{"id":15181,"date":"2012-05-23T00:08:10","date_gmt":"2012-05-23T05:08:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/?p=15181"},"modified":"2012-05-22T15:04:59","modified_gmt":"2012-05-22T20:04:59","slug":"the-us-navys-littoral-combat-ship-and-the-future-of-the-surface-fleet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/2012\/05\/23\/the-us-navys-littoral-combat-ship-and-the-future-of-the-surface-fleet\/","title":{"rendered":"The US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship and the future of the surface fleet"},"content":{"rendered":"

There’s an “after-action report” from the Cato Institute’s recent panel on the Future of the Navy Surface Fleet<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Yesterday\u2019s event on the U.S. Navy was a big success and generated a vigorous discussion. Ben Freeman from POGO spelled out his concerns about the littoral combat ship, specifically the Freedom<\/em> (LCS-1) (documented here<\/a> and here<\/a>) and CBO\u2019s Eric Labs raised a few additional ones pertaining to the program as whole. Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work delivered an impassioned defense of the LCS within the context of the entire fleet design, drawing on examples from history to demonstrate how the Navy learns and adapts. Consistent with past practice, Work is confident that the fleet will put the LCS through the paces\u2014two completely different ships\u2014and figure out how to use them.<\/p>\n

It was refreshing to engage in a serious discussion among people who are committed to a Navy that is second-to-none, and who care enough to raise questions designed to make it stronger. I focused my remarks on the LCS\u2019s operating characteristics, but especially on the decision to buy two different LCS types. The original plan was for the Navy to select just one. The advantage of having two ships, Work stressed, was that the Navy would learn about each vessel\u2019s unique capabilities. The disadvantage, as I see it, is the loss of economies of scale, including in parts, logistics and training.<\/p>\n

[. . .]<\/p>\n

Second, I seriously doubt that the Navy\u2019s shipbuilding budget will grow very much even if Mitt Romney is<\/em> elected president, and it certainly won\u2019t grow enough to obviate any discussion of trade offs between different ships. Even if the Navy is handed billions or tens of billions of dollars more for shipbuilding, it is still the case that every ship that we build, or every new one proposed, is competing against one another. There are always<\/em> opportunity costs, even when the topline budget grows. Navy warships compete against aircraft carriers. Navy surface ships compete with submarines. And the Navy competes with the Air Force. And the Air Force and Navy compete with the Army, etc.<\/p>\n

For now, the Navy has chosen the LCS over possible alternatives. But there are<\/em> alternatives. Eric Labs authored a good study a few years ago looking at the Coast Guard\u2019s national security cutters (.pdf), but stated yesterday that the NSCs would be more costly than the LCSs. In the paper, \u201cBudgetary Savings from Military Restraint,\u201d Ben Friedman and I suggested retaining the Perry<\/em>-class frigates for a few more years while we develop a different ship, perhaps a new class of frigates or corvettes that could do many of the same missions that the LCS is expected to perform, and, we believe, at less cost. At yesterday\u2019s forum, Under Secretary Work stated that we could not purchase a new frigate for less than $750 million. While I respect the Under\u2019s expertise, I plan to spend some time over the coming months scrutinizing that claim.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

There’s an “after-action report” from the Cato Institute’s recent panel on the Future of the Navy Surface Fleet: Yesterday\u2019s event on the U.S. Navy was a big success and generated a vigorous discussion. Ben Freeman from POGO spelled out his concerns about the littoral combat ship, specifically the Freedom (LCS-1) (documented here and here) and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5,13],"tags":[30,61],"class_list":["post-15181","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-military","category-usa","tag-navy","tag-ships"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p2hpV6-3WR","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15181","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15181"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15181\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15182,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15181\/revisions\/15182"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15181"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15181"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quotulatiousness.ca\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15181"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}