{"id":76244,"date":"2024-01-22T01:00:47","date_gmt":"2024-01-22T06:00:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/?p=76244"},"modified":"2024-01-21T10:17:44","modified_gmt":"2024-01-21T15:17:44","slug":"qotd-maos-theory-of-protracted-war-as-adapted-to-vietnamese-conditions-by-vo-nguyen-giap","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/2024\/01\/22\/qotd-maos-theory-of-protracted-war-as-adapted-to-vietnamese-conditions-by-vo-nguyen-giap\/","title":{"rendered":"QotD: Mao’s theory of “protracted war” as adapted to Vietnamese conditions by V\u00f5 Nguy\u00ean Gi\u00e1p"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>The primary architect of Vietnam’s strategy, initially against French colonial forces and then later against the United States and the US-backed South Vietnamese<\/a> (Republic of Vietnam or RVN) government was V\u00f5 Nguy\u00ean Gi\u00e1p<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Gi\u00e1p was facing a different set of challenges in Vietnam facing either France or the United States which required the framework of protracted war<\/a> to be modified. First, it must have been immediately apparent that it would never be possible for a Vietnamese-based army to match the conventional military capability of its enemies, pound-for-pound. Mao could imagine that at some point the Red Army would be able to win an all-out, head-on-head fight with the Nationalists, but the gap between French and American capabilities and Vietnamese Communist capabilities was so much wider.<\/p>\n

At the same time, trading space for time wasn’t going to be much of an option either. China, of course, is a very large country, with many regions that are both vast, difficult to move in, and sparsely populated. It was thus possible for Mao to have his bases in places where Nationalist armies literally could not reach. That was never going to be possible in Vietnam, a country in which almost the entire landmass is within 200 miles of the coast (most of it is far, far less than that) and which is about 4% the size of China.<\/p>\n

So the theory is going to have to be adjusted, but the basic groundwork \u2013 protract the war, focus on will rather than firepower, grind your enemy down slowly and proceed in phases \u2013 remains.<\/p>\n

I’m going to need to simplify here, but Gi\u00e1p makes several key alterations to Mao’s model of protracted war. First, even more than Mao, the political element in the struggle was emphasized as part of the strategy, raised to equality as a concern with the military side and fused with the military operation; together they were termed dau tranh<\/em>, roughly “the struggle”. Those political activities were divided into three main components. Action among one’s own people consisted of propaganda and motivation designed to reinforce the will of the populace that supported the effort and to gain recruits. Then, action among the enemy people \u2013 here meaning Vietnamese who were under the control of the French colonial government or South Vietnam and not yet recruited into the struggle \u2013 a mix of propaganda and violent action to gain converts and create dissension. Finally, action against the enemy military, which consisted of what we might define as terroristic violence used as message-sending to negatively impact enemy morale and to encourage Vietnamese who supported the opposition to stop doing so for their own safety.<\/p>\n

Part of the reason the political element of this strategy was so important was that Gi\u00e1p knew that casualty ratios, especially among guerrilla forces \u2013 on which, as we’ll see, Gi\u00e1p would have to rely more heavily \u2013 would be very<\/em> unfavorable. Thus effective recruitment and strong support among the populace was essential not merely to conceal guerrilla forces but also to replace the expected severe losses that came with fighting at such a dramatic disadvantage in industrial firepower.<\/p>\n

That concern in turn shaped force-structure<\/strong>. Gi\u00e1p theorized an essentially three-tier system of force structure. At the bottom were the “popular troops”, essentially politically agitated peasants. Lightly armed, minimally trained but with a lot of local knowledge about enemy dispositions, who exactly supports the enemy and the local terrain, these troops could both accomplish a lot of the political objectives and provide information as well as functioning as local guerrillas in their own villages. Casualties among popular troops were expected to be high as they were likely to “absorb” reprisals from the enemy for guerrilla actions. Experienced veterans of these popular troops could then be recruited up into the “regional troops”, trained men who could now be deployed away from their home villages as full-time guerrillas, and in larger groups. While popular troops were expected to take heavy casualties, regional troops were carefully husbanded for important operations or used to organize new units of popular troops. Collectively these two groups are what are often known in the United States as the Viet Cong<\/em>, though historians tend to prefer their own name for themselves, the National Liberation Front (M\u1eb7t tr\u1eadn D\u00e2n t\u1ed9c Gi\u1ea3i ph\u00f3ng mi\u1ec1n Nam Vi\u1ec7t Nam<\/em>, “National Liberation Front for South Vietnam”) or NLF. Finally, once the French were forced to leave and Gi\u00e1p had a territorial base he could operate from in North Vietnam, there were conventional forces, the regular army \u2013 the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) \u2013 which would build up and wait for that third-phase transition to conventional warfare.<\/p>\n

The greater focus on the structure of courses operating in enemy territory reflected Gi\u00e1p’s adjustment of how the first phase of the protracted war would be fought. Since he had no mountain bases to fall back to, the first phase relied much more on political operations in territory controlled by the enemy and guerrilla operations<\/strong>, once again using the local supportive population as the cover to allow guerrillas and political agitators (generally the same folks, cadres drawn from the regional troops to organize more popular troops) to move undetected. Guerrilla operations would compel the less-casualty-tolerant enemy to concentrate their forces out of a desire for force preservation, creating the second phase strategic stalemate and also clearing territory in which larger mobile forces could be brought together to engage in mobile warfare, eventually culminating in a shift in the third phase to conventional warfare using the regional and regular troops.<\/p>\n

Finally, unlike Mao, who could envision (and achieve) a situation where he pushed the Nationalists out of the territories they used to recruit and supply their armies, the Vietnamese Communists had no hope (or desire) to directly attack France or the United States. Indeed, doing so would have been wildly counter-productive as it likely would have fortified French or American will to continue the conflict.<\/p>\n

That limitation would, however, demand substantial flexibility in how the Vietnamese Communists moved through the three phases of protracted war. This was not something realized ahead of time, but something learned through painful lessons<\/strong>. Leadership in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV = North Vietnam) was a lot more split than among Mao’s post-Long-March Chinese Communist Party; another important figure, L\u00ea Du\u1ea9n, who became general secretary in 1960, advocated for a strategy of “general offensive” paired with a “general uprising” \u2013 essentially jumping straight to the third phase. The effort to implement that strategy in 1964 nearly overran the South, with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam \u2013 the army of South Vietnam) being defeated by PAVN and NLF forces at the Battles of B\u00ecnh Gi\u00e3 and \u0110\u1ed3ng Xo\u00e0i (Dec. 1964 and June 1965, respectively), but this served to bring the United States more fully into the war \u2013 a tactical and operational victory that produced a massive strategic setback.<\/p>\n

L\u00ea Du\u1ea9n did it again in 1968 with the Tet Offensive, attempting a general uprising which, in an operational sense, mostly served to reveal NLF and PAVN formations, exposing them to US and ARVN firepower and thus to severe casualties, though politically and thus strategically the offensive ended up being a success because it undermined American will to continue the fight. American leaders had told the American public that the DRV and the NLF were largely defeated, broken forces \u2013 the sudden show of strength exposed those statements as lies, degrading support at home. Nevertheless, in the immediate term, the Tet Offensive’s failure on the ground nearly destroyed the NLF and forced the DRV to back down the phase-ladder to recover. L\u00ea Du\u1ea9n actually did it again in 1972 with the Eastern Offensive when American ground troops were effectively gone, exposing his forces to American airpower<\/em> and getting smashed up for his troubles.<\/p>\n

It is difficult to see L\u00ea Du\u1ea9n’s strategic impatience as much more than a series of blunders \u2013 but crucially Gi\u00e1p’s framework allowed for recovery from these sorts of defeats. In each case, the NLF and PAVN forces were compelled to do something Mao’s model hadn’t really envisaged, which was to transition back down the phase system, dropping back to phase II or even phase I in response to failed transitions to phase III. By moving more flexibly between the phases (while retaining a focus on the conditions of eventual strategic victory), the DRV could recover from such blunders. I think Wayne Lee actually puts it quite well that whereas Mao’s plan relied on “many small victories” adding up to a large victory (without the quick decision of a single large victory), Gi\u00e1p’s more flexible framework could survive many small defeats on the road to an eventual strategic victory when the will of the enemy to continue the conflict was exhausted.<\/p>\n

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: How the Weak Can Win – A Primer on Protracted War”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry<\/em><\/a>, 2022-03-03.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The primary architect of Vietnam’s strategy, initially against French colonial forces and then later against the United States and the US-backed South Vietnamese (Republic of Vietnam or RVN) government was V\u00f5 Nguy\u00ean Gi\u00e1p. Gi\u00e1p was facing a different set of challenges in Vietnam facing either France or the United States which required the framework of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":35193,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,22,1117,7,5,41,13],"tags":[1457,108,1011,780,586,1200,269,257,585],"class_list":["post-76244","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-asia","category-china","category-france","category-history","category-military","category-quotations","category-usa","tag-bretdevereaux","tag-coldwar","tag-colonialism","tag-communism","tag-guerillawarfare","tag-maozedong","tag-propaganda","tag-terrorism","tag-vietnam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/06\/favicon.png","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p2hpV6-jPK","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76244","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76244"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76244\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":86878,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76244\/revisions\/86878"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/35193"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76244"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76244"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76244"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}