Quotulatiousness

November 5, 2011

On the other hand, that may be a feature rather than a bug

Filed under: Asia, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 11:18

Pakistan is trying to conceal the location of its nuclear weapons from US spy satellites, and the concern voiced in this article is that they’re using low-security techniques to do it. On the other hand, if you’re actually trying to get nuclear warheads into the hands of terrorists with a certain degree of deniability, this is certainly a way to do it:

Pakistan has begun moving its nuclear weapons in low-security vans on congested roads to hide them from US spy agencies, making the weapons more vulnerable to theft by Islamist militants, two US magazines reported Friday.

The Atlantic and the National Journal, in a joint report citing unnamed sources, wrote that the US raid that killed Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in May at his Pakistani compound reinforced Islamabad’s longstanding fears that Washington could try to dismantle the country’s nuclear arsenal.

As a result, the head of the Strategic Plans Divisions (SPD), which is charged with safeguarding Pakistan’s atomic weapons, was ordered to take action to keep the location of nuclear weapons and components hidden from the United States, the report said.

Khalid Kidwai, the retired general who leads the SPD, expanded his agency’s efforts to disperse components and sensitive materials to different facilities, it said.

But instead of transporting the nuclear parts in armored, well-defended convoys, the atomic bombs “capable of destroying entire cities are transported in delivery vans on congested and dangerous roads,” according to the report.

October 23, 2011

The CIA’s new boss and the new rules

Filed under: Asia, Military, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 11:53

Strategy Page discusses the new rules for the CIA under the new boss, David Petraeus:

The CIA has a new boss, David Petraeus, who formerly commanded American military forces in Afghanistan. With the arrival of Petraeus, the CIA is changing how it goes about determining the situation in Afghanistan. From now on, CIA analysts will discuss the situation with military commanders before they submit their monthly reports, rather than argue with the military leaders after the fact when people note that the military and CIA analysis comes to different conclusions. The CIA may still disagree with the military, but now they have to answer military assertions that contradict what the CIA believes.

Although this new policy was announced after Petraeus took over at the CIA recently, it was actually in the works for months. It was held up when it became clear that Petraeus was going to be the new CIA chief. Petraeus approved the new policy, which he had long been asking for.

All this came about because CIA analysts eventually noted that the military commanders were using different criteria for “success” and that often had uncovered aspects of the situation that the CIA analysts were missing. So, even before Petraeus showed up at CIA headquarters, the intelligence analysts had decided to work more cooperatively with their military counterparts, if only to ensure that all the bases were covered.

The CIA analysts always were at a disadvantage in Afghanistan, and Iraq, because the military was getting their information first hand, while the CIA often was getting it second or third hand. Moreover, the military was more aware of the fact that “success” in Afghanistan depended a lot on what you believed was possible, and what you knew was actually going on. In some cases, the CIA analysts did not appreciate what impact American field operations were having. Afghanistan, to outsiders has always been a murky place, and difficult to read.

October 3, 2011

The key to peace in Afghanistan? The Pakistani army and the ISI

Filed under: Asia, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:06

Strategy Page explains why Afghanistan will not be peaceful until the Pakistani army and their local equivalent of the CIA stop meddling:

The U.S. and Afghanistan still believe a negotiated peace is possible, but Pakistan, not the Taliban, must be the counterparty. And it’s not Pakistan the country that must negotiate, but the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the Pakistani ISI/military intelligence organization). These two organizations have been running their own foreign policy for decades. The army/ISI has gotten rich by gaining control over a large chunk of the national economy and government budget. It’s all done with coercion, corruption and constant anti-Indian/anti-American propaganda. The Pakistani Army cannot justify its privileged position unless they convince the Pakistani people that there is a major threat out there. So the army/ISI has created fearsome foes. This includes Afghanistan, which they portray as a puppet for India and America and a major threat to Pakistan. Most Afghans reject this, and see the Taliban as a Pakistani tool. While many Afghans appreciate scattered Taliban efforts to reduce corruption, they mainly want less violence. The Taliban has been the major source of violence for nearly two decades, and most Afghans want peace. The Taliban want control, above all else. But now, facing severe combat losses, lower morale and defections, increased terror attacks are believed more for internal purposes (to build Taliban morale) than to weaken the Afghan government.

Afghanistan is looking north, towards Central Asia, for economic growth, and as a safer way to move goods into and out of the country. Pakistan is seen as more of an enemy, and not a reliable economic partner. Central Asia, on the other hand, is more stable, and offers as many economic opportunities. Afghanistan calls this the “Silk Road Solution” in memory of the ancient trade route between China and the Middle East (and India), which ran through western Afghanistan. Ocean going European sailing ships put the Silk Road out of business five centuries ago, but the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 has opened Central Asia to more customers and suppliers, including Afghanistan. The Silk Road is returning, as a local economic thoroughfare.

As part of the new approach to Pakistan, the U.S. has revealed that many deaths of American troops along the Afghan border were actually caused by Pakistani troops, not Taliban fighters. These details had been kept quiet for years, to maintain good relations with Pakistan. But now the Pakistani army and ISI are seen as out-of-control, so the gloves are off.

July 14, 2011

Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan being spun as a Taliban victory

Filed under: Cancon, Media, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 17:15

To the surprise of nobody, the Taliban is claiming a clear win in driving the Canadian infidels out of Afghanistan:

During nine years of operations in Afghanistan, 157 Canadian troops died (87 percent because of the Taliban.) For most of that time, Canada suffered, proportionately, twice as many dead in Afghanistan as the United States. During this period, the U.S. had ten times as many troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. also has ten times the population of Canada, so the 3,000 Canadians are making the same scale of effort, but suffering more losses in the process. But most of those losses were not from “fighting the Taliban,” but from mines in the road. Back in early 2007, 81 percent of Canadian deaths were from IEDs (roadside bombs). But that declined as Canadian troops received more bomb resistant armored vehicles.

Since the Taliban couldn’t cope with Canadian troops in head-to-head combat, they devoted much of their roadside bombing effort against the Canadians. But in the last year, the Taliban were only able to kill four Canadian troops. Still, the constant Taliban propaganda about how killing even a few Canadian troops would eventually force the Canadians to withdraw, is believed by most Afghans. Canada decided to withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan back in 2008, and more American troops have moved in to replace them.

It’s ironic that the reason the government of the day originally committed troops to the Afghanistan campaign was that they thought it would be “safer” than being involved in Iraq. Rather than being seen to support George Bush, the Canadian contingent was sent to a “less tainted” operation instead. The party that sent the troops in the first place lost few opportunities to call for them to leave, once the current government was in power.

July 5, 2011

Miss Taliban beauty contest called off after all contestants turn out to be men

Filed under: Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 16:01

Okay, the real story:

AFGHAN police have arrested seven armed insurgents who disguised themselves as women by wearing burqas, officials said.

Interior ministry spokesman Siddiq Siddiqi said that the men, who carried light weapons with at least one in a suicide vest, were captured in Jalalabad, the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar.

He said the men wore the all-enveloping veil as part of their disguise and were planning attacks on government targets, but gave no further details.

H/T to Roger Henry, who notes:

Have a look at these delectable Afghan stunners, Afghanistan’s best!
I do so like the look of coy modesty, what possibly could have given them away?
They could do with a little grooming.

June 8, 2011

Canadian troops complete last combat mission before withdrawal from Afghanistan

Filed under: Asia, Cancon, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:31

Susan Sachs reports on the conclusion of the last planned combat mission for Canadian troops ahead of withdrawal this summer:

More than five years after taking charge of security in one of the most violent regions in Afghanistan, Canadian troops wrapped up their final combat operation with a two-week sweep through a rural swath of Kandahar that was undisputed Taliban territory just a year ago.

The offensive, conducted with a bulked-up Afghan National Army brigade in the lead, marks Canada’s last days in the long and deadly war. All combat troops are set to withdraw this summer, 5½ years after the mission in Kandahar began.

Until the last soldier leaves, the danger that has stalked Canadian soldiers in Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban and still one of its strongholds, remains.

Members of the Royal 22nd Regiment will still be patrolling the volatile area, risking death by improvised explosive devices and operating isolated outposts up to the day they hand off their positions to U.S. soldiers.

May 12, 2011

Afghanistan isn’t a “state”

Filed under: Asia, Military, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:01

Much of the problem with current expectations about the eventual outcome of the Afghan mission rest on the notion that Afghanistan is a country in the same way that Hungary or Denmark is a state. It’s not a state:

While the foreign troops are in Afghanistan to deal with international terrorism and the heroin (90 percent of it comes from Afghanistan), most Afghans see all this foreign intervention as a splendid opportunity. It’s as if Afghans were saying to foreign troops, “to you it’s a war, to me it’s an opportunity.” This is an ancient Afghan attitude. Afghanistan may appear to be at the corner of no and where, but it is actually astride the primary invasion route from Central Asia to India (including Pakistan which is still, historically and culturally, part of India). The Afghans have long since learned to step aside as the foreign invaders move through. Actually, many Afghans would join the invaders, so much so that these invasions, and the loot and stories the survivors brought back, have become a major part of the Afghan collective memory. Most Westerners have not got a clue about this cultural tradition, and how much it influences the behavior of most Afghans. Such culture shock is not unusual, but because of the greater isolation of Afghanistan from the rest of the world, there is more of it.

Part of the culture shock is the realization that Afghanistan is not a country, at least not in the Western sense of the world. In Western terms, Afghanistan is a feudal monarchy. That means that the “king” (president Karzai) serves, and survives, at the sufferance of the local barons (warlords, drug gang leaders, provincial governors, tribal leaders). Until the last few centuries, this was how things worked in the West. But in many parts of the world, and especially in Afghanistan, the medieval mind, and form of government, is alive and well.

While many residents of Kabul (the capital and largest city) would like a modern (efficient and much less corrupt) Western style government, the “rural aristocracy” (corrupt local leaders) have no interest in this kind of central control. Thus the rural leaders do whatever they can to prevent an the creation of efficient national army or police force. Local leaders will attempt, often successfully, to corrupt the military and police units in their neighborhood. National level politicians also like to “own” army or police units, and if they can’t do that, they will try to steal money meant for the security forces. So NATO commanders have come to evaluate the effectiveness of Afghan police and army units based on the honesty of the commander, and his ability to deal with all those officials who want to buy him off. There are not many Afghan unit commanders who make the grade. To do so means you must behave in a decidedly unconventional manner.

This is why the whole notion of “nation building” is the right title for the wrong idea. Afghanistan needs a nation to be constructed, but it will take much more than just suppressing the Taliban and the heroin trade. No nation can go from a feudal/tribal level to nation-state in a generation — at least, no nation ever has, and there’s no chance that Afghanistan will be the first to do so.

April 25, 2011

Taliban tunnellers re-enact the “Great Escape”

Filed under: Asia, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 10:41

This is going to hurt:

The Taliban has staged a jail-break from a high security prison in Afghanistan, freeing 541 prisoners through a network of tunnels that took five months to dig.

In scenes reminiscent of war film The Great Escape, insurgents constructed a 1,050-foot (320m) route into Sarposa Prison, in Kandahar.

Diggers finally broke through into the site last night and hundreds of prisoners, including around 100 Taliban commanders — streamed through the tunnel to freedom over four-and-a-half hours.

They were met by a fleet of cars which whisked them away to freedom. The breakout was completed at around 3.30am.

February 5, 2011

In praise of the venerable Lee-Enfield rifle

Filed under: Asia, History, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 10:19

Strategy Page talks about the weapons being found in Afghanistan:

Back before the Russians showed up, in the 1980s, the best an Afghan could hope to have was a World War II, or World War I, era bolt action rifle. These weapons were eclipsed in the 1980s by full automatic AK-47s and the RPG rocket launcher. The young guys took to the AK, and the thrill of emptying a 30 round magazine on full automatic. Not bad for a brief firefight, and suddenly hardly anyone, except a few old timers, wanted to use the old bolt action rifle.

What was not noticed much outside of Afghanistan, was that this shift in weaponry brought to an end a long Afghan tradition of precision, long range shooting.

[. . .]

The Lee-Enfield is one of the oldest, and still widely used, rifles on the planet. Over 17 million were manufactured between 1895 and the 1980s. While there are more AK-47s out there (over 20 million in private hands), these are looked down on by those who use their rifles for hunting, or killing with a minimum expenditure of ammunition. The 4 kg (8.8 pound) Lee-Enfield is a bolt-action rifle (with a ten round magazine) noted for its accuracy and sturdiness. The inaccurate AK-47 has a hard time hitting anything (with a single shot) more than a hundred meters away, while the Lee-Enfield can drop an animal, or a man, at over 400 meters.

[. . .]

One place where the Lee-Enfield found lots of fans was Afghanistan. There, the Afghans had been introduced to rifles in the 19th century, and they treasured these weapons. This was particularly true with the introduction of smokeless powder rifles in the late 19th century. Many Afghans were still using black powder rifles well into the 20th century. But once Lee-Enfields began show up in large numbers after World War I (1914-18), no one wanted the larger, heavier and less accurate black powder rifles (which always gave off your position, with all that smoke, after you fired a round.) Now, wealthy drug lords are buying expensive hunting and sniper rifles for their militias, but so far, many Taliban snipers appear to prefer using grandpa’s old Lee-Enfield.

Lee-Enfield ammunition is still manufactured, with the high quality stuff going for a dollar a round, and lesser quality for 25 cents a round. The rifles sell in the West for $500-1,000, but the hand-made copies, made new, go for more than twice that. The Lee-Enfield, both originals and copies, will carry on well into the 21st century.

Update, 9 February: Speaking of the 21st century, Australian International Arms is still producing new Lee-Enfield rifles:

Australian International Arms have manufactured the 5th generation of Lee-Enfield, for target shooting, military match and sporting markets. However, unlike the 4th generation, this is not a ‘converted’ Lee-Enfield. The AIA rifles are redesigned with modern techniques, but referencing more than a century of Lee-Enfield improvements and development… from Britain, North America and Australia.

[. . .]

Our production is limited in quantity as we
build the rifles, they are not mass-produced items. We only construct about 1,000-1,200 units each year because of all the hand-work required for metal, wood, fitting & tuning of each rifle.

H/T to Small Dead Animals for the link.

October 4, 2010

Winning the media war

Filed under: Asia, Media, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:03

Strategypage reports on the ongoing struggle by both the Taliban and the NATO/US forces to influence media coverage, both inside Afghanistan and in the outside world:

In Afghanistan, the Taliban have been very successful with the media, mainly because they give the media what they want, or an offer they can’t refuse. The Taliban know that the media loves stories where the underdog prevails, or where the powers-that-be screw up. Put out the right kind of disinformation, and the media will take it and run it as the truth. Or at least something that could, might or ought to be true somewhere.

The Taliban media people know what the Western and regional media want, and this is provided. For example, the Taliban have invented the idea that Western troops are causing most of the civilian deaths in the Taliban effort to regain control of Afghanistan. But the truth, which is published but not emphasized much, is that most of the civilians are killed by the Taliban, and the Western troops have been killing fewer and fewer civilians, even at the risk of more Western casualties. The Taliban regularly use civilians as human shields. Again, the media mentions that, but it’s something for the back pages. The headlines stress what the Taliban wants, mainly that they are winning, even when they are losing.

For a backwards, almost medieval group, the Taliban (or their non-Afghani advisors) have developed a talent for manipulating the international media coverage:

But you don’t have to bribe or threaten Western media. Just package your lies in an acceptable manner, and your message will be delivered. The Taliban are smart enough to constantly recast their press releases to suit the perceived needs of Western and regional media. All they have to do is note what stories editors are running, and work up new stuff with a Taliban angle. Thus while corruption has been an Afghan cultural problem for centuries, the Western media will swallow whole a Taliban press release suggesting that the Taliban are less corrupt (they aren’t) and this more attractive to the average Afghan (not according to opinion polls, or reports from American troops who deal with local Afghans every day.) But in the Western media, you survive by pushing what will sell, not what is actually happening.

September 7, 2010

A different kind of “outreach”

Filed under: Asia, Military, Religion — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 07:42

Looks like Terry Jones and his Dove World Outreach Center got exactly the level of attention he was looking for:

The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan said the planned burning of Qurans on Sept. 11 by a small Florida church could put the lives of American troops in danger and damage the war effort.

Gen. David Petraeus said the Taliban would exploit the demonstration for propaganda purposes, drumming up anger toward the U.S. and making it harder for allied troops to carry out their mission of protecting Afghan civilians.

“It could endanger troops and it could endanger the overall effort,” Gen. Petraeus said in an interview. “It is precisely the kind of action the Taliban uses and could cause significant problems. Not just here, but everywhere in the world we are engaged with the Islamic community.”

Over at Fark.com, they have a highly appropriate term for people like Mr. Jones: they call them “attention whores”. Seems to fit.

On the other hand, wouldn’t an appropriate counter-protest involve a small mosque in Kabul burning some Christian bibles? I wonder why nobody’s doing that instead of the mass protests being threatened? It should probably be noted that this church has fifty members: hardly the mainstream of American religious belief.

August 23, 2010

How to become an instant expert on Afghanistan

Filed under: Humour, Media, Middle East — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:50

P.J. O’Rourke had a few days to visit Afghanistan and managed to become an expert on the nation, its people, and the problems they face:

Women cover themselves in public but not more than my grandmother did at Mass. An occasional down-to-the-ground burka is seen but not as often as in London. In the malls, clothing shops predominate. Men’s and women’s clothes are shinier and more vividly colored than those seen in a traditional society such as New Hampshire.

Traditionalism being one of the things that makes Afghanistan so hard for Americans to understand. We Americans have so many traditions. For instance our political traditions date back to the 12th-century English Parliament if not to the Roman Senate. Afghans, on the other hand, have had the representative democracy kind of politics for only six years. Afghanistan’s political traditions are just beginning to develop. A Pashtun tribal leader told me that a “problem among Afghan politicians is that they do not tell the truth.” It’s a political system so new that that needed to be said out loud.

The Pashtun tribal leader was one of a number of people that Amin arranged for me to interview. Tribalism is another thing that makes Afghanistan hard to understand. We Americans are probably too tribal to grasp the subtlety of Afghan tribal concepts.

The Pashtun tribal leader was joined by a Turkmen tribal leader who has a Ph.D. in sociology. I asked the Turkmen tribal leader about the socioeconomic, class, and status aspects of Afghan tribalism.

“No tribe is resented for wealth,” he said. So, right off the bat, Afghans show greater tribal sophistication than Americans. There is no Wall Street Tribe upon which the Afghan government can blame everything.

Even the worst of Afghan governments never acquired the special knack of pitting tribe against tribe that is vital to American politics — the Squishy Liberal Tribe vs. the Kick-Butt Tribe; the Indignantly Entitled Tribe vs. the Fed-Up Taxpayer Tribe; the Smug Tribe vs. the Wipe-That-Smirk-Off-Your-Face Tribe.

There you have it: the reason we all find Afghan politics so hard to unravel!

August 10, 2010

Travel advice for unsettled times

Filed under: Media, Middle East — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:54

“Gulliver” offers some useful travel tips for people going to dangerous cities:

The first concerns how not be blown up when in Kabul, and comes courtesy of an American TV journalist who was on the course with us. You do not need Kevlar, or night-vision goggles, or an armoured car to evade the Taliban, he said: your secret weapon is to have a jolly good long lie-in every morning. In Kabul, at least, suicide bombs apparently almost always go off early in the morning. Have a leisurely breakfast and, once you venture out after 11am or so, your chances of being killed are drastically reduced. The explanation given was that the bombers spend all night psyching themselves up, then say their prayers at dawn, and go off to murder. A second helping of Corn Flakes could save your life.

The second tip is useful even for those of us who don’t travel to warzones. When booking a hotel, we were told, try to get a room between the second and sixth floors. Being on at least the second floor means you’re a little further away from whatever dangers may lurk near reception: opportunist robbers won’t venture deep into the hotel, and if things get nastier — car-bombs, shootouts and so on — you’re a little further away from the action. So far, pretty obvious.

But why not go above the sixth floor — wouldn’t that be even safer? Apparently not. More likely than a bomb or a shootout is a plain old fire, in which case you will want to make a hasty exit. More storeys mean more stairs and more delay, of course. But the killer, literally, is this: if the stairs are blocked, you will need rescuing from your window by a ladder. And in many parts of the world, the sixth floor is as high as the local fire-engines can reach.

June 14, 2010

Deadly would-be killers, or incompetent bumblers?

Filed under: Media, Middle East — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 12:32

An interesting article in The Atlantic points out that the formidable image the media has bestowed upon Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations belies much of the reality:

To be sure, some terrorists are steely and skilled — people like Mohamed Atta, the careful and well-trained head of the 9/11 hijackers. Their leaders and recruiters can be lethally subtle and manipulative, but the quiet truth is that many of the deluded foot soldiers are foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable. Acknowledging this fact could help us tailor our counterterrorism priorities — and publicizing it could help us erode the powerful images of strength and piety that terrorists rely on for recruiting and funding.

Nowhere is the gap between sinister stereotype and ridiculous reality more apparent than in Afghanistan, where it’s fair to say that the Taliban employ the world’s worst suicide bombers: one in two manages to kill only himself. And this success rate hasn’t improved at all in the five years they’ve been using suicide bombers, despite the experience of hundreds of attacks — or attempted attacks. In Afghanistan, as in many cultures, a manly embrace is a time-honored tradition for warriors before they go off to face death. Thus, many suicide bombers never even make it out of their training camp or safe house, as the pressure from these group hugs triggers the explosives in suicide vests. According to several sources at the United Nations, as many as six would-be suicide bombers died last July after one such embrace in Paktika.

Many Taliban operatives are just as clumsy when suicide is not part of the plan. In November 2009, several Talibs transporting an improvised explosive device were killed when it went off unexpectedly. The blast also took out the insurgents’ shadow governor in the province of Balkh.

In the early 1980s, I remember reading a book (possibly Dean Ing’s Soft Targets), which made a strong case for the use of a very different anti-terrorism tactic: ridicule. Instead of investing these shadowy enemies with mystique and cunning, point out their all-too-human failings and poke fun at them for these weaknesses. An attribute of many fanatics is a total lack of any sense of humour or irony: this makes them very attractive foils for this kind of media counter-attack.

It’d be hard to come up with anything to make the Taliban appear more ridiculous than what they’re doing themselves:

If our terrorist enemies have been successful at cultivating a false notion of expertise, they’ve done an equally convincing job of casting themselves as pious warriors of God. The Taliban and al-Qaeda rely on sympathizers who consider them devoted Muslims fighting immoral Western occupiers. But intelligence picked up by Predator drones and other battlefield cameras challenges that idea — sometimes rather graphically. One video, captured recently by the thermal-imagery technology housed in a sniper rifle, shows two Talibs in southern Afghanistan engaged in intimate relations with a donkey. Similar videos abound, including ground-surveillance footage that records a Talib fighter gratifying himself with a cow.

May 29, 2010

Random links

Filed under: Randomness — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:19
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