{"id":69905,"date":"2023-04-14T01:00:25","date_gmt":"2023-04-14T05:00:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/?p=69905"},"modified":"2023-04-13T08:46:48","modified_gmt":"2023-04-13T12:46:48","slug":"qotd-the-three-great-strategic-sins","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/2023\/04\/14\/qotd-the-three-great-strategic-sins\/","title":{"rendered":"QotD: The three great strategic sins"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>The first sin is the sin of of not having a strategy in the first place<\/strong>, what we might call “emotive” strategy. As Clausewitz notes, policy (again, note above how what we’re calling strategy is closest to policy in Clausewitz’ sense) is “subject to reason alone” whereas the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” is provided for in another part of the trinity (“will” or “passion”). To replace policy with passion is to invert their proper relationship and court destruction.<\/p>\n

The second sin is the elevation of operational concerns over strategic ones<\/strong>, the usurpation of strategy with operations, which we have discussed before. This is, by the by, also an error in managing the relationship of the trinity, allowing the general’s role in managing friction to usurp the state’s role in managing politics.<\/p>\n

Perhaps the greatest example of this is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; an operational consideration (the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet) and even the tactics necessary to achieve that operational<\/em> objective, were elevated above the strategic consideration of “should Japan, in the midst of an endless, probably unwinnable war against a third-rate power (the Republic of China) also go to war with a first-rate power (the United States) in order to free up oil-supplies for the first war”. Hara Tadaichi’s pithy summary is always worth quoting, “We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war.”<\/p>\n

How does this error happen? It tends to come from two main sources. First, it usually occurs most dramatically in military systems where the military leadership \u2013 which has been trained for operations and tactics, not strategy<\/em>, which you will recall is the province of kings, ministers and presidents \u2013 usurps the leadership of the state. Second, it tends to occur when those military leaders \u2013 influenced by their operational training \u2013 take the operational conditions of their planning as assumed constants<\/em>. “What do we do if<\/em> we go to war with the United States” becomes “What do we do when<\/em> we go to war with the United States” which elides out the strategic question “should<\/em> we go to war with the United States?” entirely \u2013 and catastrophically, as for Imperial Japan, the answer to that unasked question of should we do this<\/em> was clearly Oh my, NO<\/strong><\/em>.<\/p>\n

(Bibliography note: It would hardly be fitting for me to declare these errors common and not provide examples. Two of the best case-studies I have read in this kind of strategic-thinking-failure-as-organizational-culture-failure are I. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany<\/em> (2005) and Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway<\/em> (2005). Also worth checking out, Daddis, “Chasing the Austerlitz Ideal: The Enduring Quest for Decisive Battle” in Armed Forces Journal<\/em> (2006): 38-41. The same themes naturally come up in Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America\u2019s Final Years in Vietnam<\/em> (2017)).<\/p>\n

The third and final sin is easy to understand: a failure to update the strategy as conditions change<\/strong>. Quite often this happens in conjunction with the second sin, as once those operational concerns take over the place of strategy, it becomes difficult for leaders to consider new strategy<\/em> as opposed to simply new operations<\/em> in the pursuit of strategic goals which are often already lost beyond all retrieval. But this can happen without a subordination failure, due to sunk-costs and the different incentives faced by the state and its leaders. The classic example being functionally every major power in the First World War: by 1915 or 1916, it ought to have been obvious that no gains made as a result of the war could possibly be worth its continuance. Yet it was continued, both because having lost so much it seemed wrong to give up without “victory” and also because, for the politicians who had initially supported the war, to admit it was a useless waste was political suicide.<\/p>\n

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: The Battle of Helm’s Deep, Part VIII: The Mind of Saruman”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry<\/em><\/a>, 2020-06-19.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The first sin is the sin of of not having a strategy in the first place, what we might call “emotive” strategy. As Clausewitz notes, policy (again, note above how what we’re calling strategy is closest to policy in Clausewitz’ sense) is “subject to reason alone” whereas the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” is provided […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":35193,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7,24,5,683,41,13,230],"tags":[31,1457,1504,572,30],"class_list":["post-69905","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-history","category-japan","category-military","category-pacific","category-quotations","category-usa","category-ww2","tag-army","tag-bretdevereaux","tag-clausewitz","tag-leadership","tag-navy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/06\/favicon.png","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p2hpV6-ibv","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69905","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69905"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69905\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":81425,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69905\/revisions\/81425"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/35193"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69905"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69905"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69905"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}