How the Weak Can Win – A Primer on Protracted War”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-03-03.

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