July 4, 2012

Canada’s new Cyclone helicopters — already 4 years late — may not arrive for another 5 years

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Technology — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 10:32

Greg Weston reports for CBC News:

Canada’s long-promised fleet of new Sikorsky naval helicopters, already four years late and $300 million over budget, likely won’t be delivered and ready for combat for up to another five years, informed industry sources tell CBC News.

Last month, Connecticut-based Sikorsky missed its latest contract deadline to finish delivering 28 sleek, state-of-the-art Cyclone maritime helicopters to replace Canada’s aged fleet of increasingly unreliable Sea Kings, now nearing 50 years old.

In fact, delivery of the new choppers hasn’t even started.

[. . .]

As of last month, Sikorsky had only provided a couple of prototypes that have no military mission systems, and aren’t certified to fly over water or at night.

The two helicopters apparently spend most of their time on the tarmac at Shearwater Heliport at CFB Halifax as “training aids” for ground mechanics.

The machines are so incomplete the Canadian government refuses to accept them as an official delivery of anything in the contract.

What is it about helicopters in particular that makes it so difficult and so expensive for the Canadian government to acquire? Here’s the sad chronology:

  • In 1963, the CH-124 Sea King helicopter (a variant of the US Navy S-61 model) entered service with the Royal Canadian Navy.
  • In 1983, the Trudeau government started a process to replace the Sea Kings. That process never got far enough for a replacement helicopter to be ordered.
  • In 1985, the Mulroney government started a new process to find a replacement for the Sea Kings.
  • In 1992, the Mulroney government placed an order for 50 EH-101 Cormorant helicopters (for both naval and search-and-rescue operations).
  • In 1993, the Campbell government reduced the order from 50 to 43, theoretically saving $1.4B.
  • In 1993, the new Chrétien government cancelled the “Cadillac” helicopters as being far too expensive and started a new process to identify the right helicopters to buy. The government had to pay nearly $500 million in cancellation penalties.
  • In 1998, having split the plan into separate orders for naval and SAR helicopters, the government ended up buying 15 Cormorant SAR helicopters anyway — and the per-unit prices had risen in the intervening time.
  • In 2004, the Martin government placed an order with Sikorsky for 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters to be delivered starting in 2008 (after very carefully arranging the specifications to exclude the Cormorant from the competition).
  • Now, in 2012, we may still have another five years to wait for the delivery of the Cyclones.

Update: In the National Post, Kelly McParland tries to draw some useful conclusions from the longest-running Canadian comedy act:

If there is a solution to this farce it’s not easily identified. Canada desperately needs the helicopters and it is far too late to return once again to the drawing board. The blame is so widespread that politicians barely bother to bestir themselves to try: if Jean Chretien’s government hadn’t maliciously cancelled Brian Mulroney’s original 1992 purchase, a full decade might have been cut from the script, but there is no guarantee other mishaps wouldn’t have occurred. Ottawa’s only option now is to hound Connecticut-based Sikorsky relentlessly and mercilessly, recover every cent possible for its repeated failure to live up to its promises, and accept nothing less than full compliance with its contracted responsibilities.

The greater lesson lies in the nether world that surrounds military procurement. It’s a world where no promise can be accepted as reliable, no cost guarantee assumed to be binding, no contract treated as worth the paper it’s written on. The federal Conservatives should think long and hard on the Sea King saga as they push ever deeper into their own purchase of new fighter jets, whether the F-35 or otherwise. Prime Minister Stephen Harper would be well-advised to abandon his usual aggressive approach and tread warily. The uncertain costs, the shifting due dates, the obdurate insistence of the military mandarins on having their way, the determined stonewalling of the politicians : it has all the identifying markings of a Sea King re-make.

Update the second: On Facebook, Damian Brooks suggests that Kelly McParland is only able to see the humour because he hasn’t been close enough to the situation: “I’d be curious to know if McParland’s ever flown in one of our Sea Kings, with tranny fluid dripping down the fuselage, practicing autorotations ad nauseum (literally). I suspect not. If he had, I have a feeling he’d find the situation much more disgraceful and much less funny.” He also posted a link to this:


  1. Regarding the blame game, Mr. McParland is glossing over something important in the service of faux nonpartinsanship. While the CH-149s have not been without their own problems, if Chretien had bought the EH101s as originally planned, by 2012 we’d have most (possibly all) of a fleet of brand-new helicopters. Which would have better mission-capable rates than the Sea Kings. And a single (and therefore cheaper) training and logistics chain.

    By splitting the buy they eliminated any long-term savings, because we now have to train pilots and techs on multiple naval helo airframes, plus maintain parts, spares and support contracts for same. And it was done not for any compelling operational reason, but simply to avoid looking foolish to the electorate.

    Now the Tories have been no angels on this file since they took office, but to pretend that we didn’t get hornswaggled in ’93 is make-believe.

    Comment by Chris Taylor — July 4, 2012 @ 15:53

  2. Oh, and regarding the S-92/CH-148 Cyclone, and its ballooning costs… We are basically the launch customer—a position DND hasn’t been in since the Halifax-class frigates were built. Ask yourself how many people at NDHQ might have experience managing a first-of-class capital building program (and haven’t been superannuated out), add the fact that most politicians (and certainly the general public) have no concept of how many aircraft programs have serious issues in the early going (hint: ALL of them), add in the fact that the vendor isn’t local, and our buy is small potatoes to them (i.e. we have little leverage), then multiply by serious and genuine deficiencies that the program *does* have.

    If it were up to me, I would nix the 148 and buy more 149s. A flawed aircraft that we have the braintrust to fly and fix is better than a flawed aircraft that is still mostly an unknown quantity.

    Comment by Chris Taylor — July 4, 2012 @ 16:21

  3. […] What’s Canada (still not) Buying (yet)?  On that pesky CH-148 Cyclone deal – more on the delays here, how the company is facing some hefty fines here, Mark Collins’ take here, and another blogger’s chronology of the whole mess here. […]

    Pingback by MILNEWS.ca News Highlights – 5 July 12 « MILNEWS.ca Blog — July 5, 2012 @ 06:47

RSS feed for comments on this post.

Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.

Powered by WordPress